Hulsey v. Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 12 July 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 17141,17141 |
Citation | 60 S.E.2d 353,207 Ga. 167 |
Parties | HULSEY v. INTERSTATE LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. While it is the general rule that ambiguities in an insurance contract must be construed most favorably to the insured, this rule has no application when the contract is unambiguous.
2. It is the general rule that, when considered on demurrer, pleadings must be construed most strongly against the pleader, and the absence of averments of essential facts and reliance by the pleader upon allegations short of such facts require a holding that they did not exist.
3. The petition in the present case--seeking recovery under an insurance policy which provided for payment in the event of death by accident while the insured was traveling on a passenger steamship as a fare-paying passenger or on a lawful pass, and alleging merely that the accident resulting in death occurred while the insured was lawfully riding on a motor launch as a passenger from shore to the U. S. S. Kearsage--failed to allege a cause of action; and the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the judgment of the trial court, which overruled a general demurrer to the petition.
George P. Hulsey filed suit in the City Court of Hall County against Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Company, alleging himself to be the nominated beneficiary of an insurance policy issued by the defendant. The petition alleged that the petitioner was the named beneficiary in a policy issued by the defendant to Homer Lee Norris, now deceased, which policy was attached to the petition and made a part thereof, and contained the following clause: '* * * if the insured shall by the collision of or by any accident to any railroad passenger car, passenger steamship, public omnibus, street railway car, taxicab or automobile, stage or bus, which is being driven or operated at the time by a person regularly employed for that purpose, and in which such insured is traveling as a fare-paying passenger or on which he is lawfully riding on a pass; * * * the company will pay * * * to the beneficiary named herein * * * For Loss of: Life * * * Two Thousand Dollars.' It was alleged: that the insured was, on May 31, 1948, killed by the capsizing of a motor launch at Hampton Roads, Virginia, his death resulting solely through external, violent, and accidental means; that said motor launch was transporting the insured from the shore to the U. S. S. Kearsage, was a passenger steamship, and the insured was lawfully riding thereon; that the insurance policy was in full force and effect at the time death occurred; that the motor launch was a boat provided by the U. S. Navy and used primarily to transport as passengers members of the ship's company of the U. S. S. Kearsage from ship to shore and from point to point within the naval sea area, and it was, at the time of the accident, being operated by personnel regularly employed for that purpose; that after the accident visible and external evidence thereof was afforded by reason of the motor launch being flooded, overflowed, and filled with water; that the petitioner has, as required by the policy, duly filed with the defendant notice and proof of death of the said Norris, and the defendant has denied liability upon the ground that Norris was not on a passenger steamship nor any other conveyance set out in the contract at the time of death. The prayer was for a judgment of $2000, as provided in the policy, with interest thereon.
The trial court overruled the defendant's general demurrer to the petition and, on review, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of that court. The application of the petitioner to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was granted, and we now have for review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
E. C. Brannon, Smith & Stephens, all of Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.
O. J. Tolnas, Preston M. Almand, both of Athens, for defendant in error.
The clause of the policy under which liability is claimed expressly requires that the boat upon which the insured was traveling must have been a passenger steamship, and that the insured must have been traveling thereon either as a farepaying passenger or a passenger riding on a pass. Since this is a case involvng insurance policies, we must and do give full consideration to the rule of law that requires that all...
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