Chicago & W.I.R. Co. v. Guthrie

Decision Date24 October 1901
Citation192 Ill. 579,61 N.E. 658
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
PartiesCHICAGO & W. I. R. CO. v. GUTHRIE et al.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Cook county court; O. N. Carter, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company against Ossian Guthrie and others. From a judgment requiring the petition to pay certain expenses of defendants, petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

Edgar A. Bancroft, for appellant.

Matz, Fisher & Boyden, for appellees.

HAND, J.

This is an appeal by the petitioner in a condemnation proceeding from an order of the county court of Cook county requiring it to pay to the defendants threefourths of their attorney's and stenographer's fees incurred in the defense of said proceeding; petitioner having failed to make payment of full compensation for the property condemned within the time fixed by the court. The appellant filed its petition on June 9, 1897, to condemn eight lots owned by certain of the appellees as tenants in common. Summons was issued, returnable to the following August term. The case was tried at the March term, 1899, and resulted in a verdict for $26,500, upon which, on August 24th of the same year, judgment was rendered, from which judgment an appeal was prayed by the petitioner, but not perfected. Said judgment did not fix a definite time within which the petitioner should take the property and make payment of full compensation therefor. On June 29, 1900, the appellees applied to the court to fix such time, and, the petitioner having been notified of such application, on July 6th following the court entered an order fixing 20 days from that date as the time within which the petitioner must take and pay for the property. Within the 20 days the petitioner took two of said lots, and paid therefor, $6,500. On December 7, 1900, appellees applied to the court for an order for the payment to them by the petitioner of all costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees paid or incurred by them in defense of said petition upon the property not taken and paid for; and upon a hearing the court found that the petitioner had failed to make payment of full compensation for six of the lots condemned within the time fixed by the order of the court entered on July 6, 1900, and ordered the petition to pay to the appellees sums aggregating $2,293.63, as their expenses and reasonable attorney's fees.

It is first contended by the appellant that the amendment of May 14, 1897, in force July 1, 1897, to section 10 of the eminent domain law (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 839, c. 47, § 10), which section is as follows (the amendment being in italics): ‘The judge or court shall, upon such report, proceed to adjudge and make such order as to right and justice shall pertain, ordering that petitioner enter upon such property and the use of the same upon payment of full compensation as ascertained as aforesaid, within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court, and such order, with evidence of such payment, shall constitute complete justification of the taking of such property: provided, that in case the petitioner shall dismiss said petition before the entry of such order or shall fail to make payment of full compensation within the time named in such order, that then such court or judge shall, upon application of the defendants to said petition or either of them, make such order in such cause for the payment by the petitioner of all costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees of such defendant or defendants paid or incurred by such defendant or defendants in defense of said petition, as upon the hearing of such application shall be right and just, and also for the payment of the taxable costs

,’-should not be given a retroactive effect, so as to apply to this proceeding, which was commenced prior to the time when said amendment went into effect. We do not agree with such contention. Such amendment merely affects the method of procedure,-the remedy; and the law is well settled that there can be no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure, and that, while the general rule is that statutes will not be so construed as to give them a retrospective operation unless it clearly appears that such was the legislative intention, still when the change merely affects the remedy or the law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforceable under the new procedure, without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change in the law, and without regard to whether suit had been instituted or not, unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation. Railway Co. v. Hall, 67 Ill. 99;Dobbins v. Bank, 112 Ill. 553;Winslow v. People, 117 Ill. 152, 7 N. E. 135;Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Wenona, 163 Ill. 288, 45 N. E. 265;Woods v. Soucy, 166 Ill. 407, 47 N. E. 67. In Railway Co. v. Hall, supra, a proceeding to condemn land for a right of way was commenced under the act of 1852 relating to that subject; but before a trial was had the act of 1872 had taken effect, and it was held that the assessment of damages was properly made under the latter act. The court say: ‘Where proceedings of this character were in fieri, it would necessarily follow that they must be completed under the new law. The state has the right to say...

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35 cases
  • Becker v. Hopper
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • 27 Enero 1914
    ...... Clark v. Darr, (Ind.) 60 N.E. 688; Barclift v. Fields, (Ala.) 41 So. 84; Ry. Co. v. Guthrie,. (Ill.) 61 N.E. 658; Lumber Co. v. Gottschalk,. (Cal.) 22 P. 860; Groesbeck v. Barget, ......
  • White v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 2-97-0481
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 31 Marzo 1998
    ...that "there can be no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure" (Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co. v. Guthrie, 192 Ill. 579, 581, 61 N.E. 658 (1901)) and "no vested right in any statutory remedy" (Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill.2d 342, 346, 122 N.E.2d 513 (1954)). A change ......
  • Talandis Const. Corp. v. Illinois Bldg. Authority, 76-939
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 23 Mayo 1978
    ......        [60 Ill.App.3d 716] . Page 238. [18 Ill.Dec. 85] Dennis M. O'Brien, Chicago (Schippers, Betar, Lamendella & O'Brien, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant, ... (Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Guthrie, 192 Ill. 579, 61 N.E. 658; Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995; ......
  • Jennie George v. Consolidated Lighting Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • 28 Enero 1914
    ...... 381, 16 Am. Rep. 729; Baltimore etc. R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 HOW 395, 13 L.Ed. 469; Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Guthrie, 192 Ill. 579, 61 N.E. 658;. Paterson etc. Co. v. DeGray, 70 N.J.L. 59,. ......
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