Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves

• Decision Date: 03 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 5104,5104
• Parties: CORONADO OIL COMPANY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. John A. GRIEVES, Joann Grieves, Madeline Grieves, Thomas B. Grieves, Marie Grieves, Ruth K. Graham, Neal Reisland, Hazel Reisland and The Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 406

603 P.2d 406

CORONADO OIL COMPANY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. John A. GRIEVES, Joann Grieves, Madeline Grieves, Thomas B. Grieves, Marie Grieves, Ruth K. Graham, Neal Reisland, Hazel Reisland and The Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 5104.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 3, 1979.

J. John Sampson, Newcastle, and Joseph M. Montano and Shayne M. Madsen, Denver, Colo., signed the brief and Montano appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellant.

Stanley K. Hathaway, Brent R. Kunz and Richard Barrett, Cheyenne, signed the brief on behalf of amicus curiae for Maurice W. Brown.

David O. Cordell, D. Thomas Kidd, R. Stanley Lowe, Casper, and Frank H. Houck, Denver, signed the brief on behalf of amicus curiae for Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, in support of appellant.

Chester S. Jones, Newcastle, signed the brief on behalf of appellees John A. Grieves, Joann Grieves, Madeline Grieves, Thomas B. Grieves, and Marie Grieves.

Gordon W. Schukei, Newcastle, signed the brief on behalf of appellees Ruth K. Graham, Neal Reisland, and Hazel Reisland.

Oral argument was presented by Chester S. Jones, Newcastle, on behalf of all appellees.

Before RAPER, C. J., McCLINTOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.

RAPER, Chief Justice.

The central issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff-appellant, an oil company a private corporation pursuant to § 32, Art. I of the Wyoming Constitution ¹ and § 1-26-401, et seq., W.S.1977 ² has a right to condemn private property of defendants-appellees in order to obtain a way of necessity required to provide access for purposes of exploration and development of federal oil and gas leases held by the oil company. The district court granted a summary judgment generally in favor of the appellees and dismissed appellant's action to condemn a way of necessity.

We will reverse.

The issues posed by appellant are that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees and, contrary to the holdings of the trial judge, it claims that:

1. Section 32, Art. I, Wyoming Constitution, is broad enough to cover the activity 2. Appellant is entitled to condemn a way of necessity under § 1-26-401, et seq., supra, because it is engaged in "mining" within the contemplation of the statutes.

of Coronado Oil, is self-executing, and appellant is entitled to condemn a way of necessity whether or not such right is included in the statutory provision at issue in this case.

3. Appellant is entitled to condemn a way of necessity under § 1-26-301, et seq., W.S.1977, because it is a petroleum company within the contemplation of that statute.

4. Appellant did not fail to exhaust its remedies by failing to appeal a decision of the Weston County Commissioners which denied it a right-of-way of necessity after a proceeding held pursuant to § 24-9-101, et seq., W.S.1977.

5. The description of property sought to be condemned as set out in the complaint was sufficient under Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P.

The factual and procedural background of the case is essentially this. The appellant is the lessee under six federal oil and gas leases of land in Weston County, Wyoming. Appellant filed a complaint for condemnation of a way of necessity, alleging it had no access to the leased lands and sought to extend existing roads across lands owned by the appellees in order to explore for, develop and produce oil, and that it intended to haul by truck the oil produced. The complaint is complete and conforms in all respects to the requirements of § 1-26-401, et seq., supra, and Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P. The complaint also states that " * * * the Weston County Commissioners denied (Appellant's) petition for a private road pursuant to Wyoming Statues (sic), 1977 Republished Edition § 24-9-101 et seq." Before hearing on January 4, 1979, appellant amended its complaint to allege a right to condemn private property under § 1-26-303, W.S.1977. ³

At the outset of the hearing the district court granted appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's claim to condemn under § 1-26-401, et seq., supra, because appellant's activity was not mining within the contemplation of the statutes. Later in the hearing, testimony was heard by the court from William Mitchell, president of appellant's corporation, and three exhibits were introduced into evidence. At the conclusion of Mitchell's testimony, the district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on the grounds:

" * * * that the statute, 1-26-303, does not provide authority for the court to act under the facts presented. The court construes the legislature to intend petroleum pipeline companies and other pipeline companies have the right of eminent domain and oil companies or any company or associations of persons that wish to go upon the lands of another to explore and drill for petroleum does not have statutory authority to secure right-of-ways by eminent domain.

"The court is also granting the summary judgment for the reason that the plaintiff has not exhausted its remedies. It is alleged and agreed that the county commissioners of this county were petitioned for a right-of-way; that was denied. It appears to the court that this matter was not appealed as provided by statute. Thus, the remedies were not exhausted.

"Further, the description contained in the complaint for condemnation is insufficient and does not meet the requirement of Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure."

There was then much discussion concerning the scope of the summary judgment and whether it should also cover the applicability of § 1-26-401, et seq., supra. The trial judge stated "Well, the court will reconsider its ruling on the first motions made by defendants in regard to 1-26-401 through 404. During its reconsideration will grant the motion to consider Exhibits No. 1 through No. 3 as submitted together with the testimony of Mr. Mitchell. The court's ruling will remain the same on that motion. And the court will grant the summary judgment as stated."

The written judgment recites:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment against plaintiff be, and it hereby is, granted, and that summary judgment be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, and that plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed."

We, therefore, conclude the net effect of all this to be that summary judgment was granted in favor of appellees as to all issues raised by appellant; and we will consider them in that light. ⁴

The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the court's dual finding that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, Wyo.1979, 590 P.2d 1306, 1309; Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo.1975, 542 P.2d 867. In this case we have no apparent factual dispute. The conflict between the parties here relates only to the application of a constitutional provision, pertinent statutes, and Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., all pertaining to eminent domain. There is only a question of law.

Eminent domain is the right and power of the State to appropriate private property to a particular user for the purpose of promoting the general welfare. It embraces all cases where, by authority of the State and for the public good, the property of an individual is taken, without his consent, for the purpose of being devoted to some particular use, either by the State itself or by a corporation, public or private, or by a private citizen. Section 32, Art. I, Wyoming Constitution is a recognition of the proposition that the uses there outlined while serving a private purpose indirectly benefit the general public. A private use is by constitutional edict given the force and effect of a public use. Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 1913, 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43, L.R.A.1916C, 1275, Ann.Cas.1915D, 1207.

Constitutional authorization for ways of necessity is not unique to the State of Wyoming. See 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., §§ 7.626 and 7.626(1) with 1979 Supplement, for a background discussion. The right to condemn a way of necessity under constitutional and statutory provisions is an expression of public policy against landlocking property and rendering it useless. Franks v. Tyler, Okl.App.1974, 531 P.2d 1067. The obvious purpose of the constitutional and statutory provisions is to provide a means whereby a landowner or owner of an interest in lands, enclosed on all sides by lands of others and unable to get to the land from a public road or highway can get relief by condemning a right of way to it across intervening land. McGowin Investment Co. v. Johnstone, 1974, 54 Ala.App. 194, 306 So.2d 286, cert. den. 293 Ala. 766, 306 So.2d 290.

We hold that § 1-26-401, et seq., are the statutes which govern eminent domain proceedings in this case. As a general rule, statutes conferring the power of eminent domain are to be strictly construed in favor of landowners, so that no person will be deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property except by a valid exercise of the power. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 22, pp. 219-220; West's Digest System, Eminent Domain, k8. However, this doctrine does not preclude the reasonable and sound We think it plain beyond any doubt that the intended purpose of the cited constitutional provision and statutes was to facilitate the development of our state's resources. We will hereafter construe the word "mining" to include the exploration for oil and gas, and that now is hardly unique or expansive of that term and is nothing more than a reasonable and sound construction which carries out the intent of the constitution and related statutes, as well as permitting development of the resources of this state for the common good. ⁵ It is only reasonable that the owner of valuable resources should not be shut in and deprived of the opportunity to...