Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness v. Zolin
| Decision Date | 02 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 81-6338-ER.,CV 81-6338-ER. |
| Citation | 607 F. Supp. 175 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | GREATER LOS ANGELES COUNCIL OF DEAFNESS, INC., Barbara U. Sheridan, and Joy Anne Maucere, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Frank S. ZOLIN, individually, and as Jury Commissioner for the County of Los Angeles; Raymond F. Arce, individually, and as Director of Juror Services for the County of Los Angeles; County of Los Angeles; Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Los Angeles, Defendants. |
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David Grosz, Kristine Kravetz, Stanley Fleishman, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Lester J. Tolnia, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.
This suit was brought by individual plaintiffs Barbara Sheridan and Joy Anne Maucere, and by the Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. ("GLAD") against the County of Los Angeles ("County"); the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles ("Superior Court"); Frank Zolin, Jury Commissioner for the County; and Raymond Arce, Director of Juror Services for the County.
Sheridan and Maucere are both deaf. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants' refusal to pay for, or provide, sign language interpreters for deaf or hearing impaired individuals so that such individuals may serve on juries violates § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); § 122(a) of the Revenue Sharing Act, 31 U.S.C. § 6716 (1982), and accompanying regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 51); § 1983 of Title 42; and California Government Code § 11135.1 Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to pay for or otherwise provide interpreters for deaf individuals called to jury service in the Superior Court. Plaintiffs also seek monetary damages.2
In 1981, both Sheridan and Maucere received trial jury summonses ordering them to appear at the San Antonio Municipal Court and the Van Nuys branches of the Superior Court, respectively. Each wrote a letter to the individual defendants, advising them that she was deaf and asking whether sign language interpreters would be provided. The plaintiffs informed the individual defendants that unless interpreters were provided or paid for by the Superior Court or County, they would be unable to serve as jurors due to the expense. The defendants advised the plaintiffs that interpreters would not be provided.
On August 14, 1981, Nathan Shapiro, a hearing impaired individual, received a jury summons to appear at the Van Nuys Court-house mentioned above. Shapiro appeared for jury duty with a sign language interpreter provided by GLAD and was selected as an alternate juror. A GLAD representative spoke to a Superior Court employee about paying for the interpreter and was told that there was no provision for such payment. Shapiro attended court as a juror for 22 days with an interpreter provided by GLAD. At the end of the trial, GLAD submitted a bill of $2,022.63 to the Superior Court. Defendant Arce wrote a letter to GLAD informing GLAD that the bill would not be paid. At least 16 deaf or hearing impaired individuals have responded to jury summons to the Superior Court between April 1981 and January 1982, but only two have served. The rest refused to, without the provision of or payment for interpreters.
In fiscal year 1980-81, the County Clerk received $108,912 from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration ("LEAA"), a United States government agency, for a microfilm project. In the same year, the Superior Court also received $211,880 from LEAA for the Jury Service Improvement Program3 and $210,000 from the United States Department of Health, Education & Welfare ("HEW") for the Guardian Ad Litem Program. In fiscal year 1981-82, the Guardian Ad Litem Program received an additional $218,052 from HEW.4
In fiscal years 1980-81, Los Angeles County received $76,438,294 from the Department of Justice, Office of Revenue Sharing. In fiscal year 1981-82, Los Angeles County received $82,979,616 in revenue sharing funds. According to testimony, revenue sharing funds are used currently for capital improvements and no federal money was funneled through the County to the Superior Court in either 1980-81, 1981-82, or 1982-83. For at least one year between 1972 and 1979, however, between $65,000,000 and $120,000,000 of revenue sharing funds were used to meet the County's contribution to the retirement fund, which includes Superior Court personnel.
Los Angeles County supplied $47,000,000 of the Superior Court's 1982 budget of $52,000,000. Additionally, while the employees of the Superior Court, including defendants Zolin and Arce, are state employees, the County pays their salaries and includes them in the County medical and retirement funds. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Superior Court is dependent upon the County for financing, housing, and a wide variety of support systems.
The thrust of plaintiffs' case is that the defendants violated plaintiffs' statutory rights by refusing to provide or pay for sign-language interpreters for deaf or hearing impaired individuals who are called for jury duty. Plaintiffs' case rests largely upon a 1981 amendment to California law which removed the presumption that individuals who are deaf or hearing-impaired are incompetent to sit on juries. See Cal. Code Civ.Proc. § 198 (as amended January 1, 1981) ("§ 198").
The plaintiffs are not, however, arguing that § 198 mandates California State Courts to provide sign language interpreters to deaf and hearing impaired individuals. Rather, they argue the state law proves that such individuals are qualified to be jurors. Plaintiffs rely upon federal and state civil rights and anti-discrimination statutes to prove that defendants must provide interpreters for deaf persons called to jury service.5
Before examining whether defendants have violated any of these statutes, this Court must examine which, if any, of these defendants are protected by immunity from the award of monetary damages.6 In Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.1982), the Ninth Circuit held that the Los Angeles County Jury Commissioner and other employees directly involved with the jury selection process for the superior court who excluded all blind persons from jury service solely because they were blind were protected by their quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 1291. In Pomerantz, the Court said that "this circuit has repeatedly held that judges and other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process are immune from liability for damages under § 1983 for conduct in the performance of their official duties." Id. (quoting Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir.1970)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the remaining individual defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from damages, both as to the § 1983 and the § 794 action."
Under Pomerantz' rationale, defendants, Zolin and Arce, who took the actions complained of in this suit in their official capacity, are protected from money damages by their quasi-judicial immunity. Pomerantz would also bar monetary relief against the Superior Court. For if the officials who serve the Superior Court are protected by quasi-judicial immunity, the court itself would be protected by judicial immunity.7 See, generally, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Overseeing the selection of the jury is a judicial responsibility.8
The decision whether to pay for interpreters for prospective jurors was made by the Superior Court and its officials. It is true that Superior Court Judge Schwartz relied upon advice that the County Counsel had supplied to the Superior Court's Jury Commissioner's Office "that there is no authority for the court to appoint said interpreters at public expense or to order reimbursement of their costs from public funds" in declining to appoint a sign language interpreter for Shapiro. Stipulation of Judge S.S. Schwartz. But it was the Superior Court judge who made the final decision. The County Counsel's opinion and the County's paying the salary of Zolin and Arce are not sufficient to show that the County itself participated in the jury selection process, such that it would be liable under either § 504 or § 1983. The district court in Pomerantz came to the same conclusion, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 674 F.2d at 1291. Thus the County, on the showing before the Court, cannot be held liable.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped person in the United States ..., shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C. § 794.
While all the defendants are immune from money damages, see supra at p. 179, the individual defendants and the Superior Court could still be subject to a mandatory injunction if the present practice of not providing or paying for sign language interpreters were found to violate the Rehabilitation Act. To prove a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiffs must show that deaf and hearing impaired individuals are "handicapped persons" under the act, see 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982); that they are "otherwise qualified" as juror, see 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); that the jury program or Superior Court is a federally funded program; and that the policy of not paying for or providing sign language interpreters is discriminatory or excludes such persons from being a juror. See Bentivegna v. United States Department of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir.1982) ().
There is no dispute that the individual plaintiffs would be considered to be...
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Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin
...this action. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for defendants. See Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F.Supp. 175 (C.D.Cal.1984) (hereinafter GLAD ). The court later confirmed its ruling by denying plaintiffs' motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), ......
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...the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grds, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987); and (3) the court received f......
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