Morales v. Vega, 79-1071
Decision Date | 30 August 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 79-1071,79-1071 |
Citation | 604 F.2d 730 |
Parties | 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2256 Ignacio GUAL MORALES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Pedro HERNANDEZ VEGA, et al., Defendants, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
J. L. A. de Passalacqua, San Juan, P. R., for appellant.
Susan A. Goltz, New York City, with whom Chapman, Duff & Paul, Hato Rey, P. R., was on brief, for appellees.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL and BOWNES, Circuit Judges.
This appeal raises a question of the applicability of a Puerto Rico tolling statute, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5303, to the running of the statute of limitations on plaintiff's civil rights action. Plaintiff, a former employee of the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA), was discharged on June 14, 1974. Shortly thereafter plaintiff invoked the collective bargaining grievance procedure and filed a complaint with the Grievance Committee seeking reinstatement and back pay. On August 8, 1975 1 the Committee upheld plaintiff's discharge. Not until January 30, 1976, more than one year after discharge but less than one year after the Committee had rendered its decision, did plaintiff commence the instant action alleging a violation of his first amendment rights of freedom of speech and association by the operation of a conspiracy among defendants, the purpose of which was to punish plaintiff for union activity by obtaining his discharge and then rigging the arbitration process to insure that the discharge would be upheld.
Plaintiff claims that his complaint filed with the Grievance Committee for reinstatement and back pay pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement constitutes an extrajudicial claim which interrupted the running of the statute of limitations on his civil rights action against the supervisory defendants. After the Grievance Committee rendered its decision, the one year statute of limitations began to run anew, the plaintiff contends. On remand, the district court disagreed and dismissed plaintiff's action against the supervisory defendants.
State statutes of limitations, including tolling provisions, are the "primary guide" for determining the limitation period for a civil rights action, although the state statute may be displaced where its "application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action . . . ." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1722, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Here, the relevant Puerto Rican statute of limitations is the one year rule for torts, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5298(2). Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d at 679; Graffals v. Garcia, 550 F.2d 687 (1st Cir. 1977). Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to allege that any of the five supervisory defendants committed an overt act constituting a civil rights violation in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy within the one year limitation period. Therefore, unless the statute of limitations was tolled, the action must be dismissed as to the supervisory defendants. Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 576 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 1978); Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 1977).
The district court assumed without deciding that pursuance of the contractual grievance procedure could be categorized as an extrajudicial claim. It noted, however, that under the Spanish legal system It then stated
(Emphasis in original.)
We identify from the district court's opinion at least three separate reasons why plaintiff's extrajudicial claim (the Grievance Committee complaint) does not toll the running of the statute of limitations on the civil rights action:
(3) differences between the grievance proceeding and the civil rights action render the complaint in the former an insufficiently "express and precise" extrajudicial claim as to the latter.
Plaintiff's arguments are addressed to reasons (1) and (2). Plaintiff maintains that under Spanish Law the right asserted extrajudicially need not be identical to the one pursued judicially. Because the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not decided whether the rights must be identical, plaintiff asks us to certify the question to that court. With respect to (2), plaintiff also contends that it is a state law question for the Puerto Rico Supreme Court whether the Grievance Committee proceeding was...
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McLinn, Matter of
...to district judges who are citizens of Puerto Rico and well-versed in the Spanish underpinnings of Puerto Rico law.--Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 604 F.2d 730. C.A.Puerto Rico 1979. Much deference is accorded to district court's construction of law of locality in which it sits.--Garcia v......
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Afanador v. US Postal Service
...requirements. The letter sent by Afanador was not "addressed to" Tanner, nor was a copy even sent to Tanner. See Gual Morales v. Hernández Vega, 604 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir.1979) (under Puerto Rican law, "in order to have the tolling effect the extrajudicial claim must be expressly and preci......
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Fernandez v. Chardon
...that such extrajudicial claims must be "precise and specific" in order to have this desired tolling effect. Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 604 F.2d 730, 733 (1st Cir. 1979), citing Jimenez v. District Court, 65 P.R.R. 35, 42 (1945). A proper extrajudicial claim must seek the same relief ul......
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Morales v. Vega
...out at Gual Morales v. Hernández Vega, 579 F.2d 677 (C.A. 1, 1978); Morales v. Vega, 461 F.Supp. 656 (D.P.R.1978); Gual Morales v. Hernández Vega, 604 F.2d 730 (C.A. 1, 1979). 2 The Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect at the time provided in its Article XVI: "When an employee covered ......