Bever v. Spangler

• Citation: 93 Iowa 576,61 N.W. 1072
• Parties: BEVER ET AL. v. SPANGLER ET AL.
• Decision Date: 29 January 1895
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

93 Iowa 576

61 N.W. 1072

BEVER ET AL.

v.SPANGLER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 29, 1895.

Appeal from district court, Linn county; James D. Giffen, Judge.

On the 25th day of August, 1892, there was filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of Linn county, Iowa, for probate, a paper purporting to be the last will and testament of Sampson C. Bever, deceased. This paper bears date February 18, 1886, and to it is attached what appears to be a codicil, of date July 27, 1891. These papers are each signed by the maker, and witnessed according to law. A notice of hearing was immediately issued by the clerk of the aforesaid court, fixing the time for the probate of the will on October 10, 1892. On September 27, 1892, the contestants, Jane E. Spangler and Ellen C. Blake, who are daughters of Sampson C. Bever, appeared and filed written objections to the probate of the will, and contested the same on the grounds: (1) That at the time of the execution of the will and the codicil Sampson C. Bever was of unsound mind and mentally incapacitated from making a valid will; (2) that the alleged will and codicil were each procured and executed by fraud, duress, and undue influence of James L. and George W. Bever. After these objections were entered, the proponents filed a withdrawal of the codicil, and a renunciation of all claim thereunder, and asked that the original will only be admitted to probate. The proceeding on the issues thus formed came on for hearing to a jury, at the January term of the Linn district court, and, after a trial lasting more than four weeks, the jury returned a verdict that the paper presented for probate was not the valid will of Sampson C. Bever, deceased, and specially found that the will was not the result of fraud or undue influence, but did find that the deceased did not on February 18, 1886, have sufficient capacity to make a will. Proponents moved for a judgment on the special findings in their favor, and for a new trial as to the other issues. This motion was overruled, and judgment was entered denying admission to probate of the instrument filed, and alleged to be the last will and testament of Sampson C. Bever, and the proponents appeal. Affirmed.J. W. Jamison and Charles A. Clark, for appellants.

W. G. Thompson, Chas. E. Wheeler, Mills & Keeler, and Hubbard & Dawley, for appellees.

DEEMER, J.

Sampson C. Bever, an old and influential resident of the city of Cedar Rapids, died at his home in that city on August 22, 1892. At the time of his death he was 84 years of age. He was 78 years old when the paper in controversy, which purports to be his last will and testament. was executed. He left five children surviving him, to wit, Mrs. Jane E. Spangler, James L. Bever, George W. Bever, Ellen C. Blake, and John B. Bever, named in the order of their ages. His estate at the time of his death consisted of lands, town lots, bank stock, railroad stock, and bonds, and stock in other incorporations, of the aggregate value of about $650,000. At the time of the execution of the will Mrs. Spangler had no property except her homestead, which her father had built for her, and some $8,000 life insurance, which she received on the death of her husband. Her annual income, when her home was not rented, was $600 to $800, and when it was rented her income was increased to $1,100 or $1,200 per year. Mrs. Blake occupies a homestead built by her father, and had a merely nominal annual income. James L. Bever was worth in his own right about $37,000, and George W. Bever about $28,000. There is no showing as to what John B. Bever's circumstances were. Mrs. Spangler had one son, James L. Bever had two sons and one daughter, and Mrs. Blake one son and two daughters. The other children of the elder Bever were married, but had no children. By the terms of the will in question, Mrs. Spangler was given her homestead, worth from $25,000 to $30,000, and $10,000 of bank stock, worth $15,000. Mrs. Blake was given her homestead, and some other lots, the same amount of bank stock given to Mrs. Spangler, and $1,000 in stock of another bank; the aggregate value of the property devised to her being about the same as that given to Mrs. Spangler. The remainder of the estate, after deducting some small bequests, was, by the terms of the will, left to the three sons; James L. to receive about $200,000, and the other sons in the neighborhood of $175,000 each. The elder Bever came to Cedar Rapids in the year 1851, bringing with him about $30,000 in money. He also owned at this time four farms, three of them in Iowa and one in Illinois. One of these farms, consisting of about 530 acres, lying near the city of Cedar Rapids, was purchased by Bever in the early 50's for less than $4,000. The other real estate owned by him, except the homesteads of Mrs. Spangler and Mrs. Blake, were purchased about the same time for a few thousand dollars. This real estate, because of its situation and the natural rise in the value of landed property, was worth at the time of Mr. Bever's death more than half a million dollars. In 1859 or 1860, Mr. Bever, in connection with his son James L., began a private banking business in the city of Cedar Rapids, and in 1864 converted it into a national bank, with the elder Bever owning much the larger part of the stock. After the organization of the national bank, James L. and George W. Bever began investing their savings and doing business for themselves, until, by good management and fair dealing, they had accumulated, in 1886, about $56,000. James L. Bever was cashier of the bank, and George W. Bever vice president, and as such they drew salaries. We have stated these facts to show how the property of the deceased was accumulated, that we may the better understand the relative obligations he was under to his children. It may further be said in this connection that all his children treated him with the greatest respect and deference, and each administered to his wants in sickness and in health as best they knew. Mr. Bever was always welcome at the home of any of his children, and received every attention that filial affection would dictate. He seemed to make no distinction between his children, and always spoke of them in terms of love and endearment. These preliminary facts are set forth that we may better understand the case, and discuss the real issues between the parties presented to us for determination. From the preliminary statement preceding this opinion, it will be seen that the jury in the court below found against the contestants on the issue of fraud and undue influence, and in their favor on the issue of unsoundness of mind. The appeal is from this latter finding, and with the rulings of the court on this issue we will have to deal. The record is very voluminous, consisting of more than 1,300 pages of printed matter, and a large number of original exhibits, which have been certified up for our inspection. We have given the case the attention its importance demands, and proceed now to take up the errors assigned in the order in which they have been discussed by counsel.

1. Appellants' counsel strenuously, earnestly, and learnedly contend that the verdict finds no sufficient support in the testimony, and that a motion submitted by them at the close of the testimony to direct a verdict sustaining the will should have been sustained. This appeal does not present the case for trial to this court de novo. It comes to us on errors, and is to be treated as a law action, and the rules applicable to such cases on the questions thus presented by counsel are well understood. It has been announced time and again by this court that a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and such discretion will not be interfered with on appeal, unless it is manifest that it has been improperly exercised. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, the action of the court below in overruling a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal, unless a clear case of abuse of discretion is made to appear. We must be fully satisfied that the discretion of the court below has been improperly exercised in refusing a new trial, before we will disturb such ruling. These rules are undoubted. From the case of Freeman v. Rich, 1 Iowa, 504, decided in 1856, down to the present time, there has been no departure from these principles. Under our present system, giving to parties in law actions a right to trial by jury, these must of necessity be the rules governing appellate courts, else the constitutional guaranty is of no purpose. If we are to pass upon the real merits of the controversy, and finally determine the case upon the issues presented when there is a conflict in the testimony, then the jury has done no more than take a preliminary step necessary to pass the case to us, in order that we may review the testimony and pass the judgment which we think ought to be rendered. It is perfectly manifest that this is not the purpose of the jury system. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have seen fit to leave the settlement of important questions of fact in law cases to the determination of juries, and, when there is a conflict in the testimony, these jurors are charged with the duty of weighing the testimony presented on either side, and determining which of the conflicting statements shall be believed, and how the controversy shall be settled. Again, the trial judge who passes in review the findings of the jury has the opportunity of seeing the witnesses, and of observing their demeanor while on the stand. He must of necessity keep an ever-watchful eye upon the proceedings, and is much better able to arrive at the real facts in the case than we are; and it is our duty to accept his judgment, and respect his discretion, unless the findings are clearly, not doubtfully, against the manifest justice of the case. These same rules have been applied to contests of this...