State v. Sowls

Decision Date31 January 1867
Citation61 N.C. 151
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesTHE STATE v. CALVIN SOWLS.
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

The distinction between Robbery and Forcible Trespass is, that in the former a felonious intention exists, and in the latter it does not.

The question of felonious intention, is one for the jury, acting under such instructions from the court as each case may require.

If, in March, 1865, one, who bona fide thought that he was acting under the orders of a Captain of the Home Guard, went to a dwelling house, and forcibly possessed himself of a sword, not for the purpose of appropriating it but solely to disarm the prosecutor; held, that it would not have been robbery.

Illustration of the difference in the duty of the court in cases where there is slight evidence, and in those where there is none.

By PEARSON, C. J., concurring, Forcible Trespass is the taking of the personal property of another by force; Robbery, the fraudulent taking of the personal property of another by force.

ROBBERY, tried at Fall Term, 1866, of the Superior Court of COLUMBUS, before his Honor, Gilliam, J.

Upon the trial it was shown that the defendant, with three others, armed with guns, went to the house of one Stanly, in his absence, his father and his wife being there, and asked if Stanly did not have a pistol, a gun and a sword. Upon being answered that he had a sword, but no gun or pistol, they ordered it to be delivered, which was done. The father and the wife of Stanly were in fear of them. They then asked for brandy, and being told that there was a little, kept for sickness, said we want it;” and, out of fear, this also was delivered, whereupon all but one of the party drank of it twice, and then left. Upon Mrs. Stanly's seeming to be much alarmed, one of the party said, “do not be alarmed, you shall not be hurt.”

Stanly testified that he was concealed in the woods that day out of fear of personal violence which had been threatened; also that in a conversation with the defendant during that term of the court, he confessed that he was one of those who took the sword, adding that he acted under the orders of J. W. Meares. Witness also said that Meares had been a Captain in a company of Home Guards in the State service, but that his company had been disbanded, and he then had put himself at the head of a band of men who went about the country robbing and plundering.

“Upon this evidence it was insisted by the counsel for the defendant that only a case of forcible trespass was established, and the court was requested so to instruct the jury; but the court refused to give the instructions asked for, and, after defining the offences of Robbery and Larceny, to which no exception was taken, instructed the jury that they could not convict the defendant unless they were satisfied from the evidence, beyond a rational doubt, that the taking and carrying away was with a felonious intent. If they were so satisfied, they might convict; otherwise, they would acquit. The court explained that the taking and carrying away are felonious, where the goods are taken against the will of the owner, either in his absence, or in a clandestine manner, or where possession is obtained either by force, or surprise, or by any trick, device, or fraudulent expedient, the owner not voluntarily parting with his entire interest in the goods, and where the taker intends in any such case fraudulently to deprive the owner of his entire interest in the property, against his will.

The counsel further requested the court to instruct the jury that, if they believed from the evidence that the defendant acted under the orders of Meares, believing that Meares had a lawful military command, they should acquit, whether Meares was authorized to give such orders or not. To this the court answered, there is no evidence that Meares had any military authority, or that the defendant acted under the belief that he had.”

The defedant was convicted.

Rule for a new trial; rule discharged; Judgment, and Appeal.

Attorney General, for the State .

No counsel for the defendant.

BATTLE, J.

The prisoner was indicted at common law for an alleged act of robbery from the person.

This offence is defined to be “a felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, and putting him in fear.” 2 East. P. C., 707; Roscoe's Cr. Ev., 890.

It must be done animo furandi, with a felonious intent to appropriate the goods taken to the offender's own use. Roscoe's Cr. Ev., 895. Although a person may wrongfully take the goods, yet unless he intended to assume the property in them, and to convert them to his own use, it will amount to a trespass only, and not to a felony. 1 Hale's P. C., 590. As an illustration of this principle, Mr. Roscoe cites a case which occurred in Scotland. A scuffle took place on the high road between the prosecutor and the prisoner, in the course of which the former was deprived of his hat, and a quantity of articles out of his pockets, which were aftewards found by the road side. But as it appeared that he was drunk at the time, and the articles might have been lost in the struggle, without any intent of felonious appropriation by the prisoner, the latter was acquitted. Roscoe's Cr. Ev., 896, citing Alison's Prin. Cr. Law of Scot., 358.

From these authorities it is apparent that the distinction between robbery and forcible trespass is, that in the former there is, and in the latter there is not, a felonious intention to take the goods, and appropriate them to the offender's own use. This rule of law seems plain enough, but there is often a doubt about its application, arising from the difficulty of ascertaining the true intent of the offender at the time of the taking. Now this intent is a question of fact, and must be submitted to the jury with such instructions from the court as the circumstances of each case may require.

Upon the facts disclosed by the testimony in this case, the only ground which the counsel for the prisoner could take to show the want of a felonious intent was, that...

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9 cases
  • State v. Brown, 61
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • 6 May 1980
    ...is whether there is any evidence of felonious intent. This Court considered the question of felonious intent in the case of State v. Sowls, 61 N.C. 151 (1866). There the defendant was charged with common law robbery. The State offered evidence tending to show that the defendant, who mistake......
  • State v. Lawrence, 1
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • 12 June 1964
    ...jury instructions with respect to the elements of robbery and especially those dealing with felonious intent as an element. State v. Sowls, 61 N.C. 151, is a leading case. By force and intimidation defendant took a sword from a house against the will of the occupants. He stated that he was ......
  • State v. Smith, 90
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • 28 September 1966
    ...is, and in the latter there is not, a felonious intention to take the goods, and appropriate them to the offender's own use.' State v. Sowls, 61 N.C. 151, 153--154. Accord, State v. Spratt, 265 N.C. 524, 144 S.E.2d 569. See David J. Sharpe, Forcible Trespass to Personal Property, 40 N.C.L.R......
  • State v. Spratt, 256
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • 3 November 1965
    ...there is, and in the latter there is not, a felonious intention to take the goods, and appropriate them to the offender's use.' State v. Sowls, 61 N.C. 151. A defendant is not guilty of robbery if he forcibly takes personal property from the actual possession of another under a bona fide cl......
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