McIntosh County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Darien

• Decision Date: 19 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-1287,78-1287
• Citation: 605 F.2d 753
• Parties: McINTOSH COUNTY BRANCH OF THE NAACP, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF DARIEN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 753

605 F.2d 753

McINTOSH COUNTY BRANCH OF THE NAACP, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF DARIEN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 78-1287.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 19, 1979.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Jan. 2, 1980.

David F. Walbert, Atlanta, Ga., Mark F. Gorman, Brunswick, Ga., John L. Carroll, Morris Dees, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Charles C. Stebbins, Jr., Darien, Ga., Charles C. Stebbins, III, Augusta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before TUTTLE, GODBOLD and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants are organizations representing blacks who vote in the City of Darien, Georgia. They brought this suit alleging that Darien's use of an at-large electoral system for selection of city officers dilutes the votes of black citizens, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)(1) & 1973. ¹

All four members of the Darien City Council and the mayor are chosen from the city at large, with the top four vote-getters taking office. Darien is about 40% Black, and black persons comprise about 33% Of registered voters. In 1977 a black person was elected to the Council for the first time.

The district court dismissed plaintiffs' suit, holding that they had failed to carry their burden of proving facts that would support an inference of dilution. We reverse and remand.

I. District court resolution of voting dilution cases

The district court adhered to the analysis set forth in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA5, 1973) (en banc), Aff'd on other grounds sub nom., East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976) (per curiam).

Under Zimmer and many subsequent Fifth Circuit cases, four factors are of primary importance in determining whether the plaintiff in a voting rights suit has met the burden of proving that the black minority's votes are being diluted: (1) whether minority group members have equal access to the political process; (2) whether past discrimination has the present effect of discouraging participation by minority members in the political process; (3) whether the policy underlying the use of the at-large district is rooted in racial discrimination; and (4) whether the government body in question is unresponsive to the needs of the minority community. See, E. g., Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875 (CA5, 1979); Corder v. Kirksey, 585 F.2d 708, 712 n.8 (CA5, 1978); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 217 (CA5, 1978), Petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3247 (Sept. 22, 1978) (No. 78-492); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (CA5) (en banc), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 512, 54 L.Ed.2d 454 (1977); Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305. We have also identified a number of enhancing factors which, although of secondary importance, strengthen the plaintiff's case when present. These include majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions, lack of a geographic subdistrict requirement, and large election districts. See Nevett, 571 F.2d at 223; Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305. As we explained in Cross v. Baxter, Supra, decided recently for the court by this same panel, the ultimate issue in a voting dilution case is whether an at-large election system has the effect of diluting the impact of the minority's voting strength and whether such an impact is intended. ² The Zimmer framework of analysis is designed to facilitate resolution of this ultimate issue, but it is not the sole method of resolution. A plaintiff is not limited to evidence that fits within the Zimmer framework and might in some cases prevail even though not all of the four Zimmer inquiries tend to show unconstitutional dilution and few or none of the enhancing factors are present.

As we also explained in Cross v. Baxter, because of the complexity of the factual inquiry and the potential for interference with state functions, it is important in voting dilution cases that the district court scrupulously comply with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in sufficient detail that the court of appeals can fully understand the factual and legal basis for the court's ultimate conclusion. In particular a district court must indicate in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that it has considered all relevant evidence. A failure to discuss substantial evidence that tends to support a conclusion contrary to that reached by the district court may necessitate a remand.

Though the district court adhered to the Zimmer framework for analysis, we nevertheless must reverse because it did not adequately comply with the requirements of rule 52(a) and because it made errors of law in analyzing the evidence.

II. The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law

The district court held that none of the four Zimmer factors produced results tending to show unconstitutional dilution and it found only one enhancing factor present. Accordingly, the court found that in the aggregate the evidence failed to show the existence of unconstitutional dilution, and it refused to enjoin Darien's continued use of its at-large electoral system. We review the district court's conclusion on each of the Zimmer factors to determine whether the court made adequately detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and whether it committed errors of law in analyzing the evidence.

A. Equality of access to the political process

The first Zimmer inquiry is directed toward discovering whether minority group members are denied equal access to the political process. The district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove any denial of equal access because: (a) there is no slating organization in Darien, (b) the only requirements for getting on the ballot are payment of a qualifying fee and a requirement that candidates be freeholders, ³ and (c) no evidence shows that blacks have been harassed to prevent them from running for City Council or that there have been reprisals against blacks for running for office.

The district court derived from Zimmer that this first inquiry is conducted to determine whether there is a "lack of minority access to the slating process." This phrasing suggests that the district court thought that the inquiry is limited to ascertaining whether there is a formal slating organization or similar barrier preventing black candidates from obtaining places on the ballot. All of the evidence considered by the district court under this rubric related to whether black candidates were able to get their names on the ballot. None of the evidence relating to whether blacks have equal access to other phases of the political process was discussed by the district court in this portion of its opinion. However, this facet of the Zimmer test is broader than minority members' ability to be placed on the ballot; it encompasses barriers to minority participation in any phase of the political process, including registering to vote, voting, and campaigning for office. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-69, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2339, 2341, 37 L.Ed.2d 314, 324-26 (1973) (issue is whether "political processes leading to nomination and election" are equally open to all); Bolden, 571 F.2d at 243; Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 143. Although we have frequently focused on slating as a crucial factual issue in voting dilution cases, See, E. g., U. S. v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951, 954 (CA5, 1978); Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1268 (CA5, 1977), we have not held that exclusion of minority members from other phases of the political process is irrelevant.

The district court did mention evidence relating to barriers to current black participation in other phases of the Darien political process. It discussed some of these under the rubric of "effect of past discrimination on present participation." The court found that current educational and economic disparities have existed and now exist between whites and blacks in Darien, but it did not find this fact to be of significance (at least not with respect to showing that past discrimination has present effects) because, one, blacks had been permitted by law to vote in Darien city elections since 1929, and, two, the plaintiffs had not proved that the present socioeconomic disparity is the result of any past exclusion of blacks from the process of selecting the Darien City Council. ⁴

In finding that there were no current barriers to minority candidates who wish to run for office in Darien, the district court, however, did not use the standards of proof we set forth in our en banc decision in Kirksey,supra. Moreover, it did not indicate in its opinion that it had considered the evidence pertinent to whether blacks are excluded from the process of electing Darien city officers, as required by rule 52(a).

The plaintiffs introduced three kinds of evidence of the existence of current barriers: social or economic facts, unofficial conduct, and governmental action. We deal with these in turn. The district court accepted plaintiffs' evidence that blacks in Darien are on the average less well-educated and poorer than whites. It did not, however, discuss whether these demonstrated educational and economic inequalities have the effect of discouraging minority input into and participation in the Darien electoral process. We have held that such disparities between majority and minority are so likely to make participation by the minority difficult that it is presumed, subject to rebuttal, that disadvantaged minority group members do not have access to the political process on an equal basis with majority group members. See Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d at 875; Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 145. The district court did not apply this presumption in discussing the evidence of educational and economic inequalities.

The...