Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.

Citation611 F.2d 1074
Decision Date15 February 1980
Docket NumberINCORPORATE,D,77-3263,FRITO-LA,Nos. 77-2443,s. 77-2443
Parties22 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 16, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,657, 1 A.D. Cases 131 Mildred Lee ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.efendant-Appellee. Howard L. MOON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

James C. Barber, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant in No. 77-2443.

William A. Wright, Susan A. Cahoon, Duane C. Aldrich, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee in No. 77-2443.

Beverly B. Bates, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant in No. 77-3263.

Brian J. Linn, Staff Atty., Nat. Center for Law and the Handicapped, Inc., for Nat'l Center for Law and the Handicapped, Inc., Kent Hull, Director, South Bend, Ind., amicus curiae in No. 77-3263.

Charles Kelso, Ann Margaret Pointer, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee in No. 77-3263.

Appeals from the United States District Courts for the Northern Districts of Texas and Georgia.

Before GOLDBERG, FAY and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

The issue before us can be simply stated: section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires every contract in excess of $2,500 with any federal department to "contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out" the contract, the contracting parties "shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals." 29 U.S.C. § 793. 1 It also provides that any handicapped individual who believes any contractor has failed to comply with this agreement may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. 2 Does this statute also impliedly authorize such an individual to file a civil action in a United States Because each of these cases comes to us on appeal from a judgment of dismissal for failure to state a claim, we assume that, as alleged in the complaints, each of the plaintiffs is a qualified handicapped person and each was discharged because of handicaps. This merely means our inquiry is warranted; it is not decisive, for the heart of the problem is whether Congress intended to benefit the qualified handicapped by giving them a particular right: the right to sue in federal court for relief from the discriminatory conduct of federal contractors.

District Court seeking damages for the contractor's failure? 3

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was adopted after presidential vetoes had stymied two earlier attempts to enhance federal aid to handicapped persons. Most of the controversy surrounding the bill and its predecessors focused on wide ranging programs, to be federally funded, designed to aid handicapped persons in assuming a full role in society, and on the appropriations that would be required if the measure were adopted. Consequently, Congress devoted little of its discussion to its intentions regarding section 503. See Sen.Rep.No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 12-16 (1973), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2076. The statute's muteness, therefore, is not given meaning by voices in the legislative background. The plaintiffs ask us to find not only significance in the silence, but also the specific message of intent to bestow a private cause of action.

Federal courts are not common law courts of general jurisdiction. Limited by the express language of the Constitution, and the functional role it allots to the judiciary, we can recognize the cause of action only if it has been created by statute. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 1979, 441 U.S. 677, 717, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1968, 60 L.Ed.2d 560, 587 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Therefore, our answer to the question in this case depends, the authorities and the parties all agree, on whether Congress intended, when this statute was enacted, to create such a method of enforcing the statutory policy. Because Congress did not speak to us unequivocally, either in the statute or in some other authoritative fashion, we must seek an answer in the history of enactment of the statute and in analogies to what the courts have derived from other statutes.

Having done so, in a manner we describe below, we have concluded that Congress has not authorized a private cause of action.

I.

In two cases decided within the last five years, the Supreme Court, summarizing its reflections in other prior cases, has told us how to seek intimations sufficient to read statutory silence as affirmative or negative. Cort v. Ash, 1975, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 1979, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560. We are directed to consider four factors; but we are warned, as we should surely already know, that mechanical adherence to any multiple-part test is injurious and negates the very judgmental wisdom that is sought from courts. See id. at 717, 99 S.Ct. at 1968, 60 L.Ed.2d at 587 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Our obligation is to determine, to the best of our abilities, whether Congress intended to create the private right of action plaintiffs seek to bring in federal court; even were we satisfied that some of the Cort factors supported implying such a right, we could not do so if unconvinced that Congress intended such a remedy. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 1979, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 1979, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82. 4

A. Was the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted?

The statute was intended at the least to direct federal agencies to use their purchasing power so as to improve employment opportunities for "qualified handicapped persons." But it would be facile simply to conclude that, because Congress had handicapped persons in mind when it enacted section 503 and mentioned them in the statute, the first Cort factor is satisfied. What Cort demands is not that we determine whether Congress intended to aid a particular class of persons, but that we ascertain whether Congress intended to "create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff." Cort v. Ash, 1975, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26, 36. To this end, "the right or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 1979, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1954 n. 13, 60 L.Ed.2d 560, 571 n. 13.

The words of the statute, which are remarkably plain and jargon-free, do not indicate that it is aimed at overcoming those barriers to the employment of a qualified handicapped person that can be surmounted only by costly action or major programs. What is required of the employer could be as simple as providing a ramp for wheelchairs over a stairway or as complex as installing altered machinery, or it may, of course, be that apparently simple but much more difficult problem of eliminating prejudice, a disease so deep rooted that it caused Clemenceau to say, "a citizen is sometimes called upon to make a greater sacrifice for his country than the sacrifices of his life, namely, to sacrifice his prejudices."

The statutory language does not imply on its face any intention to endow the handicapped with a direct suit after suffering handicap-based discrimination. It merely requires those who give out federal contracts to obligate contractors to take affirmative steps to employ and advance handicapped persons. 5 The duty it directly creates is imposed upon federal departments and agencies, not upon contractors. The statute does not confer a clearly defined right on the benefitted class.

There is no intimation that every qualified handicapped person has a right to affirmative action in his particular case; what is apparent is that those who control federal contracts have a duty to make and enforce contracts containing the requisite clause. The handicapped may have simply the right to petition those who administer federal contracts to perform their duty.

The language of the statute is thus unlike those statutes that unequivocally focus on the benefitted class in their right or duty-creating language. See, e. g., id., 441 U.S. at 681 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. at 1950 n. 3, 60 L.Ed.2d at 567 n. 3 ("No person . . . shall be excluded . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-55, 89 S.Ct. 817, 825-26, 22 L.Ed.2d 1, 11. ("No person shall be denied . . . ."). It is, however, Not unlike language that the Cannon court indicated would be sterile ground for implying a cause of action: "(t)here would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress . . . had written (the statute) simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to . . . institutions engaged in discriminatory practices." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 1979, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 and n. 14, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1954-55 and n. 14, 60 L.Ed.2d 560, 571-573 and n. 14 (footnote omitted). Here, that is precisely what Congress did.

The duty-creating phrases are not conclusive, but they make inference of a private cause of action more difficult. When a statute is structured as a directive to federal agencies and does not clearly define a right inhering in individual members of a benefitted class, there must be persuasive evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to confer such a right before the courts are justified in concluding that one exists. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 1979, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146.

B. Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?

In trying to learn Congressional intent by examining the legislative history of a statute, we look to the purpose the original enactment served, the discussion of statutory meaning in committee reports, the effect of amendments...

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