Sturgess v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co

• Decision Date: 27 August 1907
• Citation: 60 S.E. 1135
• Parties: STURGESS . v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

60 S.E. 1135

STURGESS .

v.ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina,

Common Pleas Circuit Court of Charleston County.

August 27, 1907.

For opinion on appeal, see 00 S. E. 939; on rehearing, 61 S. E. 261.

PURDY, Circuit Judge. On the 1st day of March, 1906, the plaintiff instituted this action to recover of the defendant the sum of $421.50, alleged to be due him by the Relief Department maintained by the defendant and its employes, on account of injuries received by him while in the service of the defendant and a member of such department. In lieu of raising the issues by way of answer, before the time for answering expired, plaintiff and defendant, by their respective counsel, entered into a stipulation whereby they agreed to submit certain issues to the court, each party to have the right to introduce such evidence as might be necessary to the hearing. This stipulation was as follows: "It is hereby stipulated between counsel that this cause shall be transferred from the county of Sumter to the county of Charleston for trial, and for the purposes of this motion it is hereby deemed pending in the county of Charleston, and shall be heard before Judge R. O. Purdy at his chambers. The plaintiff, J. R. Sturgess, was injured in November, 1904, while in the employment of the defendant company as a carpenter, and he brought an action for the injuries sustained, alleging that the same were caused by and through the negligence of the defendant company. As a result of said action the plaintiff succeeded in recovering from the defendant the sum of $2,700 for the alleged injuries sustained, and the same was paid to the plaintiff by the defendant, and a full and complete release and discharge was taken for all claims or demands against the said defendant for said injuries. The plaintiff, at the time he received said injuries, was a member of what is known as the Hospital and Relief Fund of the defendant company, all of which will more fully and at large appear by the Hospital and Relief Fund contract, which is appended to this agreement and made a part thereof. The said contract provides in case of injury that the plaintiff was to receive $1 a day for 52 consecutive weeks, and thereafter one-half of this amount so long as his disability continues. The plaintiff is unable to pursue the business in which he was engaged when he was injured, but is not disabled from doing work of a lighter character. It is hereby stipulated that two questions shall be submitted to the court for determination: (1) Whether the act of the General Assembly of this state allowing a party, a member of the Hospital and Relief Fund, to recover benefits from the said Hospital and Relief Fun J, not-withstanding his compensation for damages, is constitutional and valid? (2) Whether the disability mentioned in the contract known as the Hospital and Relief Fund has reference to the work at which the plaintiff was engaged at the time he was injured, or does it apply to any class of labor he is now able to perform?"

In view of the nature of the issues presented, a brief statement of the character and workings of the Relief Department will be necessary. I find from the evidence submitted that the defendant company operates, in conjunction with its employes, what is commonly known as a Relief and Hospital Department, or association. Employes entering the service of the company become members of this association and make monthly contributions to its relief fund; the amount of the contribution varying according to the class of membership, which is graded by the rate of salary an employe; draws. The railroad company acts as treasurer of this fund, paying interest thereon, and, in addition, assumes the entire management of the department, paying all its expenses, and guarantees to make good all its obligations, which at this time are shown to be many times larger than the relief fund actually on hand in the department. From the relief fund so maintained by the defendant company and its employes death benefits are paid to the members, whether death results to a member from accident, sickness, or other cause, and whether an accident causing death is due to the negligence of the company, the negligence of the member, or otherwise. In addition to this, members, in case of sickness from any cause, receive free medical and surgical treatment in the hospitals maintained by the department, and sick dependent members of the family of a member are accepted for treatment in such hospitals at special rates. In the contract of membership in the Relief Department and in rule 05 of the regulations it is stipulated that after injury a member, may either accept benefits or bring his action at law for damages, but if he elects to accept benefits such acceptance shall operate as an accord and satisfaction of all claims he may have against the company growing out of the accident, and if he elects to sue for damages he shall thereby forfeit all right to receive benefits.

From the stipulation heretofore set out it appears that plaintiff has already recovered a judgment against defendant on account of this very injury, and is now seeking to recover the benefits from the Relief Department in addition thereto. If the contract with the Relief Department is valid, then the judgment in favor of plaintiff is a bar to this action. But against this plaintiff offers the act of the General Assembly of South Carolina in effect making a contract of the kind in question null and void. In reply to this, defendant contends that said act of the General Assembly is in contravention of article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States and of section 5 of article 1 of the Constitution of the state of South Carolina, in that it is an illegal interference with the liberty of contract, and is therefore void.

1. This brings us to the first and main issue in the case, namely: Is the act of the General Assembly of South Carolina, allowing a member of the Relief Department to recover benefits in addition to compensation in damages, constitutional? The statute whose validity is here drawn in question was enacted on March 7, 1905 (24 St. at Large, p. 962), and is as follows:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of South Carolina, that when any corporation, firm or individual runs or operates what is usually called a relief department for its employes, the members of which are required or permitted to pay dues, fees, money or other compensation, by whatever name called, to be entitled to the benefit thereof upon the death or injury of the employe, a member of such relief department, such corporation, firm or individual, so running or operating the same, be, and is hereby, required to pay to the person entitled to the same the amount it was agreed the employe, his heirs or other beneficiary under such contract should receive from such relief department; the acceptance of which amount shall not operate to estop or in any way bar the right of such employe or his personal representative from recovering damages of such corporation, firm or individual for personal injury or death caused by the negligence of such corporation, firm or individual, their servants or agents, as are now provided by law; and any contract or agreement to the contrary, or any receipt or release given in consideration of the payment of such sum is and shall be null and void.

"Sec. 2. That all acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed."

A similar statute applying exclusively to relief departments operated by railroads had been enacted at the session of 1903 (24 St. at Large, p. 79), but this, I hold, was repealed by the later act of 1905. My reasons for so holding are two-fold: First, the act of 1903 was intended "to regulate and fix the liability of railroad companies having a relief department, " while the purpose of the act of 1905 was "to fix and declare the liabilities of any corporation, firm or individual operating a relief department." The word "corporation, " found in the act of 1905, is a generic term, embracing every species of corporation, including railroads. The subject-matter and rules prescribed by the two acts are identical. Therefore, under the principle that the later of two statutes on a given subject fully embracing the whole subject-matter repeals the first, the act of 1903 was repealed by the act of 1905. Johnson v. Railway Co., 69 S. C. 326, 48 S. E. 260. and cases cited. Second, the act of 1903, applying as it did exclusively to railroads, was open to the objection of being class legislation, and this objection the Legislature evidently recognized and intended to remove by enacting a second statute on the same subject, applying alike to corporations, firms, and individuals. The act of 1905, therefore, only need be considered in this case.

The provision of the contract with the Relief Department, at which this statute is aimed, is that already referred to wherein the member agrees that in case of injury he may elect either to sue the company for damages or to accept benefits from the Relief Department; but an election to do either, when fully carried out, shall operate as a forfeiture of all right to the other. The first question, then, is whether, in the absence of this statute, such a provision would be valid. That a common carrier can make no contract exempting itself from liability for the consequences of its own negligence is a principle so well established as to need the citation of no authority to support it; but that principle is wide of the mark here. If the provision of the Relief Department contract in question were to the effect that mere membership in the association and the right to receive benefits should of themselves release the company from liability, then I concede that it would be a contract against liability for future negligence, and consequently void; but such are not its terms. On the contrary, as I view it, it can in no...