Sloan v. Pacific R.R.
| Decision Date | 31 October 1875 |
| Citation | 61 Mo. 24 |
| Parties | WILLIAM S. SLOAN, et al., Appellants, v. THE PACIFIC RAILROAD, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Johnson County Circuit Court.
Rogers & White, for Appellants.
I. The law impairs no provision of the contract. The word “rates” in § 12 of the Act of 1849 (Sess. Acts 1849, p. 219,) gives only the right to charge proportionate amounts. The word “toll” has the same meaning. (N. E. Express Co. vs. Me. C. R. R. Co., 57 Me., 188.) This contract confers no right upon the company with which this law comes in conflict.
1. The claim of defendant, that it is specially exempt from legislation in respect to its regulation of rates, is not in terms stated in the charter, and does not exist.
2. Defendant, as a corporation, is a person and like a natural person, subject to general legislation. (1 Bouv. L. Dic., 318; Prov. B'k vs. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Thorp vs. R. B. R. R., 27 Vt., 140; West Riv. Bridge vs. Dix, 6 How., 507; 2 Kent. Com., 291, 7 Ed.)
3. The common law obligations of common carriers is to make no unjust discriminations or unreasonable charges which this statute enforces. (N. E. Ex. Co. vs. Me. Cent. Railroad Co., 57 Me., 188; McDuffee vs. P. R. R. Co., 52 N. H., 430; C. & A. R. R. Co. vs. People, -- Ill., --; Harris vs. Packwood, 3 Taunt., 264.)
4. Franchises are property, and, as such, subject to all such rules and regulations as the good of the community may require. (West Riv. Bridge vs. Dix, 6 How. 507; Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet., 420; R. F. & P. R. v. vs. Louiza, 13 How., 71; Turnpike Co. vs. State, 3 Wall., 210; The Binghampton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51 [three Judges dissented]; Peters vs. St. L. & I. M. R. R., 23 Mo., 107.)
II. This law impairs no valid contract of the charter within the meaning of the Constitution.
1. Franchises are a branch of the king's prerogative, which belong to the State like other property, as a corporate body; and are granted by the legislature as agents of the State. As State agents the legislature cannot make a contract conveying away legislative power.
2. The franchises of defendant belong directly to the members, or are held in trust for them as property. The fundamental obligation of every member of the community as the organic principle of civilized society, is that each person holds his rights of person and property subject to all needful regulations for the common good. There is, therefore, no power in the government to release any person or property from this obligation.
3. The clause of the Constitution as to laws impairing the obligation of contracts applies entirely to legislation concerning private rights depending upon contracts, and has no reference to legislation that has for its object the general good. (Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518, 6 How., 511, 27 Vt., 140, cited above; Peters vs. St. L. & I. M. R. R., 23 Mo., 107; Gorman vs. Pacific R. R., 26 Mo., 441.) This law belongs to the class of general legislation known as a police regulation. (C. & N. W. R. R. vs. Fuller, 17 Wall., 560; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. vs. Attorney General, before cited; 2 Bill of Rights., § 1, Const. 1820; Phalen vs. Comm. Va., 8 How., 163.)
4. A railway franchise is an agency in the company to exercise a State function in operating a public highway. Defendant cannot make any discriminations in the beneficial use of the function. (Olcott vs. Board of Supervisors, 16 Wall., 678, Id., 673; Piqua Bank vs. Knoup, 1 Ohio St., 602, Id., 622; Cool. Const. Lim., 533.)
5. Defendant has, by its grant, the equivalent to the assessments and contributions to make and operate a highway belonging to the State as its tolls. These tolls must therefore be levied in the most just proportions. (Puffendorf, book 7, ch. 9, cases cited above.)
6. The right to regulate its toll, cannot be vested in defendant as a franchise, or as an incident to the franchise to take toll, or as a covenant annexed to that franchise. The right is simply legislative, when it affects the public interest.
7. The claim of the defendant is in conflict with the policy of our government, and is in conflict with sections 1, 2 and 20 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 1820.
James Baker, with J. N. Litton, for Respondent.
I. The charter of defendant is a contract between the State and defendant, which cannot be altered without defendant's consent. Said charter conferred on defendant the exclusive right and power to establish the rates to be charged and received by it for the transportation of freight and passengers on its road, and the act in question, so far as it interferes with this right and power, is void. .)
II. Common carriers, whether corporations or natural persons, must treat all persons alike under similar circumstances, and are prohibited from making unjust discriminations. But the question whether a discrimination is unjust or not, is a judicial question, and for the determination of courts, and not the legislature. ( .)
III. The discrimination, complained of in this case, was reasonable and just, and was the result of a necessity, which could not be controlled by the defendant or the legislature. ( NAPTON, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
On the first day of April, 1872, the legislature of this State passed an act entitled “An act to prevent unjust discriminations and extortions in the rates to be charged by the different railroads in this State for the transportation of freights on said roads.” The first section of this act is as follows:
“No railroad corporation organized or doing business in this State, under any act of incorporation or general law of this State, now in force or which may hereafter be enacted, shall directly or indirectly charge or collect for the transportation of goods, merchandise or property on its said road, for any distance, any larger or greater amount as toll or compensation than is at the same [time] charged or collected for the transportation of similar quantities of the same class of goods, merchandise or property over a greater distance upon the same road; nor shall such corporation charge different rates for receiving, handling or delivering freight at different points on its road, or roads connected therewith which it has a right to use; nor shall any such railroad corporation charge or collect for the transportation of goods, merchandize or property over any portion of its road a greater amount as toll or compensation than shall be charged or collected by it for the transportation of similar quantities of the same class of goods, merchandise or property, over any other portion of its road of equal distance; and all such rules, regulations or by-laws of any railroad corporation as fix, prescribe or establish any greater toll or compensation than is herein before prescribed, are hereby declared to be void.”
The third section of this act prohibited any railroad company from increasing its rates of toll for transportation, &c., from one point to another, by reason of any decrease in its rates required by the first section, and declared that the rate of toll after the passage of the act should not be altered from what it was in the same month and day in the year, 1871.
The fourth section declared a forfeiture of one thousand dollars for any breach of this act, to be recovered by any person aggrieved.
This suit is for a violation of this act by the defendant, setting out thirty-one breaches of the act, and claiming $1,000 for each breach. In each count the allegation is that defendant charged and received a greater sum for transporting certain merchandise from St. Louis to Warrensburg than it charged for transporting the same class of freight in similar quantities from St. Louis to Kansas City, the distance from St. Louis to Kansas City being 63 12 miles greater than from St. Louis to Warrensburg.
The defendant answered, admitting the facts charged, but asserting that under its charter, dated March 12, 1849, and an amendatory act passed March 1, 1851, and under the act of March 31, 1868, the right to regulate its rates of freight, etc., was left exclusively to defendant. The answer, moreover, alleges that the rates were reasonable, and that the discrepancy stated was owing to the...
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