Roswell Beebe Et Al Appellants v. William Russell

• Citation: 15 L.Ed. 668,19 How. 283,60 U.S. 283
• Parties: ROSWELL BEEBE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WILLIAM RUSSELL
• Decision Date: 01 December 1856
• Court: United States Supreme Court

60 U.S. 283

19 How. 283

15 L.Ed. 668

ROSWELL BEEBE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WILLIAM RUSSELL.

December Term, 1856

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Arkansas, sitting in chancery.

The bill was filed by William Russell against Roswell Beebe, Mary W. W. Ashley, Henry C. Ashley, William E. Ashley, George C. Watkins, and Mary A. Freeman, praying that they might be ordered to convey to the complainant certain pieces of property, which, it was alleged, they fraudulently withheld from him, and account for the rents and profits.

The Circuit Court decreed that the defendants should execute certain conveyances, surrender possession, and then proceeded to refer the matter to a master, with the instructions which are stated in the opinion of the court. The defendants appealed to this court.

It was submitted by Mr. Lawrence for the appellants, and Mr. Pike for the appellee.

Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Arkansas.

We find, from our examination of the record, that the decree from which this appeal has been taken is not final, within the meaning of the acts of Congress of 1789 and 1803. It will therefore be dismissed for a want of jurisdiction. The right of appeal is conferred, defined, and regulated, by the second section of the act of March 2d, 1803, which, however, adopts and applies the regulations prescribed by the 22d, 23d, and 24th sections of the judiciary act of the 24th September, 1789, ch. 20, respecting writs of error. The language of both is, that final judgments and decrees, rendered in any circuit, &c., &c., may be reviewed in the Supreme Court, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum or value of two thousand dollars. It has been the object of this court at all times, though an accidental deviation may be found, to restrict the cases which have been brought to this court, either by appeal or by writ of error, to those in which the rights of the parties have been fully and finally determined by judgments or decrees in the court below, whether they were cases in admiralty, in equity, or common law. In the case of the Palmyra, (10 Wheat., 502,) where, in a libel for a tortious seizure, restitution with costs and damages had been decreed, but the damages had not been assessed, this court held that the decree was not final, and dismissed the appeal. It said, 'the decree of the Circuit Court was not final in the sense of the act of Congress. The damages remain undisposed of, and an appeal may still lie upon that part of the decree awarding damages. The whole cause is not, therefore, finally determined in the Circuit Court, and we are of the opinion that the cause cannot be divided so as to bring up distinct parts of it.' This court also ruled, in Brown v. Swann, (9 Peters, 1,) that a decree enjoining a judgment at law taxing a sum which remained to be ascertained with precision was not final, to permit an appeal from it. We might multiply citations from the reports of this court, to show its caution upon this subject. We feel very confident no case has been decided by it, when the question of the finality of a decree or judgment has been brought to its notice, in which the distinction between final and interlocutory decrees has not been regarded as it was meant to be by the legislation of Congress, and as it was understood by the courts in England and in this country, before Congress acted upon the subject. A decree is understood to be interlocutory whenever an inquiry as to matter of law or fact is directed, preparatory to a final decision. (1 New., 322.) And we find it stated in the second volume of Perkins's Daniel's Chancery Practice, 1193, 'that the most usual ground for not making a perfect decree in the first instance, is the necessity which frequently exists for a reference to a master of the court, to make inquiries, or take accounts, or sell estates, and adjust other matters which are necessary to be disposed of, before a complete decision can be come to upon the subject-matter of the suit.' When a decree finally decides and disposes of the whole merits of the cause, and reserves no further questions or directions for the future judgment of the court, so that it will not be necessary to bring the cause again before the court for its final decision, it is a final decree. It is true, a decree may be final, although it directs a reference to a master, if all the consequential directions depending upon the result of the master's report are contained in the decree, so that no further decree of the court will be necessary, upon the confirmation of the report, to give the parties the entire and full benefit of the previous decision of the court. (Mills v. Hoag, 7 Paige, 18.)

Testing, then, this decree by the citations just given from Daniel's Chancery Practice, from the case of Mills v. Hoag, our inquiry is, whether further action of the court in the nature of a decree would not be necessary to give to the defendant in error the benefit of the 'rents and profits received by the defendants in the court below,...