In re Gates
Citation | 600 F.3d 333 |
Decision Date | 26 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 09-4125.,09-4125. |
Parties | In re Bryan GATES, Jr., Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nicholas Sanchez Hernandez, Defendant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
ARGUED: Bryan Gates, Jr., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Office of The United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, L. Patrick Auld, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of The United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Reversed by published opinion. Chief Judge TRAXLER wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING and Judge GREGORY joined.
Bryan Emery Gates, Jr., appeals his contempt conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) for failing to appear in court on time for a plea hearing. We conclude that the district court erroneously imposed punishment in a summary proceeding without affording Gates notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges against him. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
Gates, an attorney practicing in North Carolina, was appointed by the district court to represent Nicholas Sanchez Hernandez with respect to federal criminal charges in a ten-count indictment filed in the Middle District of North Carolina. On December 2, 2008, Hernandez pled not guilty to all counts. The district court entered a general scheduling order applicable to all cases arraigned in the Middle District of North Carolina during December 2008, requiring that any plea agreements be filed by December 31, 2008, and preliminarily setting all change of plea hearings for January 5, 2009.
Hernandez ultimately pled guilty to five counts in the indictment. The district court scheduled and rescheduled Hernandez's plea hearing three times, relying on the office of the United States Attorney to notify Gates of the date and time. As was apparently common practice, Mr. Owens, a staff employee of the United States Attorney, communicated the hearing schedule by telephone rather than formal, written notice.
On January 5, despite the fact that Hernandez had not yet agreed to the terms of a plea agreement, the government requested that the district court direct him to appear for a change of plea hearing in accordance with the date established by the general scheduling order. Because Hernandez was in state custody at the time, the government moved for, and the district court granted, a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum to secure Hernandez's presence for a change of plea hearing. On January 7, 2009, Hernandez appeared for the hearing, but, having no written plea agreement in place, "elected not to enter a plea of guilty." J.A. 3.
State officials subsequently transferred custody of Hernandez to federal agents. On January 29, 2009, the government moved for an order of detention; by this time, however, Hernandez had decided to change his plea on five of the ten counts and signed a waiver of his right to a detention hearing. Although a plea agreement still had not been filed, the district court proceeded to schedule a change of plea hearing for Monday, February 2, 2009, which was also the trial date.
On Thursday, January 29, however, the district court decided to reschedule Hernandez's plea hearing for the morning of Friday, January 30—the next day. When the court called Hernandez's case at 10:50 a.m. Friday morning, shortly after the government filed the signed plea agreement, neither Gates nor Hernandez was present. The district judge inquired whether the government notified Gates of the last-minute scheduling change:
Gates arrived in court fifteen minutes later and attempted to explain his tardiness to the district court:
J.A. 7-10 (emphasis added). Having concluded Gates's conduct was contemptuous, the district court imposed a $200 fine against Gates.
On appeal, Gates argues that because his alleged contempt was committed, if at all, outside of the district court's presence, the court was precluded from summarily imposing contempt sanctions. Instead, Gates claims he was entitled, at a minimum, to reasonable notice and a chance to prepare a defense against allegations that his failure to be on time for Hernandez's hearing, as well as his failure to appear on other unspecified occasions, constituted criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). Moreover, Gates argues that because the record contains no evidence of the kind of intentional conduct required for a criminal contempt conviction under § 401(3), there is no reason for us to remand for a plenary contempt hearing. We conclude that on both points Gates is correct.
Gates did not object to the summary procedure employed by the district court in its consideration of criminal contempt sanctions against him, nor did he specifically challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy the elements of a criminal contempt offense. Thus, the plain error standard of review applies. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b) (). We recognize, however, that until the very moment the district court imposed a fine against Gates, it was not at all clear that the district court was contemplating criminal contempt sanctions. The district court simply asked Gates to explain why he failed to make a timely appearance for Hernandez's plea hearing. The court did not indicate that contempt sanctions were a possibility, and we see nothing in the record suggesting that Gates should have understood that the court was weighing the possibility of a contempt citation. Under the circumstances, Gates's failure to raise a timely objection to the court's summary contempt proceeding is understandable.
Nonetheless, as reasonable as Gates's response may have been, the issues before us on appeal were not raised or tested below, and therefore we are constrained to apply the plain error standard of review. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see also United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir.1996) ( ); United States v. Hawkins, 76 F.3d 545, 552 (4th Cir.1996) (per curiam) ( ). Accordingly, we must determine whether (1) the district court committed an error, (2) whether the error committed is plain, and (3) whether the district court's error "affects substantial rights." Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Even if these prerequisites are satisfied, however, "Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Under Seal United States v. Lavabit, LLC.
...an orderly progression.”). Forfeiture and waiver principles apply with equal force to contempt proceedings. See, e.g., In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir.2010) (applying plain-error standard to unpreserved claim of error in criminal contempt proceedings); United States v. Neal, 101 F.3......
-
United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P.
...we affirmed the with-prejudice dismissal on alternate grounds, concluding that the Release barred Radcliffe's FCA claims. See Radcliffe, 600 F.3d at 333. After we issued our opinion in Radcliffe, Steven May and Angela Radcliffe (the “Relators”) commenced this FCA action against Purdue (“ Qu......
- United States ex rel. McNulty v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc.
-
United States v. Peoples
...Peoples failed to object to the imposition of summary contempt before the district court, we review for plain error. See In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir.2010). Generally, a person who commits criminal contempt may be punished for his contemptuous conduct only “after prosecution on n......
-
Trials
...may not be imposed without affording defendant right to jury trial); U.S. v. Harris, 582 F.3d 512, 515 (3d Cir. 2009) (same); In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2010) (criminal contempt may not be imposed without “fundamental procedural safeguards”); In re Bradley, 588 F.3d 254, 263-6......