Swinford v. Teegarden

Decision Date12 February 1901
PartiesSWINFORD v. TEEGARDEN et al., Appellants
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Grundy Circuit Court. -- Hon. P. C. Stepp, Judge.

Affirmed.

Harber & Knight for appellants.

(1) All the evidence shows, that on part of plaintiff, and of defendants as well, that Mrs. Teegarden, nee Benedict, was largely indebted to her son, Austin, and that the conveyance of August 14, 1889, was made by Mrs. Teegarden to her son, by reason of such indebtedness. Hence the allegation that said conveyance was voluntary, or without consideration, is without the slightest proof to sustain it. (2) Mrs Teegarden, being indebted to her son Austin, had a perfect right to convey him property in payment of, or to be applied on her debt to him. And this is true, though such conveyance necessarily operated to delay Swinford, or any creditor she might have in the collection of any claim against her. Henderson v. Henderson, 55 Mo. 534; Milling Co v. Burns, 152 Mo. 350; State ex rel. v Purcell, 131 Mo. 312; Coffin Co. v. Rubelman, 15 Mo.App. 280; Ames v. Gilmore, 59 Mo. 537; Schroeder v. Bobbitt, 108 Mo. 289; Larrabee v. Bank, 114 Mo. 592; Ettlinger v. Kahn, 134 Mo. 492; Jaffrey v. Mathews, 120 Mo. 317; Bank v. Worthington, 145 Mo. 91. And we insist that the evidence is wholly lacking to show any fraudulent intent or wrongful act on the part, even, of Mrs. Teegarden, and confidently contend that the evidence shows that at the time she made the conveyance to Austin, she did not know that she had a creditor in the world other than her son. And hence she could not have had any purpose or intent in making said deed, other than to partly pay her son the amount she was justly indebted to him, which she had lost years before in her loans to the Crookshanks. But a fraudulent intent even upon the part of Mrs. Teegarden, would not be sufficient to in anywise affect the deed. Forrester v. Moore, 77 Mo. 657; Alberger v. White, 117 Mo. 347; State to use v. Mason, 112 Mo. 374; Bank v. Worthington, 145 Mo. 91; Milling Co. v. Burns, 152 Mo. 352; National Tube Works Co. v. Machine Co., 118 Mo. 365; Ettlinger v. Kahn, 134 Mo. 492; Van Raalte v. Harrington, 101 Mo. 602; Holloway v. Holloway, 103 Mo. 274; Kerstner v. Vorweg, 130 Mo. 200; Implement Co. v. Ritchie, 143 Mo. 611. (3) Dishonesty, fraud, is never presumed but must be proved, not conjectured; and we confidently insist that when given fair and impartial consideration the testimony, facts and circumstances in proof, shows the bona fide, and absolute good faith of the conveyance from Mrs. Teegarden to her son. Yet, if there were facts in proof which might give rise to the suspicion of the existence of fraud, such facts do not, even if they were uncontradicted, establish it. And when, as in this case, any such claimed circumstances, or facts, are fully overthrown and explained by the most indisputable evidence, no unfavorable inference can be drawn therefrom. Priest v. Way, 87 Mo. 16; Ridge v. Greenwell, 53 Mo.App. 479.

C. J. Bain and Hall & Hall for respondent.

(1) The final receipt and order of the probate court of Ionia county, Michigan, discharging the guardian, constituted a final judgment and was conclusive between the parties thereto and their creditors. They can not impeach or attack it in a collateral proceeding, but are estopped thereby as to their creditors. Cox v. Boyce, 152 Mo. 576; Smith v. Hauger, 150 Mo. 444; Nelson v. Barnett, 123 Mo. 564; State ex rel. Pountain v. Gray, 106 Mo. 533; Patterson v. Booth, 103 Mo. 417; Garton v. Botts, 73 Mo. 276; Miller v. Major, 67 Mo. 247; Dix v. Morris, 66 Mo. 514; Sheetz v. Kirtley, 62 Mo. 417; Lewis v. Williams, 54 Mo. 200; Brent v. Groses, 30 Mo. 253; State to use v. Roland, 23 Mo. 95; Jones v. Brinker, 20 Mo. 87; State ex rel. v. Bilby, 50 Mo.App. 168; Smith v. Denny, 34 Mo. 219; Robert v. Morren, 27 Mich. 306. (2) These deeds were voluntary, without consideration, fraudulent and void as to creditors. R. S. 1889, secs. 3397, 3398; Shanklin v. McCracken, 151 Mo. 597; Frank v. Reuter, 116 Mo. 517; Snyder v. Free, 114 Mo. 360; Patton v. Bragg, 113 Mo. 595. (3) While a debtor may prefer his creditors, if he conveys to a creditor more property than is sufficient to pay or secure his debt, the entire conveyance is fraudulent as to his other creditors, and is void. Imhoff & Co. v. McArthur, 146 Mo. 378; Bolin v. Ross, 120 Mo. 217; Tube Works Co. v. Machine Co., 118 Mo. 375; Alberger v. White, 117 Mo. 370; Segers Sons v. Thomas Bros., 107 Mo. 641; State ex rel. v. Hope, 102 Mo. 429; Sexton v. Anderson, 95 Mo. 379; Lumber Co. v. Mining Co., 78 Mo.App. 681; Ball v. O'Neill, 64 Mo.App. 388; Gregory v. Sitlington, 54 Mo.App. 65; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U.S. 685; Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances (4 Ed.), secs. 34, 485; Clark v. Lee (Mich.), 44 N.W. 260. (4) Fraud need not be proven by direct testimony; it may be inferred from circumstances. The false recital of the consideration in the deeds was a badge of fraud, as also the fact that the mother conveyed to her son all her property, and conveyance to relatives is always looked upon with suspicion, and payment of a valuable consideration must be made out by proof of the most unquestionable character. State to use v. Mason, 112 Mo. 382; Snell v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 188; Benne v. Schnecko, 100 Mo. 256; Hisey v. Goodwin, 90 Mo. 366; Baldwin v. Whitcomb, 71 Mo. 659; Gordon v. Isnay, 55 Mo.App. 323; Guarantee Co. v. Baker, 54 Mo.App. 79; State ex rel. v. Hope, 102 Mo. 429. (5) The defendants and their witnesses having all testified orally, the Supreme Court will defer to the chancellor unless clearly erroneous. Shanklin v. McCracken, 151 Mo. 594; Milling Co. v. Burnes, 144 Mo. 196; Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 667; Benne v. Schnecko, 100 Mo. 257; Mathias v. O'Neill, 94 Mo. 529; Snell v. Harrison, 83 Mo. 658. (6) While the conclusion of facts drawn by the trial court from the evidence in an equity case are not regarded by this court as conclusive, but subject to review; yet much deference is accorded such findings on account of the superior advantages they possess for weighing the evidence and judging of the credibility of the witnesses. Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 657; Mathias v. O'Neill, 94 Mo. 520; Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290; Sharp v. Pike, 62 Mo. 307; Shanklin v. McCracken, 151 Mo. 587; Eskine v. Lowenstine, 82 Mo. 309; Springer v. Kleinsorge, 83 Mo. 159; Berry v. Hartzell, 90 Mo. 138; Bushong v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 660.

OPINION

MARSHALL, J.

This is an action to set aside a deed to certain land in Grundy county, from Sarah Teegarden, formerly Benedict, and her husband, to her son, Austin B. Benedict, dated August 14, 1889, and a deed to the same land from Austin B. Benedict and wife, to Alice J. Dean, niece of Mrs. Teegarden, on the ground that such deeds were made without consideration and for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the plaintiff in the collection of his claim against Mrs. Teegarden. The answers of defendants Teegarden and Benedict allege that the plaintiff's claim and judgment against Mrs. Teegarden are fraudulent and void, and deny generally the allegations of the petition, except as to the relationship of the parties.

The defendants formerly lived in Ionia, Michigan, where the defendant, Alice J. Dean, still resides. The defendant Sarah Teegarden, was the widow, and Austin B. Benedict the son, of Dr. Thomas B. Benedict, who died in 1874. The defendant Alice J. Dean, is the niece of defendant Sarah Teegarden. Dr. Benedict left an estate valued at $ 8,979.22. The defendant Sarah Teegarden was appointed administratrix of his estate in October, 1874, and guardian of Austin B. Benedict. On the eleventh day of October, 1875, the defendant Teegarden as administratrix of the Thomas B. Benedict estate, filed a report or settlement in the probate court of her administration of said estate up to that time. In this report she took credit for $ 2,761.71, on account of disbursements and uncollectible accounts, leaving a balance of $ 6,217.51, including the real estate valued at $ 3,800, and personal property valued at $ 377.

Defendants claim that the personal estate was loaned by the administratrix to the firm of Crookshank Bros., between 1880 and 1884. In 1884 Crookshank Bros. failed and made an assignment, at which time they were largely indebted to the Benedict estate, in payment of which they, or John C. Crookshank, one of the firm, turned over to the administratrix a stock of millinery goods of the value of $ 4,000. She moved this stock of goods to Kansas City, in 1884, at the instance of John C. Crookshank, who went to Kansas City about that time. With the aid of Crookshank she bought and traded and added to this stock. On the 29th day of May, 1885, she traded a part of this stock to S. R. Nelson for the land in controversy, subject to an incumbrance of $ 750. On the 8th day of February, 1887, defendant Austin B. Benedict, became of age. On the 12th day of April, 1887, the defendant Sarah Teegarden made final settlement as guardian of defendant, Austin B. Benedict, and Austin B. executed to her a final release under seal, releasing and discharging her from all liability on account of said guardianship absolutely and forever. On the same day the probate court of Ionia county, Michigan, by an order of record, discharged and released said guardian and her securities from all liability concerning her administration of said estate.

On the 2d day of May, 1887, defendant, Sarah Benedict, was married to James M. Teegarden, who died before the commencement of this suit.

On the 11th day of November, 1886, the defendant Teegarden executed and delivered to the plaintiff a warranty deed to eighty acres of land in Dade county, Missouri, in exchange for a stock of millinery...

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