Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese Of Tulsa

• Decision Date: 13 July 2010
• Docket Number: 09-5095.,No. 09-5089,09-5089
• Citation: 611 F.3d 1238
• Parties: Monica Maria SKRZYPCZAK, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,v.ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF TULSA; Edward James Slattery, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

611 F.3d 1238

Monica Maria SKRZYPCZAK, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,v.ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF TULSA; Edward James Slattery, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 09-5089, 09-5095.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

July 13, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Daniel E. Smolen (Donald E. Smolen, II, with him on the briefs), of Smolen, Smolen & Roytman, PLLC, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

John B. Jarboe of Jarboe & Stoermer, P.C., Tulsa, OK, (J. Daniel Morgan of Newton, O'Connor, Turner & Ketchum, Tulsa, OK, with him on the briefs) for Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Before LUCERO, McKAY, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

In this case we consider whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa on a former employee's federal employment law claims, based on the ministerial exception to Title VII. After considering the parties' arguments and the evidence in the record before us, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed the claims.

BACKGROUND

In April of 1996, the Appellant, Monica Skrzypczak, began work as the director of the Department of Religious Formation for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa. As director, Appellant's principal responsibilities included, among other things, “[k]eep[ing] the Chancellor informed on [the] Department's activities”; “developing office goals, objectives, policies and programs” and overseeing their implementation; overseeing office staffing; promoting “intra- and inter-departmental collaboration and cooperation”; supervising “the Diocesan Resource Libraries”; and overseeing the budget in different offices. (Appellant's App. at 170.) Appellant's duties also required her to “[s]upervis[e] the Office of Religious Formation, Pastoral Studies Institute, and Office of Youth and Young Adult Ministry overseeing office communications, publications, and reports.” ¹ (Appellant's App. at 170.) Finally, it is undisputed that, in addition to having a supervisory role over the Pastoral Studies Institute, Appellant taught or facilitated numerous religious courses at the Institute from the fall of 1999 through the spring of 2007.²

Throughout her time as director of the Department of Religious Formation, Appellant allegedly received positive performance reviews but was ultimately terminated from her position in June of 2007. Following her termination, Appellant brought suit against the Diocese and the Bishop of the Diocese, Edward James Slattery, alleging, inter alia, gender and age discrimination. Specifically, Appellant brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for gender discrimination, disparate impact based on gender, and hostile work environment. Appellant also brought federal law claims for violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act, as well as two state law claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotion distress.

In response to these claims, the Diocese filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, claiming under the ministerial exception to Title VII the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant's federal employment law claims. The district court re-characterized the Diocese's motion as one brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Then, pointing to a copy of Appellant's job description the Diocese had attached to its motion, the court further converted the Diocese's motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and directed the parties to file supplemental materials in support of their positions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) ..., matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment.”). Following this ruling, Appellant filed a motion to extend the deadline for the supplemental briefs, alleging the Diocese had failed to respond to numerous discovery requests. The court denied this motion. Appellant then filed her supplemental brief accompanied by a motion to compel discovery.

After considering both parties' supplemental briefs, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Diocese on Appellant's federal claims based on the ministerial exception. In making this ruling, the district court disregarded three affidavits from various church officials that Appellant had submitted in opposition to the Diocese's motion. The court held these affidavits, each of which contained the exact statement based on language from a Fourth Circuit case, were “nothing more than conclusions of law” which failed to create a material issue of fact. (Appellant's App. at 223.) Finally, the court dismissed Appellant's remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). On appeal, Appellant challenges both the district court's rulings concerning discovery and the court's ultimate decision to dismiss her claims. Additionally, despite prevailing before the district court, the Diocese has entered a cross-appeal alleging the court erred by converting its Rule 12(b)(1) motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary issue, we first address the Diocese's cross-appeal.³ In converting the Diocese's motion to a motion for the summary judgment, the district court relied on our decision in Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir.2002). In Bryce we considered this same issue in the context of the church autonomy doctrine. We stated “[t]he crucial element is the substance of the motion” and held the motion in that case “would more appropriately be considered as a challenge to the sufficiency of plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at 654. On appeal the Diocese argues Bryce does not control in this case because it was based on an application of the broader church autonomy doctrine, rather than the doctrine's ministerial exception. ⁴

As the Third Circuit has explained, “it is beyond cavil that a federal district court has the authority to review claims arising under federal law.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir.2006). The essential question then, when considering the ministerial exception, is not whether the district court has the power to consider a plaintiff's claims, “but rather whether the First Amendment bars [that plaintiff's] claims.” Id. Thus, the ministerial exception, like the broader church autonomy doctrine, can be likened “to a government official's defense of qualified immunity,” Bryce, 289 F.3d at 654; both “may serve as a barrier to the success of a plaintiff's claims, but [neither] affect[s] the court's authority to consider them.” Petruska, 462 F.3d at 303. Therefore, our holding in Bryce that a motion to dismiss based on the church autonomy doctrine should be considered under Rules 12(b)(6) or 56 rather than 12(b)(1) is equally applicable in cases involving the ministerial exception. We accordingly hold the district court did not err in converting the Diocese's motion to one for summary judgment.

Having addressed the Diocese's cross-appeal, we now turn to the issues raised by the Appellant. First, Appellant alleges the trial court erred by denying her request for an extension of time to file her supplemental brief and by not granting her motion to compel. We review both the district court's decision to deny Appellant's request for an extension of time and its decision to grant summary judgment before ruling on Appellant's motion to compel for an abuse of discretion. See Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir.1998) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the denial of an extension of time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)); Campfield v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1111, 1124 (10th Cir.2008) (reviewing for abuse of discretion a decision not to rule on a “pending discovery motion” before granting summary judgment). Appellant argues the court abused its discretion because she had “not had the opportunity to discover information that [wa]s essential to [her] opposition.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

We begin by noting Appellant did not file an affidavit under Rule 56(f) and has thus “waived the argument that the grant of summary judgment should be set aside for lack of sufficient discovery.” Campfield, 532 F.3d at 1124. However, even if we ignore Appellant's waiver, there was no abuse of discretion because Appellant has not explained “why facts precluding summary judgment [could] not be presented.” Id. The only relevant evidence that Appellant claims to be seeking is information on what she did in her position with the Diocese; however, the best source of that information is Appellant herself. Indeed, Appellant could easily have presented information to the court in a personal affidavit along with her supplemental brief. She had the same opportunity as the Diocese to present evidence, but she did not. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's discovery motions.

We now consider the district court's determination that summary judgment was appropriate under the ministerial exception. The ministerial exception preserves a church's “essential” right to choose the people who will “preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines[,] both to its own membership and to the world at large,” free from the interference of civil employment laws. Bryce, 289 F.3d at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the doctrine usually comes into play in employment suits between an ordained minister and her church, it extends to any employee who serves in a position that “is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.” Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir.1985).

We review the district court's determination to grant summary judgment de novo. See Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d...