State v. Ayala, 14379
| Citation | 610 A.2d 1162,222 Conn. 331 |
| Decision Date | 09 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 14379,14379 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Enrique AYALA. |
Michael A. Georgetti, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
Judith Rossi, Asst. State's Atty., with whom were Kevin Murphy, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., and, on the brief, John M. Bailey, State's Atty., and John O'Reilly, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Paul F. Thomas and Shelley R. Sadin, Bridgeport, filed a brief, for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation, as amicus curiae.
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, COVELLO, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the revocation of the defendant's pretrial release from confinement pursuant to General Statutes § 54-64f 1 violated the right of bail provision of article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution. 2 The defendant Enrique Ayala, while released on a $25,000 surety bond following his arrest on May 28, 1991, was arrested on June 12, 1991, and again on June 14, 1991. Upon a motion by the state to revoke the defendant's release, the trial court, Barry, J., after an evidentiary hearing, revoked the defendant's release on the basis that the state had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that another person would be endangered while the defendant was on release, and that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a federal, state or local crime while on release in violation of General Statutes § 54-64e. 3 In response to the defendant's petition for review, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-63g, 4 the Appellate Court granted review but denied the relief requested. This court thereafter granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal. State v. Ayala, 220 Conn. 922, 598 A.2d 365 (1991). 5 We conclude that the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
The record discloses the following undisputed facts. Subsequent to the defendant's arraignment on June 5, 1991, on charges that included burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101, unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95, risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 and assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61, 6 the defendant was released after posting a $25,000 surety bond. His release was conditioned on orders that expressly required him, inter alia, to stay away from the named victim and not to commit any federal, state or local crime during the period of release. See General Statutes § 54-64e. On June 12, 1991, while on release, the defendant was arrested and charged with assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60. He was released after posting a $50,000 surety bond. Two days later, on June 14, 1991, he was arrested and charged with threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 and was released after posting a $5000 surety bond.
The state filed a motion pursuant to § 54-64f to revoke the defendant's release alleging that (1) the defendant had been released on bail following his arrest on June 4, 1991, for a criminal offense punishable by more than ten years imprisonment, and (2) the defendant had violated the conditions of his release by violating the criminal laws of this state.
At the June 20, 1991 evidentiary hearing on the state's motion to revoke release held pursuant to § 54-64f(a), the state offered the testimony of I. Charles Mathews, deputy mayor of Hartford, who testified that, while on his way to a local radio station on the morning of June 12, 1991, he had been severely beaten about the head and body by a man wielding a steel pipe. 7 Mathews, who remained in the hospital for two days following the assault, required treatment for a head wound and received stitches in both legs. At the hearing, Mathews positively identified the defendant as his assailant and then testified that he had never seen the defendant before and did not know what had precipitated the attack. He further testified that he was receiving police protection and was in fear of the defendant.
The trial court, Barry, J., applying the criteria of subsection (c) of § 54-64f, 8 found that probable cause existed to believe that the defendant had committed a federal, state or local crime while on release, and further found by clear and convincing evidence that the safety of another person, namely Mathews, was endangered while the defendant was on release. It stated that these findings gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defendant's release should be revoked, which, it concluded, the defendant had failed to rebut. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant's release under the initial bond of $25,000 be revoked.
On July 19, 1991, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the first information or in the alternative to set new conditions of release. The trial court, Kocay, J., after hearing oral argument by the parties on July 31, 1991, denied the defendant's motion on August 2, 1991, and declined to set bond. On August 8, 1991, the defendant filed a motion for review of bond in the Appellate Court pursuant to § 54-63g. 9 On September 8, 1991, the Appellate Court granted the motion for review and denied the relief requested. The defendant filed a petition for certification in this court. On October 9, 1991, by a corrected order on the defendant's petition for certification to appeal; see footnote 5, supra; we granted certification on two questions: (1) procedurally, does this court have jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claim, and (2) substantively, does article first, § 8 of our state constitution, which establishes a right to bail in criminal prosecutions, render the bail revocation provisions of § 54-64f(c) unconstitutional in the circumstances of this case?
The first issue that we must address is whether this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the defendant's interlocutory appeal within the confines of our authority to certify appeals from the Appellate Court. If we conclude that such jurisdiction is lacking, the question then arises whether any other avenue of appellate review is appropriate in the particular circumstances of this case.
The statute that governs our certification jurisdiction is General Statutes § 51-197f, which provides that this court may certify cases for review "[u]pon final determination of any appeal by the appellate court...." This court has previously dismissed petitions for certification from decisions of the Appellate Court denying leave to appeal in a zoning matter; Ingersoll v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 194 Conn. 277, 278-79, 479 A.2d 1207 (1984); and denying relief on a motion for review. State v. Carter, 212 Conn. 811, 564 A.2d 1072 (1989). We have thus consistently observed the statutory mandate that our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Appellate Court is not plenary but is limited to final judgments by that court. We have never construed Practice Book § 4126, which describes our review of "causes" decided by the Appellate Court, as having been intended to enlarge our statutory jurisdiction.
In this case, the Appellate Court did not undertake finally to determine an appeal. Instead, in accordance with § 54-63g, the Appellate Court granted the defendant's petition for review of the revocation of his bail but denied the relief that he had requested. That decision was neither the determination of "an appeal" nor action that constituted a final judgment. In a criminal proceeding, there is no final judgment until the imposition of a sentence. State v. Coleman, 202 Conn. 86, 89, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987); State v. Grotton, 180 Conn. 290, 293, 429 A.2d 871 (1980).
It may be true, as the defendant contends, that some interlocutory orders are directly appealable to a court that has the statutory jurisdiction to hear them. The general rule is, however, that interlocutory orders in criminal cases are not immediately appealable. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978) (); Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 227-28, 49 S.Ct. 118, 120-21, 73 L.Ed. 275 (1929) (); State v. Atkins, 203 Conn. 33, 34, 522 A.2d 1234 (1987) (); In re Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), 195 Conn. 303, 306, 488 A.2d 778 (1985) (); State v. Longo, 192 Conn. 85, 89, 469 A.2d 1220 (1984) (); State v. Spendolini, 189 Conn. 92, 97, 454 A.2d 720 (1983) (); State v. Grotton, supra, 180 Conn. at 295-96, 429 A.2d 871 (); State v. Kemp, 124 Conn. 639, 646-47, 1 A.2d 761 (1938) (); compare State v. Aillon, 182 Conn. 124, 126, 438 A.2d 30 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1090, 101 S.Ct. 883, 66 L.Ed.2d 817 (1981) (). Notably, this court has reviewed, on appeal after a final judgment, a criminal defendant's claim that the trial court had violated his state constitutional right to be released on bail. State v. Olds, 171 Conn. 395, 404, 370 A.2d 969 (1976).
Even when we have entertained the possibility that an interlocutory order in a criminal case might warrant an immediate appeal; see State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 463 A.2d 566 (1983); we have recognized that "[t]he right of appeal is purely statutory." Id., at 30, 463 A.2d 566. The legislature has the authority to make interlocutory orders immediately appealable; see, e.g., General Statutes...
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