Sandford v. Seabd. Air Line Ry
| Decision Date | 03 April 1908 |
| Citation | 79 S.C. 519,61 S.E. 74 |
| Parties | SANDFORD et al. v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
1. Constitutional Law—Equal Protection of the Laws.
The act of 1904 (24 St. at Large, p. 671), imposing a penalty on any railroad failing to transport goods within a reasonable time, treats all railroads alike, and does not deny to them the equal protection of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution and article 1, § 15, of the state Constitution.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 10, Constitutional Law, §§ 700, 701.]
2. Appeal — Harmless Error — Failure to Consider Question Raised.
The failure of the court to consider the question of the constitutionality of an act attacked by the pleadings is not cause for reversal where the act is valid.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, § 4034.]
3. Carriers—Regulation—Delay in Transportation of Goods—Penalties—Statutes.
Act 1907 (25 St. at Large, p. 490), entitled an act "to amend an act * * * to prevent delays in the transportation of freight by railroads, " approved March 25, 1904, by striking out certain words and inserting others in lieu thereof, and imposing on common carriers a penalty for failing to transport freight within areasonable time, operates as a repeal of Act 1904 (24 St. at Large, p. 671), so far as the same is inconsistent with the act of 1907.
4. Same—Actions for Penalties—Issues.
Where, in an action against a carrier for the penalties for delay in transporting goods, the carrier had by its bill of lading treated the goods as those of both plaintiffs, and there was testimony in corroboration of their ownership, the issue of ownership was for the jury, though counsel for plaintiffs during the trial inadvertently stated that one of plaintiffs was the sole owner, which statement he withdrew by the consent of the trial judge.
5. Same.
Where, in an action against a carrier for penalties for delay in the transportation of goods, a written bill of lading acknowledging the receipt of a car was admitted in evidence, a charge that the carrier was presumed to know what it was doing when it accepted the car, and that it could not be heard to say that it did not have possession thereof at the time it issued the bill of lading, was proper.
6. Trial — Instructions — Hypothetical
Statement of Facts.
An instruction which treats the matters hypothetically, and which declares the law applicable to the hypothesis, is not erroneous.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 442.]
7. Carriers — Bill op Lading — Ownership of Property—Presumptions.
Where a bill of lading declared that the consignee therein was the owner of the goods described therein, the presumption was that the consignee was the owner.
8. Same—Conclusiveness of Bill of Lading.
A carrier issuing a bill of lading acknowledging the receipt of a car on a designated date, which is the date of the bill, is concluded by the bill, and is estopped from claiming that it had not received the car, in the absence of evidence that the bill was misdated.
9. Same—Penalties for Delay—Evidence-Instructions.
Where, in an action against a carrier for penalties for delay in the transportation of goods, the evidence showed the issuance of a bill of lading on a designated date, acknowledging the receipt of a car on that date, an instruction that the jury in computing the time of delay should count from the time the shipment was actually received by the carrier or was within its control was properly refused.
10. Same.
In an action against a carrier for penalties for delay in the transportation of goods, Sundays are not to be included in the verdict.
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County, Geo. E. Prince, Judge.
Action by W. H. Sandford and another against the Seaboard Air Line Railway. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
E. L. Craig and Lyles & McMahan, for appellant.
James H. Fowles, Jr., and De Pass & De Pass, for respondents.
This action was commenced May 30, 1906, for the recovery of $185, and in the complaint therefor two causes of action—one for $50, for the loss of two bags of fertilizers and the expenses of resacking, and for other expenses incident to the injuries sustained by guano in the course of shipment and the extra expense incurred by the movement of such guano from the car and the other for $5 a day the statutory penalty for delay in the shipment. The defendant in its answer set up various defenses, one of which was, although the bill of lading was dated February 1, 1906, yet the car was delayed in its movement by reason of the Southern Railway Company offering defective cars for shipment of said fertilizer, and the defendant did not receive same until the 20th day of February, 1906, and other defenses of that character, wherefore the defendant denied that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from it. The trial came on to be heard before Judge Prince and a jury on May 10, 1907, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $150.45. Testimony was offered to show that the bill of lading was dated February 1, 1906, and was issued to the plaintiffs W. H. Sandford and J. I. Sally, but the goods consigned did not reach the consignees until the 3d day of March, 1906. The statute regulating the shipment required that $5 be paid for each day of delay in the said shipment, and that any injuries to the property shipped should be paid by the railway while the goods were in its possession. In his charge to the jury the circuit judge did not pass upon the question of constitutional law under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and also of article 1, § 15, of the state Constitution, but the circuit judge held that the defendant by its bill of lading issued on February 1, 1906, was bound to stand by that date, and that the effort to place the responsibility for the delay of the shipment of said goods so that they did not reach their destination until March 3, 1906, owing to the action of the Southern Railway Company would not release the defendant from its liability under its bill of lading dated February 1, 1906. And he submitted to the jury the question whether the plaintiff J. I. Sally was alone entitled to be considered as the owner of said fertilizers. The jury, as before stated, found a verdict for the plaintiff for $150.45. A motion for a new trial was made by the defendant on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the plaintiffs were the owners, and that there was no evidence as to who paid for the hauling of the fertilizers, and there was no evidence as to whose benefit the fertilizer was hauled. They also claimed in said motion that there was no evidence that the loss of fertilizer was due to the delay in shipment. They also claimed that it appeared from the evidence and admission of counsel that the purchase was made by J. I. Sally alone, and that he alone was the party in interest. The motion was overruled by the circuit judge. Thereupon the defendant appealed upon 11 exceptions. We will consider these exceptions in their order.
In disposing of the first exception, we hold that the act of 1904 (24 St. at Large, p. 671), under which the penalty in this action is sought, was not in violation of section 1, art. 14, Const. U. S. This question has been a vexed one for years in both the United States Supreme Court and the state courts. It is contended by the defendant that the statute in question endeavors to make a classification of property in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner; and the equality clause is violated. There is no doubt that class legislation discriminating against some and for others is prohibited, but upon reflection such is not the case here, for this court in the case of Simmons v. Telegraph Co., 63 S. C. 430, 41 S. E. 522, had held: "The decisions of the United...
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