State v. Holsworth

Decision Date14 February 1980
Docket NumberNos. 45976,46000,46046,45869,46258 and 46309,45999,s. 45976
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Patrick Jerome HOLSWORTH, Donald Frank McMillan, Anthony Akridge, and Ernest James Stringer, Respondents. STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Donald Carl DENNIS, Petitioner. STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Alvin GALLEGOS, Petitioner. STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Richard Lee BOYD, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Norman K. Maleng, Pros. Atty., Philip Y. Killien, David Boerner, J. Robin Hunt, Marilyn Showalter, Julie Baute, Gregory P. Canova, Betsy R. Hollingsworth, Barbara D. Johnson, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for State.

Thomas, Whittington & Anderson, Patrick B. Anderson, Issaquah, for petitioner Gallegos.

John G. Ziegler, Seattle, for petitioners Dennis and Boyd and respondents Holsworth et al.

Robert Olson, King County Public Defender Assn., Seattle, for petitioner Dennis.

HOROWITZ, Justice.

These cases concern the claimed right of a criminal defendant to challenge the use in an habitual criminal proceeding of certain prior convictions entered before the decision of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The convictions allegedly violate the standards for valid guilty pleas set forth in that case.

Seven cases are consolidated for this appeal. Three of the cases have been decided by the Court of Appeals. In two unpublished decisions the Court of Appeals, Division I, upheld the trial court's consideration in habitual criminal proceedings of convictions on pre-Boykin guilty pleas. State v. Dennis, No. 5924-I (January 8, 1979); State v. Gallegos, No. 5695-I (August 24, 1978). In another case the Court of Appeals, Division I, allowed attacks on the use of a pre-Boykin conviction, but upheld a trial court determination that the defendant had not shown the challenged guilty pleas to be involuntary. State v. Boyd, 21 Wash.App. 465, 586 P.2d 878 (1978). A footnote, added to the Court of Appeals decision in Dennis after it was filed, provides as an alternative justification for the holding the defendant's failure to prove the invalidity of his prior guilty pleas. Dennis, supra, n. 1.

Relying on the Court of Appeals decision in Boyd, supra, in the four other prosecutions against Holsworth, McMillan, Akridge and Stringer the King County Superior Court dismissed habitual criminal proceedings in which pre-Boykin convictions on guilty pleas were relied on by the State. This court took direct review of the single issue raised in those cases and consolidated the dismissed cases with the three petitions for review granted in the Court of Appeals decisions.

Review has been granted only on the issue of the admissibility of convictions based on pre-Boykin guilty pleas. The seven defendants share the following characteristics:

(1) Each defendant challenges the use of convictions on guilty pleas entered before Boykin, supra, which requires that in order for a guilty plea to be valid the defendant must be apprised of the nature and consequences of the offense to which he pleads guilty. Either one or both of these disclosures allegedly were not made to the defendant at the time of the prior plea. 1

(2) If the State cannot use the challenged conviction, the defendant cannot be sentenced under the habitual criminal statute, RCW 9.92.090.

(3) All but one of the defendants was represented by counsel when the challenged pre-Boykin guilty plea was entered. 2

(4) The defendant is not challenging the pre-Boykin conviction itself, so as to set it aside, but only its use in the instant habitual criminal proceeding.

This opinion considers the following questions raised:

(1) Can the defendant in an habitual criminal proceeding attack the use of convictions based on pre-Boykin guilty pleas which allegedly do not meet the criteria for valid guilty pleas set out in that case and in prior Washington cases?

(2) If attack on the use of pre-Boykin pleas in habitual criminal proceedings is allowed, does the State or the defendant have the burden of proving the validity or invalidity of a guilty plea and the prior conviction based thereon?

We hold that the defendant in an habitual criminal proceeding can attack the use of convictions based on pre-Boykin guilty pleas and that the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior conviction was based on a valid guilty plea. Disposition of the individual causes will follow an analysis of our holding.

I.

USE OF PRE-BOYKIN PLEAS. Boykin v. Alabama, supra, overturned the conviction of a robbery defendant based on his plea of guilty. The record did not show that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea and waived his constitutional rights to confront his accusers and to jury trial and against self-incrimination. Justice Douglas, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, stated that criminal defendants who plead guilty demand "the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence," Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, and thus established the rule that the pleading defendant must be apprised of the nature of the offense and the consequences of pleading guilty, in order for the plea to be accepted as knowing, intelligent and voluntary.

To be made sufficiently aware of the nature of the offense, the defendant must be advised of the essential elements of the offense; he must be given "notice of what he is being asked to admit." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2258, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). 3 The consequences of which the defendant must be advised include not only the sentencing alternatives possible, including specifically any mandatory minimum or possible maximum sentence for the offense to which he pleads guilty. The defendant must also be apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to confront accusers, and to jury trial. He must be made aware that his guilty plea necessarily waives those rights. Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.

Although neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has ruled on the issue, Boykin has generally not been applied retroactively. See, e. g., Moss v. Craven, 427 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1970). A rule is applied "retroactively" to events occurring before the rule's promulgation. See Pape v. Department of Labor & Ind., 43 Wash.2d 736, 740-41, 264 P.2d 241 (1953). When retroactive application of a new rule is allowed, it is often accomplished through a collateral attack of the conviction obtained through violation of the rule, e. g., through a personal restraint petition complaining that incarceration is unjustified rather than through appeal of the conviction itself, which is often precluded by time limitations. This court has declined to apply retroactively a rule designed to effectuate Boykin in Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 501, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976).

Construing the challenge to the use of pre-Boykin pleas in habitual criminal proceedings as an inappropriate collateral retroactive attack on the pleas themselves, the State argues that Boykin must not be applied to invalidate these convictions for that purpose of enhanced sentencing.

However, the attack in an habitual criminal proceeding on the use of pre-Boykin pleas is neither collateral nor retroactive. The challenge instead is to the present use of an invalid plea in a present criminal sentencing process.

An analogy must be drawn to Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that it was reversible error to admit, for purposes of enhanced sentencing under an habitual criminal statute, evidence of a prior conviction by guilty plea entered by a defendant unrepresented by counsel at the time of the plea. The conviction whose use was successfully challenged in Burgett had occurred before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), established the right to counsel. But the Supreme Court refused to allow use of the prior conviction because admission of the evidence would have in effect "renewed" the deprivation of the defendant's constitutional rights.

The State attempts to distinguish the Gideon/Burgett analysis as dealing with the right of constitutional magnitude, characterizing the Boykin right to be made aware of the nature of the offense and the consequences of pleading guilty as "merely prophylactic," i. e., that failure to afford the defendant his Boykin rights is not significant if the danger Boykin was intended to thwart unwitting waiver of the constitutional rights to jury trial, to confront accusers, and to remain silent is otherwise avoided. It is true, as noted by the State, that the right to counsel may be more assiduously guarded, perhaps because it may help insure the existence of Boykin disclosures. Unlike the disclosure requirements of Boykin, the Gideon right to counsel is specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. U.S.Const. amend. 6. But protection of the defendant's right to due process, which is likewise explicitly included in the Bill of Rights, U.S.Const. amend. 5, depends on the defendant's knowledge of the information which must be disclosed under Boykin. Henderson v. Morgan, supra.

Both Gideon and Boykin, then, are "merely prophylactic" to the extent they insure the existence of procedures which protect the defendant's constitutional rights to remain silent, to confront his accusers, and to trial before a jury. Extension of the Burgett analysis to the use of pre-Boykin pleas which were not adequately informed is justified by the importance of full disclosure to valid waiver of these constitutional rights through the plea of guilty. This is true regardless of whether the defendant was represented by counsel or not, since...

To continue reading

Request your trial
171 cases
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • October 3, 1985
    ...criminal status. We hold he cannot. The resolution of the issue requires addressing a question left unanswered by State v. Holsworth, 93 Wash.2d 148, 607 P.2d 845 (1980). We must outline the scope of a defendant's constitutional right to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea. See Boy......
  • State v. Chervenell
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1983
    ...offender proceeding violates anew the defendant's constitutional rights by renewing the original violation. State v. Holsworth, 93 Wash.2d 148, 157, 607 P.2d 845 (1980). Once the defendant raises the issue of a past conviction's constitutional validity, therefore, the State must prove its v......
  • State v. Manussier
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • August 8, 1996
    ...State v. Murdock, 91 Wash.2d 336, 340, 588 P.2d 1143 (1979); State v. Furth, 5 Wash.2d 1, 11, 104 P.2d 925 (1940); State v. Holsworth, 93 Wash.2d 148, 159, 607 P.2d 845 (1980); Kelly, 52 Wash.2d at 678, 328 P.2d 362.122 Furth, 5 Wash.2d at 18-19, 104 P.2d 925 (citing cases); see also Murdoc......
  • State v. Witherspoon
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • October 16, 2012
    ...burden the State had to meet to prove the existence of prior convictions, our Supreme Court settled the issue. In State v. Holsworth, 93 Wash.2d 148, 159, 607 P.2d 845 (1980), the court held, “The existence of three valid felony convictions is an element of the habitual criminal status whic......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT