600 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1979), 79-1079, J. B. K., Inc. v. Caron
|Citation:||600 F.2d 710|
|Party Name:||J.B.K., INC., etc., et al., Appellants, v. Norman CARON, et al., Appellees.|
|Case Date:||June 14, 1979|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit|
Submitted April 24, 1979.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 23, 1979.
James R. Wyrsch, Kansas City, Mo., for appellants.
Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, Mo., for appellees Ashcroft and Lubker; John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., on the brief.
Russell D. Jacobson and Stephen F. Volek, Associate Jackson County Counselors, and Robert Frager, Asst. Jackson County Prosecutor, on brief for appellees Martin and Rennau.
Allen R. Purvis, Kansas City, Mo., filed brief for appellee John Campbell.
Before LAY, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
ROSS, Circuit Judge.
Appellants, massage parlor operators in Missouri, sought a preliminary injunction to prevent state and local law enforcement personnel from enforcing Chapter 567, Revised Statutes of Missouri, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 567.010-567.100, which became effective January 1, 1979. Chapter 567 prohibits prostitution, which Mo.Rev.Stat. § 567.010(2) defines as follows:
"Prostitution", a person commits "prostitution" if he engages or offers or agrees to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for something of value to be received by the person or by a third person.
Terms such as "sexual conduct" and "something of value" are subsequently defined.
Appellants' business activities include genital massage for payment which would come within the statutory definition of prostitution. See Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 567.010(2) and (4)(c). They contend that the prohibition of this activity violates their rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, privacy, due process, equal protection, freedom of contract and employment.
They also allege a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e Et seq.
The district court 1 denied the requested preliminary injunction primarily because he considered that appellants had not established a probability of success on the merits of any of these claims. We hold that the denial of the preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion, and we affirm on the basis of the district court's comprehensive opinion. In addition, we make the following observations.
Appellants' right to privacy claim rests on their mistaken premise that the constitutionally protected right to privacy encompasses All sexual acts performed by consenting adults in nonpublic places. We do not agree that the right to privacy extends to all sexual practices performed in private including the commercialized sexual activities regulated in this case. See Paris Adult Theatre I v...
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