State v. Jarman
| Decision Date | 06 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. M2017-01313-SC-R11-CD,M2017-01313-SC-R11-CD |
| Citation | 604 S.W.3d 24 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Steve M. JARMAN |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor General; Clark B. Thornton, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Ray Crouch, District Attorney General; and Carey Thompson and Brooke Orgain, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
Olin J. Baker, Charlotte, Tennessee, for the appellee, Steve M. Jarman.
Steve M. Jarman ("defendant") was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his girlfriend, Shelly Heath ("victim"). At trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant allegedly assaulted the victim two years prior to her death, an act for which he was tried and acquitted. The defendant appealed his conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed based, in part, on the acquitted-act evidence being used at trial. We accepted the State's appeal to consider two issues: (1) whether the rule announced in State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981), which prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant at a subsequent trial, should be overruled, and (2) if so, whether the trial court properly admitted the acquitted-act evidence as a prior bad act under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review of the case law in this area and the record before us on appeal, we expressly overrule our decision in Holman to the extent that it prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant in a subsequent trial under all circumstances. Additionally, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the acquitted-act evidence, pursuant to Rule 404(b), under the theory that it was relevant to show the defendant's intent. We also hold that additional errors in admitting threats made by the defendant against the victim or the victim's sister, not at issue in this appeal, were harmless. For reasons stated herein, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision and reinstate the defendant's conviction.
The defendant and victim were in a relationship for approximately four years and lived together in the defendant's home in Dickson County, Tennessee. In the early morning hours of April 18, 2015, the defendant called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that he needed assistance because the victim had shot herself. Emergency responders and law enforcement attempted life-saving measures on the scene but were not successful. The victim died from a single gunshot wound
to the chest. While law enforcement initially believed the gunshot wound was self-inflicted, the investigation ultimately led to the defendant being arrested and charged with first-degree murder of the victim. Before trial, the State gave notice that it intended to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of the defendant, including an alleged aggravated assault by the defendant against the victim that occurred in 2013 ("2013 alleged assault") and evidence that the defendant allegedly threatened the victim and the victim's sister on two occasions.2 At the pre-trial hearings and the jury trial, the following evidence was adduced.
In response to the State's notice that it intended to introduce evidence of prior bad acts, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the State "from introducing any and all prior convictions, alleged bad acts, and / or expunged matters." The defendant argued that the State should not be allowed to admit evidence of the 2013 alleged assault because he was acquitted of the charge. Specifically, the defendant argued that the acquitted-act evidence should not be allowed because "[o]nce the jury verdict [was] laid down, that resolved any question of fact[,]" and whether the defendant committed the assault was "not an issue that you could relitigate."
The State argued that it did not seek to introduce the charge or the previous trial into evidence, rather it sought to present the defendant's alleged actions and that the couple had "a history of prior domestic violence" in their relationship. The State explained that the victim's brother, Paul Heath, who did not testify at the trial on the 2013 alleged assault, witnessed the act and would testify to what he observed.
Additionally, the State argued that under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b),3 the defendant's actions during the 2013 alleged assault were relevant to issues of intent and motive in the present case. The State relied on two cases, State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1993), and State v. Moody, No. W2014-01056-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1045660, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016), which both involved murder victims who were previously harmed by the accused through acts of domestic violence. In both cases, the court permitted evidence of prior acts of domestic violence, as well as statements made by the victim and other family members regarding the victim's fear of the accused, as relevant to show the relationship between the parties and the intent of the accused to harm the victim.4 The State also argued that the evidence was necessary to rebut the defendant's claim of suicide or that the gunshot wound
was self-inflicted.
Prior to taking testimony at this hearing, the trial court compared the 2013 alleged assault and the 2015 death of the victim, stating:
[F]or the record ... the gap in time, [sixteen to seventeen] months, is not a real long time considering what -- domestic violence type issues because the [c]ourt sees them a lot as a Judge, of course, so that's not a real long time. And the [c]ourt believes that that potential testimony by [Mr. Heath] could show motive and intent and believes that the probative value would probably be high. Of course, the prejudicial value could also be high too.
The court stated that acquitted-act evidence " ‘should not be admitted, at least absent clear and convincing proof that the offender actually committed the other acts.’ "5 Ultimately, the court decided to reserve its ruling on the admissibility of the evidence until it "hear[d] from the witness [who] allegedly saw the defendant choke the victim."
The State called multiple witnesses, starting with Deputy Joseph Calhoun, the responding officer on December 6, 2013, the night of the 2013 alleged assault. The call came in to Deputy Calhoun as a "domestic assault in progress," and when he got close to the location, he "observed a white female walking in the middle of the road." He stopped to speak with her, and "learned that it was [the victim] ... [and] that she was the one that called for help." According to Deputy Calhoun, the victim "appeared to be very upset," and he was able to "smell the odor of alcohol coming from her person." Additionally, "[the victim] had stated that she had been assaulted by [the defendant] and that she was walking to 990 Coaling Road to get away from him." Deputy Calhoun recalled the victim's story:
[H]er and her brother ... had been in the living room consuming alcohol and [the defendant] was in his bed asleep. She said that [the defendant] awoke, come [sic] in there and they started verbally arguing. [The defendant] then grabbed her by the throat, started choking her, and she said she fell back into a recliner at which time her – I believe it was her right arm went through a glass window and a door. [The defendant] then put her on the floor and proceeded to kick her in her rib area.
As the victim recounted the story that night, Deputy Calhoun observed injuries "consistent with a hand around the throat" and "lacerations to her arm
." Additionally, Deputy Calhoun saw the victim "holding her ribs" as he spoke with her. He called an ambulance to come to the scene, and the victim went to the emergency room. Based on the consistencies between the victim's statements and her physical injuries, Deputy Calhoun arrested the defendant for aggravated assault.
On cross-examination, Deputy Calhoun stated that he did not interview the defendant or any other witnesses that evening. Deputy Calhoun was present at the trial for the 2013 alleged assault and acknowledged that the victim recanted her statement and claimed that she was lying the night of December 6th when she told Deputy Calhoun the defendant assaulted her. Even though Deputy Calhoun heard the victim recant her statement during the trial, he still believed her December 6, 2013 statement was the truth, based on the consistencies between her statements and injuries at the time. Deputy Calhoun admitted that he transcribed the victim's statement that night and that he may have paraphrased it but assured the court that "what she told [him] was put in that statement." Additionally, he read it back to the victim before she signed it.
Mr. Heath, the victim's brother, testified that he was present in the defendant's house the night of December 6, 2013. He described that he "seen [sic] [the defendant] choke [the victim], beat her in the face, and then boot stomp her." According to Mr. Heath, the fight started because the defendant gave the victim a fifth of whiskey, and Mr. Heath and the victim drank it all. When the yelling started, Mr. Heath was out on the porch making a phone call so he did not observe how the physical altercation began, but he testified that he saw the defendant "choking her and then he hit her with his fist a few times, and then he boot stomped her." He also observed the victim "bleeding pretty bad" afterward.
Aside from the 2013 alleged assault, Mr. Heath acknowledged that he had not observed any other instances of physical violence between the defendant and victim, but he did hear the defendant threaten to shoot the victim on at least one occasion....
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