Doe v. Williams

Decision Date05 March 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. KEN–11–454.
PartiesJohn DOE I et al. v. Robert WILLIAMS et al.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James E. Mitchell, Esq., (orally), and Elizabeth H. Mitchell, Esq., Jim Mitchell and Jed Davis, P.A., Augusta, for appellants John Does I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XIII, XVI, XVIII, XXIV, and XLIII.

Ronald W. Bourget, Esq., Law Offices of Ronald Bourget, Augusta, for appellants John Does XIX and XXIII.

William J. Schneider, Attorney General, Paul Stern, Dep. Atty. Gen., Laura Yustak Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ronald Lupton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine.

Paul Stern, Dep. Atty. Gen., (orally), for appellee State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.

Dissent: ALEXANDER, SILVER, and JABAR, JJ.

MEAD, J.

[¶ 1] John Does I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XIII, XVI, XVIII, XXIV, and XLIII, joined by John Does XIX 1 and XXIII, appeal from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) in favor of numerous State officials on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The Does challenge the constitutionality of Maine's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999), 34–A M.R.S. §§ 11201– 11256 (2012). We affirm the trial court's judgment, concluding that SORNA of 1999 as amended following our decision in State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 A.2d 4, does not violate the constitutional rights of the litigants before us.

I. BACKGROUND 2

[¶ 2] John Doe I was previously before us in Doe v. District Attorney, 2007 ME 139, 932 A.2d 552. John Doe I pleaded guilty to and was convicted of unlawful sexual contact with a family member, id. ¶ 2, and in 1985 was sentenced to five years' imprisonment with all but sixty days suspended and two years' probation. He has not been convicted of any sex offenses since.

[¶ 3] In 2005, the Legislature amended SORNA of 1999 to apply retroactively to all sex offenders sentenced on or after January 1, 1982. P.L.2005, ch. 423, § 1 (effective Sept. 17, 2005) (codified at 34–A M.R.S. § 11202(1) (2012)); see Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 14, 932 A.2d 552. John Doe I sued several State officials in their official capacities, arguing that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 violated his rights to procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and a civil jury trial, pursuant to the Maine and United States Constitutions. Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 5, 932 A.2d 552. Upon the State officials' motion to dismiss, the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.) dismissed John Doe I's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. ¶ 1. John Doe I appealed, and we concluded that (1) further factual development was required to determine whether SORNA of 1999 was an unconstitutional ex post facto law 3 as applied to him,4 and (2) he should not have been foreclosed from pursuing his other theories of relief. Id. ¶¶ 1, 36–37. We then remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on those issues. Id. ¶ 37. On remand, John Doe I's case was consolidated with cases brought by other convicted sex offenders who were also challenging the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999.

[¶ 4] In 2009, the Legislature created an exception from the duty to register for sex offenders meeting certain criteria who were sentenced on or after January 1, 1982, and before June 30, 1992. P.L.2009, ch. 365, § B–3 (effective Sept. 12, 2009) (codified at 34–A M.R.S. § 11202–A(1) (2009)).5 Sex offenders fall within the exception if, among other criteria, their underlying convictions did not include more than one Class A sex offense or sexually violent offense, they had no prior sex offense convictions, and they had no subsequent convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. 34–A M.R.S. § 11202–A(1)(A)(F). Because of the newly enacted exception, many of the John Does became eligible for relief from the duty to register and withdrew from the litigation. Some Does who were eligible for relief, however, chose to continue with the litigation along with the Does who were ineligible for relief.

[¶ 5] We decided Letalien shortly after 34–A M.R.S. § 11202–A(1) became effective. Pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1995, Letalien's sentence included a requirement that he register for fifteen years on the State's sex offender registry; the sentence provided that after five years Letalien could seek a waiver “upon a finding that [he] ‘ha[d] shown a reasonable likelihood that registration is no longer necessary and waiver of the registration requirement is appropriate.’ Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 5, 985 A.2d 4 (quoting 34–A M.R.S.A § 11121(6)(C) (Supp.1996)). While Letalien was on probation, the Legislature enacted SORNA of 1999, which required him to register for life, prevented him from seeking a waiver, and established additional reporting requirements. Id. ¶¶ 6–8 (citing P.L.1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective Sept. 18, 1999) (codified at 34–AM.R.S.A. §§ 11201–11252 (Pamph.1999))). Letalien challenged SORNA of 1999 as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions. Id. ¶ 1. We concluded that SORNA of 1999 “impose[d]an ex post facto punishment as to offenders sentenced in the years before the effective date of [the statute] for whom registration was a required part of their sentence and who were subsequently made subject to the more burdensome requirements.” Id.

[¶ 6] In response to the Letalien decision, the Legislature amended SORNA of 1999 by enacting P.L.2009, ch. 570 (effective Mar. 30, 2010) (codified at 34–A M.R.S. §§ 11202–A, 11222, 11225–A (2012)). The amendments extended the exception from registration provided by P.L.2009, ch. 365, § B–3, making it available to qualifying offenders sentenced through September 18, 1999, the effective date of SORNA of 1999.6See P.L.2004, ch. 570, § 1. The amendments also changed the reporting requirements for offenders' registration information, such as residence and place of employment. P.L.2004, ch. 570, § 4. Ten-year registrants are now subject to annual verification in writing and in-person verification once every five years. 34–A M.R.S. § 11222(4–A). Lifetime registrants are now subject to quarterly verification in writing and in-person verification once every five years. Id. § 11222(4–B). Additionally, if a law enforcement agency with jurisdiction over a registrant or the State Bureau of Identification has “reason to believe the [registrant's] appearance has changed significantly,” the agency or Bureau may instruct the registrant to appear in person with a current photograph or to allow a new photograph to be taken, or may instruct the registrant to submit a new photograph without appearing in person. Id. § 11222(4–A)(C)(1)(2), (4–B)(C)(1)(2).

[¶ 7] John Does I, IV, V,7 VI, VIII, and XVI were initially required to register, but successfully petitioned to be removed. John Doe XXIV was also required to register, but he obtained a temporary restraining order preventing his information from being publically posted; he later successfully petitioned for removal from the registry. John Does VII, XIII, and XVIII obtained temporary restraining orders relieving them from registering, and they were also statutorily relieved of the registration requirement. John Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII 8 remain on the registry and have viable claims.

[¶ 8] The Does and State defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court issued its decision on the cross-motions on August 18, 2011, denying the Does' motion on all of their claims, and granting the State defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the cases of the Does who successfully petitioned to be relieved from the duty to register were moot, and that SORNA of 1999 as amended after Letalien was constitutional. The court also denied the Does' motion for attorney fees.

[¶ 9] The Does make numerous claims on appeal, namely that (A) the claims of the John Does who are no longer required to register as sex offenders are not moot; (B) SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law; (C) SORNA of 1999 violates article I, section 1 of the Maine Constitution; (D) SORNA of 1999 violates their procedural due process rights; (E) SORNA of 1999 violates their substantive due process rights; (F) SORNA of 1999 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Maine and United States Constitutions; (G) SORNA of 1999 violates the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 4681–4685 (2012); (H) SORNA of 1999 violates 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (Lexis 2012); (I) summary judgment was improperly granted; and (J) they are entitled to an award of attorney fees.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 10] This case comes before us on a grant of summary judgment in favor of the State defendants, which we review de novo and will affirm “if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Levesque v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 114, ¶ 5, 56 A.3d 1227 (quotation marks omitted). Because we find that there are no genuine issues of material facts in dispute, we evaluate whether the State defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is properly granted when “the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of [his] cause of action.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶ 11] The Does' arguments based on procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and the Ex Post Facto Clause challenge the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999. Accordingly, the Does have “the burden of establishing [the statute's] infirmity.” See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 15, 985 A.2d 4 (quotation marks omitted). We review challenges to...

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