Donaca v. Ivall, 77-4-273
Decision Date | 21 January 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 77-4-273,77-4-273 |
Citation | 605 P.2d 709,44 Or.App. 121 |
Parties | Douglas W. DONACA and Lynda C. Donaca, husband and wife, Appellants Cross-Respondents, v. Glen E. IVALL, Respondent Cross-Appellant, Ronald R. Wyffels, Defendant, Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, Respondent. ; CA 11261. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., Portland, argued the cause for appellants-cross-respondents. With him on the briefs were Thomas A. Gerber, Elizabeth K. Reeve, and Souther, Spaulding, Kinsey, Williamson & Schwabe, Portland.
John C. Caldwell, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent-cross-appellant Glen E. Ivall. With him on the brief was Hibbard, Caldwell, Canning, Bowerman & Schultz, Oregon City.
No appearance made by respondent Washington Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n.
Before SCHWAB, C. J., and BUTTLER and ROBERTS, JJ.
Both parties appeal from the judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiffs nominal damages for defendant's violation of the Declaration of Restriction to which the properties owned by both are subject.
Plaintiffs have lived in their home since 1974 when it was built for them. Defendant purchased a lot across the street from plaintiffs in 1976 and began to build a home on that lot in January, 1977. Much of the property in the area, including defendant's lot, is hilly and steep. It is desirable, however, because of the view of the Tualatin Valley and coastal range which it affords. Defendant's house is between plaintiffs' house and a portion of that view.
From the time defendant began construction on his house plaintiffs expressed concern that he comply with the "Declaration of Restrictions on Palisades Heights Plat No. 2" (Declaration) to which both properties are subject. 1 Plaintiffs' primary concern was with the height of defendant's house. 2 They feared obstruction of their view, which they had attempted to maximize by the design and placement of their house. The portions of the Declaration which particularly concerned them were:
Defendant's house extends 31 feet from the average grade level to the peak of the roof, and defendant did not obtain approval from the Neighborhood Committee (Committee) before beginning construction of his house.
Defendant contends that the Committee was no longer in existence when he began construction, based on the following provisions of the Declaration:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The parties have stipulated that as of January, 1977, 70% Of the lots in Plat No. 2 had been sold. No elections were held until after suit was instituted in the spring of 1977. Of the original members of the Committee, only Robert Bangs remained at the times pertinent to this case. He testified that he was not certain whether or not he was still functioning as the Committee when defendant began construction. Defendant did submit his plans to Bangs at some point after plaintiffs began to protest his failure to comply with the Declaration. Bangs did not approve or disapprove the plans because of his uncertainty as to his status as the Committee, but testified that they would probably have been approved by the Committee as a solution allowable for that particular lot. 3 He further testified that the Committee had never denied approval to submitted plans, but had occasionally suggested slight modification. The Committee had used 20 feet as the lowest they could require, it being their standard for the height of a one-story house. He said it was more of a guide for the Committee than a height restriction as such.
Plaintiffs contend defendant has violated the height restrictions contained in the Declaration and seek a mandatory injunction requiring that defendant lower his house to no more than 20 feet above the average grade level of the lot. Alternatively, they seek damages in the amount of the diminution in value of their property because of the additional 11 feet in the height of defendant's house.
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the Declaration does not set any specific height restriction, and that he did not violate the Declaration because he did all he reasonably could do to obtain approval from the Committee where there was uncertainty as to whether the Committee existed.
The trial court found the Declaration set no specific height restriction; defendant's house did not interfere unreasonably with plaintiffs' view; but defendant violated the Declaration by failing to submit his plans to the Committee for approval. Based on those findings the trial court denied plaintiffs' prayer for injunction but awarded $200 nominal damages and attorney fees.
Restrictions such as those contained in the Declaration are generally enforceable. See Alloway v. Moyer, 275 Or. 397, 550 P.2d 1379 (1976); Snashall et ux. v. Jewell et ux., 228 Or. 130, 363 P.2d 566 (1961); Rodgers et ux. v. Reimann et ux., 227 Or. 62, 361 P.2d 101 (1961). However, we must first determine what restrictions were placed on the property by the Declaration. Plaintiffs' contention that there is a limit of 20 feet is not supported by the language of the Declaration or by the practice of the Committee for several reasons. The language of paragraph 1(b) of the Declaration does not directly specify a 20 foot limit and when read with paragraph 5 does not even say that houses 20 feet or less in height need not obtain approval. The Committee considered it to be the lowest that could be required of a house because they considered 20 feet to be the usual height for a one-story house. The Declaration, however, states that two stories is the limit for houses in the plat. A 20 foot height restriction would be inconsistent with a two story limit. For these reasons we agree with the trial court that there was no specific height restriction established by the Declaration.
Plaintiffs sought an injunction or damages based on the contention that defendant exceeded the allowable height by 11 feet. However, because there is no 20 foot height restriction plaintiffs have no right to require that defendant's house be no higher than 20 feet. The Committee could have approved plans with a height exceeding 20 feet and the only evidence was that had the Committee acted it "probably" would have approved defendant's house as it was.
The Declaration did, however, require that defendant's plans be...
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