U.S. v. Wooden, 14

Decision Date14 July 1995
Docket NumberD,No. 14,14
Citation61 F.3d 3
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Anthony WOODEN, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 93-1702.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Darrell B. Fields, the Legal Aid Soc. Federal Defender Div., New York City, for defendant-appellant.

Daniel J. Fetterman, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City (Mary Jo White, U.S. Atty. for the S.D.N.Y., Guy Petrillo, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, WINTER, and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges.

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

Anthony Wooden appeals from Judge Sweet's affirmance of a conviction following a three-day bench trial before Magistrate Judge Roberts. Wooden claims that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction because the government failed to prove the requisite intent for "knowingly and willfully obstruct[ing] and retard[ing] the passage of the mail." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1701. Wooden also claims that the Magistrate Judge applied an incorrect legal standard with respect to willfulness. We affirm.

Wooden was a United States Postal Service Mail Carrier. He was assigned to the Fordham Station in the Bronx, a mail station with apparently more than its share of administrative difficulties. Indeed, the manager of the Fordham Station, one Larry Passiatore, had apparently been criticized for his management and had even directed that backlogged mail be driven around during postal inspections so that it would not be discovered. Wooden himself had a desk full of backlogged mail and often argued with his supervisors about his workload.

On February 24, 1992, Wooden became ill. He called in and told the substitute carrier about two bags of mail at a particular relay box. Upon opening one of the bags, this carrier discovered unsequenced mail--not in order of route--dating back to the previous September. Unsequenced mail is not supposed to leave the station. The bag--and another similar bag found on Wooden's route--were brought to Passiatore, who promptly called in postal inspectors.

After searching the relay boxes on Wooden's mail route, postal inspectors recovered 946 pieces of unsequenced, undelivered mail. On March 3, 1992, postal inspectors interviewed Wooden, who signed a written statement acknowledging that he did "delay" mail and that he would leave mail in relay boxes until he got around to sequencing it.

Magistrate Judge Roberts found Wooden guilty after a three-day bench trial. Wooden claimed that he had been assured by a postal inspector that the matter would be handled "administratively" and that he had previously been directed by Passiatore to take the unsequenced mail out of the station to avoid its observation by postal inspectors. Wooden also contended that his written statement consisted solely of what a postal inspector told him to write. Magistrate Judge Roberts found "the defendant's testimony at trial not credible; rather, I find defendant's statement to the Postal Inspectors credible and consistent with all of the evidence in the case."

Wooden appealed to the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 58(g)(2)(B) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3402. Judge Sweet affirmed the conviction. The instant appeal followed. However, both parties agreed to a remand for clarification on the issue of whether the Magistrate Judge had found Wooden guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court remanded to the Magistrate Judge, who confirmed that she had found Wooden guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Sweet again affirmed, and the instant appeal was reinstated.

To prove a violation of Section 1701, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant willfully and knowingly obstructed or retarded the passage of the mails. E.g., United States v. Upshaw, 895 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Schankowski, 782 F.2d 628, 631 (6th Cir.1986). The main issue on this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Wooden had the requisite willfulness.

We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 530 (1988), and defer to the credibility determinations of the trier of fact with respect to conflicts in the testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 548 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 828 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986). In addition, the issue for us is whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Brown, 937 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 917, 112 S.Ct. 323, 116 L.Ed.2d 264 (1991).

Wooden is correct that an illegitimate or improper intent is required for a conviction under Section 1701 and that an inadvertent or negligent delay of the mail...

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4 cases
  • U.S. v. Doyle
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • December 4, 1997
    ...be different. For purposes of the appeal, however, we accept the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, United States v. Wooden, 61 F.3d 3, 5 (2d Cir.1995), and note that appellants do not contest the sufficiency of the A. Background In January, 1986, the President of the Unit......
  • United States v. Marshall
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • June 4, 2014
    ...willful action requires proof only that a defendant had an “illegitimate or improper intent” to obstruct deliverance of the mail. 61 F.3d 3, 5 (2d Cir.1995). Marshall, in contrast, suggests that “willfulness” is shown only when a defendant knew his conduct was unlawful at the time he engage......
  • United States v. Marshall
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • November 9, 2012
    ...or improper intent . . . and that an inadvertent or negligent delay of the mail does not violate [the statute]." United States v. Wooden, 61 F.3d 3, 5 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence that carrier concealed mail by placing it in arelay box rather than delivering it supported finding of......
  • Keigney-Rodriguez v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • August 7, 2017

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