Lincoln v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 March 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 113063, Calendar No. 4.
• Citation: 607 N.W.2d 73,461 Mich. 483
• Parties: Arthur L. LINCOLN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

607 N.W.2d 73

461 Mich. 483

Arthur L. LINCOLN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 113063, Calendar No. 4.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued November 8, 1999.

Decided March 8, 2000.

Kelman, Loria, Simpson, Will, Harvey & Thompson (by Ann Curry Thompson ), Detroit, MI and Randall K. Caryl, Flint, MI, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Morrison Zack and Ray W. Cardew, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, and Gerald M. Marcinkoski, Special Assistant Attorney General, Detroit, MI, for Second Injury Fund (Total and Permanent Disability Provisions).

Martin L. Critchell, Detroit, MI and J. Walker Henry, Detroit, MI, amicus curiae, for Michigan Manufacturers Association and Michigan Self-Insurers Association.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff is a disabled worker whose benefits are in dispute, as the result of a series of statutory amendments and judicial decisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission, which granted the contested benefits. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated by the concurring member of the Court of Appeals panel.

I

In 1966, the plaintiff suffered serious leg injuries in the course of his employment at a General Motors plant in Flint. These injuries left him totally and permanently disabled.

A person who has lost the industrial use of both legs is presumed to be disabled for a period of eight hundred weeks. This presumption, now stated in M.C.L. § 418.361(3)(g), 418.351(1); MSA 17.237(361)(3)(g), 17.237(351)(1), was in effect at the time the plaintiff became disabled.¹ After the eight hundred weeks had passed, he continued to collect basic weekly benefits from his employer, and also differential benefits from the Second Injury Fund (SIF), as now provided in M.C.L. § 418.521(2); MSA 17.237(521)(2).

In Eva King v. State Second Injury Fund, 382 Mich. 480, 170 N.W.2d 1 (1969), this Court considered the effect of certain statutory amendments on the differential benefits available to persons who were permanently and totally disabled.² The plaintiff is one of a group of benefit recipients whose situation was governed by King, and he is thus said to be one of "the Eva King people."³

The special status of Eva King people was later codified by 1980 PA 357, which added M.C.L. § 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2).⁴ This measure provides:

A totally and permanently disabled employee whose date of injury preceded July 1, 1968, is entitled to the compensation under this act that was payable to the employee immediately before the effective date of this subsection, or compensation equal to 50% of the state average weekly wage as last determined under [MCL 418.355; MSA 17.237(355)], whichever is greater.

In 1968, the Legislature enacted a provision that reduces benefits by five percent each year from a person's sixty-fifth birthday until the seventy-fifth birthday. The section took effect July 1, 1968,⁵ and is now found in M.C.L. § 418.357(1); MSA 17.237(357)(1). It reads:

When an employee who is receiving weekly payments or is entitled to weekly payments reaches or has reached or passed the age of 65, the weekly payments for each year following his or her sixty-fifth birthday shall be reduced by 5% of the weekly payment paid or payable at age 65, but not to less than 50% of the weekly benefit paid or payable at age 65, so that on his or her seventy-fifth birthday the weekly payments shall have been reduced by 50%; after which there shall not be a further reduction for the duration of the employee's life. Weekly payments shall not be reduced below the minimum weekly benefit as provided in this act.

An issue soon arose regarding whether Eva King people were subject to these age-related reductions. Initially, the SIF assumed that the reductions applied only to persons injured on or after the effective date of the new measure (July 1, 1968) and that they were thus inapplicable to the Eva King people. However, the Court of Appeals held in 1982 that the reductions were applicable. Lopez v. Flower Basket Nursery, 122 Mich.App. 680, 687-689, 332 N.W.2d 630 (1982).

The SIF responded to Lopez by applying the age-related reductions to all surviving Eva King people. It also attempted to recoup a portion of what appeared to have been overpayments to these claimants.⁶

Without further appellate guidance, the SIF also concluded that payments to these claimants could not fall below a floor set by M.C.L. § 418.356(3); MSA 17.237(356)(3), which now provides:

The minimum weekly benefit for 1 or more losses stated in [MCL 418.361(2), (3); MSA 17.237(361)(2), (3)] shall be 25% of the state average weekly wage as determined under [MCL 418.355; MSA 17.237(355) ].

This approach was challenged by some of the Eva King people, but most accepted without protest the SIF's handling of this matter in the wake of Lopez.

One of the persons who challenged the approach taken by the SIF persuaded the Court of Appeals that it had erred in Lopez by holding that the age-related reduction could be applied to the Eva King people. Wozniak v. General Motors Corp., 198 Mich.App. 172, 497 N.W.2d 562 (1993). In that decision, usually called Wozniak I, the Court of Appeals also ruled that the Eva King people had the benefit of the fifty-percent benefit floor of M.C.L. § 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2), rather than the twenty-five-percent floor found in M.C.L. § 418.356(3); MSA 17.237(356)(3).

The SIF did not appeal Wozniak I. Instead, it increased differential benefit payments for Eva King people to at least fifty percent of the current average weekly wage, as required by M.C.L. § 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2). The SIF refused, however, to compensate the Eva King people for the benefit reductions between the 1985 date when Lopez became final and the 1993 decision in Wozniak I.

This refusal was premised on several grounds, including the one-year-back rule of M.C.L. § 418.833(1); MSA 17.237(833)(1), the two-year-back rule of M.C.L. § 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381)(2), and the belief that Wozniak I should not be applied for the benefit of Eva King people who did not seek the disputed benefits until after Wozniak I was decided.⁷

In Wozniak I, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the WCAC for further proceedings regarding whether the SIF's repayment obligation to Ms. Wozniak (who had protested immediately) was limited by either the one-year- or two-year-back rules. The eventual result was that the two-year-back rule was found inapplicable by the WCAC (the SIF did not appeal that ruling) and the one-year-back rule was found inapplicable by the Court of Appeals. Wozniak v. General Motors Corp. (After Remand), 212 Mich.App. 40, 536 N.W.2d 841 (1995). This is Wozniak II.

The panel in Wozniak II did not reach an issue that pertains to many of the Eva King people, including the plaintiff in the present case.

We decline defendants' invitation to decide whether [Wozniak I] should be applied retroactively to employees who did not object to the benefit reduction. [212 Mich.App. at 44, 536 N.W.2d 841.]

II

In 1993, the plaintiff filed a petition in which he sought recoupment of the benefits he lost during the years when Lopez controlled. On appeal from the decision of a magistrate, the WCAC held that the plaintiff was entitled to these benefits.

The SIF appealed to the Court of Appeals,⁸ which affirmed the decision of the WCAC. 231 Mich.App. 262, 586 N.W.2d 241 (1998). The majority concluded that, with regard to this plaintiff, "Wozniak I should be given full retroactive effect in favor of those who did not initially object to the reduction of benefits pursuant to Lopez." 231 Mich.App. at 269, 586 N.W.2d 241. In a concurring opinion, Judge WHITBECK agreed with the outcome, but employed a different analysis. 231 Mich.App. at 269-315, 586 N.W.2d 241.

III

Issues concerning the interpretation and application of statutes are questions of law for this Court to decide de novo. Mager v. Dep't of State Police, 460 Mich. 134, 143, n. 14, 595 N.W.2d 142 (1999); Hoste v. Shanty Creek Management, Inc., 459 Mich. 561, 569, 592 N.W.2d 360 (1999). Likewise, questions concerning the retroactivity of earlier judicial decisions are for this Court to decide de novo as matters of law. See, generally, Michigan Educational Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 460 Mich. 180, 189-197, 596 N.W.2d 142 (1999), and People v. Neal, 459 Mich. 72, 80-81, 586 N.W.2d 716 (1998).

The issue before us is whether to apply the holding of Wozniak I to this plaintiff, so that he can obtain the statutory benefits that were denied him in the years following the decision in Lopez.⁹ In resolving this question, we repeat what we said a few months ago in Michigan Educational Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris, supra at 189, 596 N.W.2d 142. In the course of deciding whether a 1993 decision called Profit¹⁰ should be applied retroactively, we explained:

In these companion cases, both defendants argue that this Court's decision in Profit should be applied prospectively rather than retroactively. "[T]he general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect.... [C]omplete prospective application has generally been limited to decisions which overrule clear and uncontradicted case law." Hyde v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 426 Mich. 223, 240, 393 N.W.2d 847 (1986).

Accordingly, the first question is whether Wozniak I overruled clear and uncontradicted prior case law. In turn, that leads to the question whether Lopez constituted a clear and uncontradicted ruling on the subject of these proceedings—the relationship among the three statutory provisions discussed in Wozniak I. M.C.L. § 418.351(2), 418.356(3), and 418.357(1); MSA 17.237(351)(2), 17.237(356)(3), and 17.237(357)(1). Since both M.C.L. § 418.351(2); MSA 17.237(351)(2)...