60 Cal.2d 666, 7451, In re Zerbe
|Citation:||60 Cal.2d 666, 36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182|
|Opinion Judge:|| Gibson|
|Party Name:||In re Zerbe|
|Attorney:|| Neyhart & Grodin and Duane B. Beeson for Petitioner.  Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.|
|Case Date:||January 14, 1964|
|Court:||Supreme Court of California|
Neyhart & Grodin and Duane B. Beeson, San Francisco, for petitioner.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.
GIBSON, Chief Justice.
Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court for the San Leandro-Hayward Judicial District of wilful trespass in violation of subdivision (l) of section 602 of the Penal Code. 1 The judgment of conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Alameda County, which certified that a transfer of the case to the District Court of Appeal appeared necessary to settle important questions of law. The District Court of Appeal denied the transfer, and petitioner, who is presently on bail, commenced this habeas corpus proceeding.
The Shipwrights, Joiners, Boatbuilders and Caulkers, Local 1149, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, which had been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the collective bargaining agent for the employees of Chris Craft Corporation at its Hayward plant, instituted a strike after negotiations for a contract proved unsuccessful. The Southern Pacific Company served the plant by means of a spur track, and, in connection with picketing commenced by the union, petitioner, an official of the union, entered Southern Pacific's right-of-way and stationed himself at or near the junction of the spur track and the main line. Petitioner was arrested by an agent of Southern Pacific after he refused to leave the property.
Habeas corpus is available in cases where the court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction. (Pen.Code, § 1487, subd. 1; Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 16, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607.) For purposes of this writ as well as prohibition or certiorari, the term 'jurisdiction' is not limited to its fundamental meaning, and in such proceedings judicial acts may be restrained or annulled if
determined to be in excess of the court's powers as defined by constitutional provision, statute, or rules developed by courts. (Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 16, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 (habeas corpus); Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 450, 454-455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 (certiorari); Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d...
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