Dodge Mfg. Co. v. Patten, 4702.

• Decision Date: 06 October 1932
• Docket Number: No. 4702.,4702.
• Citation: 60 F.2d 676
• Parties: DODGE MFG. CO. et al. v. PATTEN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

60 F.2d 676 (1932)

DODGE MFG. CO. et al. v. PATTEN.

No. 4702.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

June 22, 1932.

Rehearing Denied October 6, 1932.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

A. Trevor Jones, of Chicago, Ill. (Hopkins, Sutter, Halls & De Wolfe, of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellants.

Wm. J. Peck, of Peoria, Ill., for appellee.

Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.

SPARKS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

We are first confronted with the contention on the part of Dodge Manufacturing Corporation that venue was not laid for the jurisdiction of the court over that corporation, because neither it nor appellee is or was a resident of the judicial district of the trial court, as required by the Judicial Code, § 51 (U. S. C., tit. 28, § 112 28 USCA § 112), which, in so far as it relates to the instant case, is as follows: "* * * Where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant."

In United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 49 F. 297, 302, it was held by Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Circuit Court in the Northern District of California, that a corporation, for the purposes of jurisdiction in personam, may have additional habitations in states other than the one in which it was incorporated. In referring to the cases which hold that for the purposes of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States a corporation is to be deemed a citizen of the state creating it, Justice Harlan said: "Those cases undoubtedly hold that a corporation cannot throw off its allegiance or responsibility to the state which gave it existence, and that its primary, legal domicile or habitation — that is, its citizenship — is in such state; consequently, for the purposes of suing and being sued in the courts of the United States, it is to be deemed a citizen of the state by whose laws it was made an artificial person. But neither those cases, nor any case in the supreme court of the United States, directly decides that a corporation may not, in addition to its primary, legal habitation or home in the state of its creation, acquire a habitation in, or become an inhabitant of, another state, for purposes of business, and of jurisdiction in personam."

He then refers to certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure of California relating to corporations of other states transacting business in that state, and says:

"It is thus seen that corporations of other states do business here under the license of this state, subject to the implied condition that they may be brought, by service of process upon their agents, before the courts of this jurisdiction; * * *

"If it be said that inhabitancy in a state, in its strict legal sense, implies a permanent, fixed residence in that state, the answer is that a corporation of one state, operating, by agents, a railroad or telegraph line in another state, with its consent, or under its license, may be regarded as permanently identified with the business and people of the latter state, and, for the purposes of its business there, to have a fixed residence within its limits; * * * It does there just what it would do if it had received its charter from that state. It seems to the court that a corporation of a state, * * * holding such close relations with the business and people of another state, may, within a reasonable interpretation of the act of 1887, be deemed an `inhabitant' of the latter state for all purposes of jurisdiction in personam by the courts held there; although a corporation is, and, while its corporate existence lasts, must remain, a `citizen' only of the state which gave it life."

We are impressed with the reasoning of that opinion, and are convinced that it is not inconsistent with the later rulings of the Supreme Court. We regard it as especially applicable to the instant case because the facts in this case relative to residence in Indiana are quite as strong as in the California case, and the pertinent statutes of Indiana relative to corporations of other states transacting business in Indiana are substantially the same as those of California. See Burns' Indiana Statutes 1926, §§ 4913, 4918, 4923. We think the court had jurisdiction of appellant Dodge Manufacturing Corporation.

The remaining question to be considered arises over the construction of the contract referred to as Exhibit A. It is upon that contract alone that the suit is based. The contract referred to as Exhibit B was entered into about five months later, and...