Christian v. Wagner

• Decision Date: 29 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 4:03-CV-90435.,4:03-CV-90435.
• Citation: 611 F.Supp.2d 958
• Parties: Peter CHRISTIAN, Plaintiff, v. David WAGNER, William Deatsch, and Sue Koshatka, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

611 F.Supp.2d 958

Peter CHRISTIAN, Plaintiff, v. David WAGNER, William Deatsch, and Sue Koshatka, Defendants.

No. 4:03-CV-90435.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

April 29, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tara Z. Hall, William P. Kelly, Amber K. Rutledge, Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

Andrew B. Chappell, J. Patrick White, Johnson County Attorneys Office, Iowa City, Jennifer S. Lampe, Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Chief Judge.

Trial in the above-captioned case commenced on March 9, 2009. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants David Wagner, William Deatsch, and Sue Koshatka (collectively "Defendants"¹) on March 12, 2009. Clerk's No. 171. Presently before the Court is Peter Christian's ("Plaintiff") Combined Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Clerk's No. 178. Defendants filed a response on April 15, 2009. Clerk's No. 179. Plaintiff filed a reply on April 27, 2009. Clerk's No. 181. The matter is fully submitted.

I. BACKGROUND

Peter Christian filed the present action as a pro se plaintiff on August 7, 2003. Clerk's No. 1. He subsequently filed three amended complaints, the first on September 29, 2003, the second on June 3, 2004, and the third on August 14, 2008.² Clerk's Nos. 6, 17, 117. In each of these complaints, Plaintiff asserted that while he was a pre-trial detainee at the Johnson County Jail, from May 11, 2001 through August 9, 2001, the cleaning solvent HDQ Neutral was used to clean the cells, and he had an adverse reaction when the solvent was sprayed. Id. Plaintiff alleged that various Johnson County Jail staff and the former Johnson County Sheriff were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical need by depriving Plaintiff of necessary and adequate medical care and violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

In the weeks before trial, it became clear that the parties disagreed as to "whether a conditions of confinement claim should be presented to the jury separately from a `serious medical need' claim." Proposed Stipulated Statement of the Case at 1. As the Pre-trial Conference Order noted, Plaintiff believed a combined conditions of confinement and "serious medical need" claim applied to his case. Pre-trial Order at 13 (listing legal issue number 3 as "[whether] the Defendants violated the 8th and 14th Amendments by committing deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and by confining the Plaintiff and subjecting him to conditions with deliberate indifference to his health and safety"). Plaintiff suggested the following factual questions would be presented to the jury in regard to the conditions of confinement theory:

• Whether the Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by holding him in hazardous and unsafe conditions of confinement.

• Whether the conditions of the Plaintiff's confinement violate evolving standards of decency.

• Whether the conditions of the Plaintiff's confinement and his continued exposure to HDQ Neutral constituted an excessive risk to the Plaintiff's health and safety.

Id. at 12.

Trial in the case was held from March 9, 2009 to March 12, 2009. Clerk's Nos. 163, 165, 166, 169. In conference with the parties, before commencing the trial on March 9, 2009, the Court addressed Plaintiff's legal contention that a conditions of confinement claim should be presented to the jury separately from the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim. Pre-Trial Tr. at 3.³ The Court noted that the evidence and the pleadings both indicated that the condition of confinement challenged by the Plaintiff was, in fact, deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Id. The Court also expressed its concern that presenting the Jury with a conditions of confinement claim independently of a serious medical need claim would lead to jury confusion. Id. Accordingly, the Court informed the parties it would submit only one claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and there would be no separate instruction regarding conditions of confinement. Id.

During the trial, the parties elicited testimony from medical experts, Plaintiff, Defendants, and other Johnson County Jail staff, including a treating physician assistant, and introduced documentary evidence, such as grievance forms and medical intake forms. Clerk's No. 175. At the close of evidence, both Plaintiff and Defendants moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. Day Three Trial Tr. at 179-82; Day Four Trial Tr. at 2-3; Clerk's Nos. 167, 168. Additionally, Plaintiff, in response to the Court's proposed final jury instructions, again argued that a separate conditions of confinement claim should be presented to the Jury and made a Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented at Trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). Day Four Trial Tr. at 5-10; Clerk's No. 180. Upon inquiry by the Court, Plaintiff agreed that the conditions of confinement claim was a challenge to the overall conditions in the Johnson County Jail. Day Four Trial Tr. at 8, 9. On the record, the Court reviewed the conditions of confinement legal standard, emphasizing the narrowness of the objective component of the standard, noting: "Nothing so amorphous as `overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists." Id. at 10 (quoting Fed. Judicial Ctr., Section 1983 Litigation 67-68 (2d ed. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991))). The Court stated its conclusion that the record and the law did not support a conditions of confinement claim independent of the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim and denied Plaintiff's Rule 15(b) Motion. Id.

After receiving instructions on the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim, the Jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need. Clerk's No. 171. Because the Jury concluded Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need, it was not required to consider the subjective component of the claim or whether Plaintiff sustained damage. Id. Plaintiff now argues that the Court erred by failing to submit a conditions of confinement jury instruction, and that the Jury erred in its verdict because Plaintiff clearly established each element of the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Conditions of Confinement Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," and requires that prison officials provide humane conditions of confinement. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). "Prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)). However, the Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). A prisoner asserting a conditions of confinement claim must identify the "deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise," and "the risk that the prisoner complains of [must] be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321. A conditions of confinement claim based on prison conditions requires a showing of: (1) a deprivation of "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," and (2) deliberate indifference by prison officials to those basic needs. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321. A pre-trial detainee may challenge the conditions of his confinement under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments just as a prisoner can challenge the conditions of his confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; the deliberate indifference standard applied is identical. Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir.2005).

A deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim presents one subset of possible conditions of confinement claims, and specifically asserts that a plaintiff was deliberately deprived of his basic need for medical care. Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 463-64 (8th Cir.1995) ("A claim asserting deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical need is thus best characterized as falling within a specific subcategory of conditions of confinement claims, not as a separate and distinct legal theory."). The same analytical model applies equally to conditions of confinement cases and to deprivation of medical care cases. Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 n. 1 (8th Cir.1995). To prevail on a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim, a prisoner detainee must show: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) defendants knew of the need yet deliberately disregarded it. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir.2000). The Eighth Circuit distinguished between a more general conditions of confinement claim and a claim asserting deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in Aswegan v. Henry:

The type of proof necessary to prove a particular type of conditions of confinement claim depends on the harm that the inmate alleges. See Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) ("What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual...