Nicewonder v. Nicewonder, 90-957

• Decision Date: 28 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-957,90-957
• Citation: 602 So.2d 1354
• Parties: Calvin NICEWONDER, Appellant, v. Arstine NICEWONDER, Appellee. 602 So.2d 1354, 17 Fla. L. Week. D1781
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1354

602 So.2d 1354

Calvin NICEWONDER, Appellant, v. Arstine NICEWONDER, Appellee.

No. 90-957.

602 So.2d 1354, 17 Fla. L. Week. D1781

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

July 28, 1992.

Kristin Adamson and Jerome M. Novey of Novey & Mendelson, Tallahassee, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Robert B. Staats of Staats, Overstreet, White & Clark, Panama City, for appellee/cross-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

We review by appeal and cross-appeal a final judgment of dissolution awarding equitable distribution of marital assets. The appealing former husband urges a number of points for reversal and the cross-appealing former wife "challenges the court's valuation of the parties interest in LABRISA." We reverse and remand for further proceedings, concluding that the trial court failed to follow certain requirements and decisions of this court, and failed to set forth sufficient findings of fact on significant disputed factual issues to afford the parties adequate appellate review. Because the judgment must be reversed for the errors discussed below, we find it unnecessary to discuss any other points raised by Appellant's appeal and by Appellee's cross-appeal.

The principal areas of dispute between the parties involved the appropriate valuations to be given to the various marital properties. The trial court's final judgment under review set forth the following findings of fact:

THIS CAUSE came on this day to be heard upon the Wife's Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, and the Husband's Answer and Counter-Petition, and the Court having taken testimony in this cause and having found:

1. That the marriage of the parties is irretrievably broken.

2. That a proper date for valuation of the marital assets would be December 31, 1988.

3. That the Wife is entitled to permanent, periodic alimony.

4. That all of the assets owned by the parties were accumulated by them during their marriage and are considered marital assets to be equitably distributed.

5. That the Husband, CALVIN NICEWONDER, should be awarded as his sole and exclusive property the parties' interest in La Brisa Motor Inns, Inc., and Bay Front Development, Inc. and the IRA account titled in his name.

6. That the Wife, ARSTINE NICEWONDER, should receive all of the other marital assets in existence as of December 31, 1988. This division of assets would result in a distribution of approximately 60% of the marital assets to the Husband and 40% to the Wife. The Court finds that this is an additional factor in determining the Wife's entitlement to permanent, periodic alimony.

7. That each party should pay their own Court costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with these proceedings.

Based on these findings, the court ordered the following equitable distribution of the various marital properties. To the appellant husband, the court awarded "the parties' interest in the stock of La Brisa Motor Inns, Inc., the parties' interest in the stock of Bay Front Development Company, Inc., and that IRA account registered in his name." To the appellee wife, the court awarded the marital residence, the parties' interest in the Parker Village Apartments together with the office building and adjacent land where Nicewonder Realty is located, the parties' interest in Twin Oaks Apartments, the parties' interest in a mobile home and certain lots, the Horizon South Condominium, a rental house on East Fourth Street, two lots on Cherry Street, the wife's IRA account, stock in Nicewonder Realty, the Thomas mortgage receivable, the $1,000 church bond, the $300 U.S. government bond, all household furnishings and effects in the marital residence and in the Horizon South Condominium, the 1984 Pontiac automobile, all life insurance policies outstanding as of December 31, 1988, insuring the husband's life, including the cash surrender value thereof, and the balance in the parties' checking and savings accounts in Security Federal and First Federal, totaling $94,500.

We reverse these distributions of marital assets and remand for further findings of fact on valuation and reconsideration of the plan of equitable distribution for the following reasons.

First, the appealed order fails to contain findings of fact on the disputed valuation issues that are sufficient to allow this court to afford meaningful and reliable appellate review. The final judgment leaves unclear what valuations were used in arriving at the ordered equitable distribution, although such valuations constitute the principal source of dispute between the parties in this litigation. We are unable to determine from the record what valuations were attributed to the properties by the trial court. ¹ If the parties are to be accorded full and fair appellate review of the findings of fact and rulings made by the court below, that can be done only if the appealed order sets forth adequate findings of fact as to valuation assigned to the various properties by the court. For example, in Prom v. Prom, 589 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), this court held, consistent with many prior decisions of this court in similar situations:

Although the trial court's distribution was intended to be equitable, meaningful appellate review is not possible because the trial court failed to make specific findings as to the value of the marital assets. Without determining the value of the assets, the court's other findings could not be effectuated. The lack of findings as to the value of the wife's interest in the law firm, the duplexes, the Isuzu Trooper, the marital home and its furnishings, and the current balance of liabilities contained in the former husband's financial affidavit prohibit this court from determining what sort of distribution was made, or even intended, by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the distribution of assets and liabilities and remand for further proceedings.

589 So.2d at 1365. See also Saxton v. Saxton, 454 So.2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (where confusion existed as to the valuation of a piece of property and this valuation was integral to the trial court's entire plan of distribution, the interests of justice compelled reversal of all aspects of the final judgment save the dissolution). For these reasons, it is not possible in this case to address with fairness and accuracy Appellant's and Appellee's arguments respecting the valuation of each disputed property. ²

Second, the trial court used December 31, 1988, as the date of valuation of the property, although that is not the date of filing of the petition, the hearing date, nor the date of a valid settlement agreement between the parties, and failed to provide any reason in the final judgment for the use of this date. Cf. Sec. 61.075(4), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988). Although this case is not...