Silver v. Mohasco Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 July 1979
• Docket Number: D,No. 1112,1112
• Citation: 602 F.2d 1083
• Parties: 20 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 464, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,137 Ralph H. SILVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOHASCO CORPORATION, Edward Curren, Raymond Greenhill, Frederick Woller, Herbert Brown and James Cullen, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 78-7595.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 1083

602 F.2d 1083

20 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 464,

20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,137

Ralph H. SILVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOHASCO CORPORATION, Edward Curren, Raymond Greenhill, Frederick Woller, Herbert Brown and James Cullen,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1112, Docket 78-7595.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued June 7, 1979.

Decided July 18, 1979.

Jonathan I. Blackman, New York City, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas Mead Santoro, Albany, N. Y. (Bouck Holloway & Kiernan, Francis J. Holloway, Albany, N. Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Raj K. Gupta, Washington, D. C., for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae.

Before KAUFMAN, Chief Judge, and OAKES and MESKILL, Circuit Judges.

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Chief Judge:

In this case, in which we are called upon to interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Learned Hand's admonition is particularly appropriate:

There is no surer guide in the interpretation of a statute than its purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark of over solicitude for the letter than to wince at carrying out that purpose because the words used do not formally quite match with it. ¹

We believe that the district court failed to attach sufficient weight to the overriding purpose of the Act.

I

Title VII is a statute "rife with procedural requirements which are sufficiently labyrinthine to baffle the most experienced lawyer," Egelston v. State University College at Geneseo, 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), not to mention a layman such as the appellant Ralph H. Silver. On August 29, 1975, Silver was discharged from his position as a senior marketing economist with appellee Mohasco Corporation. During his thirteen-month tenure, Silver, who is of the Jewish faith, came to believe he was the target of harassment by Mohasco executives because of his religious beliefs. ² Silver alleged Mohasco wished to induce him to resign, and that he was discharged when he refused to do so.

Sometime after his discharge, Silver concluded that Mohasco's treatment of him was part of a carefully conceived plan under which Jews and other minorities were hired, harassed, and fired in a systematic fashion. This scheme, Silver believed, was designed to erect a facade of equal employment opportunity at Mohasco.

Thus, on June 15, 1976, some 291 days after his discharge, Silver wrote to the Buffalo office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In his letter, Silver alleged that he had been hired and subsequently discharged because of his religion, and detailed the substance of his charge against Mohasco. Silver concluded by characterizing it as a "rough, incomplete and hastily drafted complaint."

Upon receiving Silver's communication, the EEOC set into motion the complex procedural machine established by Title VII. The Commission immediately forwarded the letter to the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYSDHR). Under § 706(c) of the statute, that agency must be given sixty days to process a charge before the EEOC may act. ³ Accordingly, the EEOC advised NYSDHR that it would automatically file the charge at the expiration of the deferral period. The EEOC formally processed Silver's charge on August 20, 1976. ⁴

On August 12, Silver complied with an NYSDHR request that he file a formal complaint. ⁵ Nineteen days later, Silver wrote to both NYSDHR and the EEOC, detailing his suspicions that Mohasco had been "blacklisting" him by supplying unfavorable references to prospective employers. On February 9, 1977, NYSDHR, without discussing the allegations of blacklisting, announced its conclusion that there was not probable cause to believe Silver had been discharged because of his religion.

At this point the proceedings shifted back to the EEOC. That agency, which had deferred any investigation of Silver's claim until NYSDHR issued its findings, adopted them as its own on August 24, 1977. Finally, in compliance with another procedural mandate of Title VII, the EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter to Silver, enabling him to pursue his charges in federal district court. ⁶ This he did promptly by filing his complaint on November 23, 1977. Mohasco responded by moving for summary judgment, which Judge Foley granted. ⁷

Silver, the judge held, had failed to file his charge with the EEOC within 300 days of his discharge, as required by § 706(e) of Title VII. ⁸ Moreover, Judge Foley concluded that he could not consider Silver's allegations of blacklisting because they had not been investigated by either the EEOC or NYSDHR. We are of the view that both rulings were erroneous.

II

The resolution of this appeal hinges on determination of the date when a charge is considered "filed" with the EEOC. This superficially simple issue is complicated by the plethora of overlapping procedural requirements that pervade Title VII. Nonetheless, we believe that much of this complexity is overcome by fidelity to the fundamental policies embodied in Title VII. Indeed, our approach accords with the relevant case law, the legislative history, and the considered judgment of the EEOC.

A.

The crucial importance of "filing" under Title VII stems from the mandate of § 706(e) that, when a state has created an agency to hear employment discrimination claims, a charge must be "filed" with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. ⁹ See International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 240, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976). Unfortunately, this requirement becomes less than clear when considered together with § 706(c), which states that "no charge may be filed" with the EEOC, until sixty days after state agency proceedings have commenced.

Confronted with these two provisions, the able district court judge read § 706(c) literally. He reasoned that even when a charge is received by the EEOC well within 300 days of the alleged discrimination, it cannot be considered "filed" with that office until sixty days after referral to the state agency. Thus, according to Judge Foley, Silver's charge, albeit received by the EEOC 291 days after his discharge, was not "filed" before August 14, 1976, 352 days subsequent to the termination of his employment. ¹⁰ Accordingly, Judge Foley determined that Silver was barred by the 300-day jurisdictional prerequisite of § 706(e).

The district court decision would, therefore, require a Title VII complainant to file his charge with the state agency within 240 days of discharge or forfeit the opportunity to bring his complaint before the EEOC. We are of the view, however, that an informed reading of Title VII, consistent with its purpose, requires us to conclude that a charge is "filed" for purposes of § 706(e) when received, and "filed" as required by § 706(c) when the state deferral period ends.

B.

In interpreting the filing provisions of Title VII, our lodestar must be the statute's fundamental purpose. In view of the strong federal policy in ensuring that employment discrimination is redressed, this court has consistently eschewed rigid construction of Title VII's procedural mandates. See Egelston, supra, 535 F.2d at 753-55; Accord, Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 1975); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1971), Cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 1768, 32 L.Ed.2d 117 (1972). Accordingly, we have resisted any temptation to require technical precision of Title VII plaintiffs, who often proceed without counsel. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, --- U.S. ----, ----, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (stressing the remedial purposes of employment discrimination statutes). ¹¹

Thus, it is the Supreme Court's decision in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972), that best illuminates the path we travel in arriving at our decision in this case. In Love, the Supreme Court liberally construed the filing provision of § 706(c) and decided that a charge submitted initially in error to the EEOC may be kept in "suspended animation" by the Commission and automatically referred to the appropriate state agency. 404 U.S. at 526, 92 S.Ct. 616. After the sixty-day deferral period ended, the Court concluded, the EEOC may begin its own investigation. Id. Thus, the Court spared the unwary litigant of the obligation of "filing" a second EEOC charge sixty days after the first one was sent to the state agency, the proper recipient.

In our view, the clear import of Love is that a charge held, like Silver's, in "suspended animation," is "filed" under § 706(e) when the EEOC First receives it, and not when the sixty-day period ends. ¹² As the Love Court noted, to construe the statute to require a second "filing" after the state proceedings had concluded would create an additional procedural obstacle without advancing the purposes of the statute. 404 U.S. at 526-27, 92 S.Ct. 616. ¹³ We therefore hold that Silver's charge was "filed" under § 706(e) on June 15, 1976, 291 days after he was discharged and well within the 300-day limit. ¹⁴ In sum, we believe the requirement in § 706(c) that no charge be "filed" before the deferral period ends simply means that the EEOC may not process a Title VII complaint until sixty days after it has been referred to a state agency.

This interpretation not only serves the concern of Title VII for individual rights, but also comports with the overarching procedural scheme embodied in the statute. There is little doubt that § 706(c) is designed solely to provide state agencies with an opportunity, before the federal agency intervenes, to resolve disputes between employer and employee. Oscar Mayer & Co., supra, --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. 2066; Accord, Love, supra, 404 U.S. at 526, 92 S.Ct. 616; Voutsis, supra, 452 F.2d at 892. Viewed in this light, it is clear that, because the charge is referred to the local...