Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Kassel

• Citation: 612 F.2d 1064
• Decision Date: 07 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 79-1709,79-1709
• Parties: CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, a Delaware Corporation, Appellee, v. Raymond KASSEL, Individually and in his capacity as Director of Transportation; Robert Rigler, Individually and in his capacity as a member and Chairman of the Transportation Commission; L. Stanley Schoelerman, Individually and in his capacity as a member of the Transportation Commission; Donald Gardner, Individually and in his capacity as a member of the Transportation Commission; Jules Busker, Individually and in his capacity as a member of the Transportation Commission, Allan Thoms, Individually and in his capacity as a member of the Transportation Commission; Barbara Dunn, Individually and in her capacity as a member of the Transportation Commission; William McGrath, Individually and in his capacity as a member of the Transportation Commission; Jon McCoy, Individually and in his capacity as Director of the Motor Vehicle Division; Charles W. Larson, Individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Safety; Edward Dickinson, Individually and in his capacity as Chief of the Iowa Highway Patrol; Richard C. Turner, Individually and in his capacity as Attorney General; and Robert D. Ray, Individually and in his capacity as Governor, Appellants, Motor Club of Iowa, Intervenor-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 1064

612 F.2d 1064

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, a Delaware

Corporation, Appellee, v. Raymond KASSEL, Individually and in his capacity as Director

of Transportation; Robert Rigler, Individually and in his

capacity as a member and Chairman of the Transportation

Commission; L. Stanley Schoelerman, Individually and in his

capacity as a member of the Transportation Commission;

Donald Gardner, Individually and in his capacity as a member

of the Transportation Commission; Jules Busker, Individually

and in his capacity as a member of the Transportation

Commission, Allan Thoms, Individually and in his capacity as

a member of the Transportation Commission; Barbara Dunn,

Individually and in her capacity as a member of the

Transportation Commission; William McGrath, Individually and

in his capacity as a member of the Transportation

Commission; Jon McCoy, Individually and in his capacity as

Director of the Motor Vehicle Division; Charles W. Larson,

Individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the

Department of Safety; Edward Dickinson, Individually and in

his capacity as Chief of the Iowa Highway Patrol; Richard C.

Turner, Individually and in his capacity as Attorney

General; and Robert D. Ray, Individually and in his capacity

as Governor, Appellants,

Motor Club of Iowa, Intervenor-Appellant.

No. 79-1709.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 11, 1979.

Decided Dec. 7, 1979.

Brent Appel, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Transp., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellants; Lester A. Paff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ames, Iowa, co-counsel, on brief.

John H. Lederer, DeWitt, McAndrews & Sundby, S. C., Madison, Wis., for appellee; John Duncan Varda and Anthony R. Varda, Madison, Wis., and Terry C. Hancock, Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, Des Moines, Iowa, on brief.

Before LAY, HEANEY and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court ¹ erred in holding that an Iowa law barring the use of trucks longer than sixty feet on Iowa's interstate highways unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. Since we find that this case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 98 S.Ct. 787, 54 L.Ed.2d 664 (1978), we affirm.

Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware is a regular route common carrier of general commodities operating in forty-eight states under a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Its business consists primarily of consolidating and transferring small shipments from one location to another by truck. To move these goods, Consolidated operates a variety of tractor-trailer combinations of which the sixty-five-foot combination of a tractor and two trailers (sixty-five-foot twins) has become the most common.

Iowa law ² prohibits the use of sixty-five-foot twins on its highways although it allows sixty-foot twins and fifty-five-foot semis (a combination of a tractor and a forty-five-foot trailer). ³ The sixty-foot twins are not an industry standard and are used primarily in states that prohibit the longer trailers.

Two major interstate highways, I-80 and I-35, cross Iowa. I-80 is a principal east-west transcontinental route and is heavily used in the shipment of goods between the two coasts. Sixty-five-foot twins are permitted on the entire length of I-80 except in the states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Iowa. I-35 is a principal north-south route linking Minnesota to Texas. Sixty-five-foot twins are lawful on the entire length of I-35 except in Iowa. As a result of Iowa's prohibition on sixty-five-foot twins, Consolidated (1) diverts its sixty-five-foot twins off of the interstate system and on to longer routes around the state, (2) shuttles its twin trailers across the state individually, and (3) uses sixty-foot twins and fifty-five-foot semis in the state.

Consolidated brought this action claiming that the prohibition on the use of sixty-five-foot twins on Iowa's interstate highways is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. It also alleges that statutory and administrative exceptions to Iowa's general limitation discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local interests. It sought, and the district court granted, injunctive relief preventing the enforcement of Iowa's law as applied to sixty-five-foot twins on Iowa's interstate highways. ⁴ The court also enjoined enforcement of the Iowa law on roads furnishing reasonable access between the interstates and Consolidated's terminals and facilities for food, fuel, repairs or rest. This appeal followed.

I.

In granting relief, the district court relied on Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, supra. In Raymond, Consolidated and another common carrier challenged Wisconsin's general prohibition on trucks longer than fifty-five feet. The case was tried to a three-judge district court on affidavits, depositions and exhibits. That court upheld the law as a valid state safety regulation. In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the trucking interests had "produced uncontradicted evidence showing that their operations are disrupted, their costs are raised, and their service is slowed by the challenged regulations." Id. at 438, 98 S.Ct. at 792. These disruptions and added expenses included shuttling twin trailers in and out of the state, diverting its long east-west routes around the state, and using fifty-five-foot semis rather than sixty-five-foot twins on Wisconsin routes between Chicago and Minneapolis. Id. The Court also noted that the truckers had "presented a great deal of evidence supporting their allegation that 65-foot doubles are as safe as, if not safer than, 55-foot singles when operated on limited-access, four-lane divided highways." 434 U.S. at 436, 98 S.Ct. at 791. Wisconsin, "for reasons unexplained, made no effort to contradict this evidence of comparative safety with evidence of its own." Id. at 437, 98 S.Ct. at 792.

On the basis of this record, the Supreme Court concluded that the strong presumption of validity generally attaching to state highway safety regulations was rebutted. The Court stated:

On this record, we are persuaded that the challenged regulations violate the Commerce Clause because they place a substantial burden on interstate commerce and they cannot be said to make more than the most speculative contribution to highway safety. Our holding is a narrow one, for we do not decide whether laws of other States restricting the operation of trucks over 55 feet long, or of double-trailer trucks, would be upheld if the evidence produced on the safety issue were not so overwhelmingly one-sided as in this case.

Id. at 447, 98 S.Ct. at 797 (footnote deleted).

The similarities between the instant case and Raymond are manifest. The primary difference, however, is that Iowa, unlike Wisconsin, zealously presented arguments concerning two major issues in the case: the interference with interstate commerce and the safety advantages of its regulation. Additionally, it augmented the customary safety argument that sixty-five-foot twins were in some respects less safe than other truck configurations by attempting to show that the regulation promoted safety by reducing the amount of traffic crossing the state. Despite these efforts, the district court concluded that (1) the state law interferred with interstate commerce, (2) "(t)he evidence convincingly, if not overwhelmingly, establishes that the 65 foot twin is as safe as, if not safer than, the 60 foot twin and the 55 foot semi," 475 F.Supp. at 548, and (3) even given the local benefits derived by diversion of traffic around the state, the "Total effect of the law as a safety measure * * * is so slight and problematical that it does not outweigh the national interest." Id. at 551 (emphasis in original).

II.

Iowa presents two significant contentions on appeal. The first relates to the district court's analysis of the evidence regarding the safety features of the sixty-five-foot twin as compared with other truck configurations. The second concerns the district court's analysis of the argument that, by prohibiting traffic that might otherwise flow through the state, Iowa's law promotes legitimate local safety interests.

A.

Iowa first argues that the district court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Iowa State Legislature in determining whether sixty-five-foot twins are safe enough for Iowa's interstate highways. Iowa contends that, instead of making a finding as to the relative safety of the sixty-five-foot twin and the sixty-foot twin or fifty-five-foot semi, the district court should have merely probed the factual dispute with an eye toward determining whether the state's safety justification was "arguable" or "colorable." ⁵ If any "colorable" or "arguable" safety justification exists, Iowa argues, Raymond requires that the regulation be presumed valid when weighed against its alleged burden on interstate commerce.

We cannot accept either Iowa's reading of Raymond or its characterization of the district court's treatment of the factual issue before it. First, in Raymond, the Supreme Court did not suggest that any state regulation supported by a "colorable" safety claim is to be cloaked with the presumption of validity ordinarily attaching to legitimate safety regulations. The Court held, rather, that when a burdensome regulation cannot, on the record, "be said to make more than the most speculative contribution to highway safety," Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, supra at 447, 98 S.Ct. at 797, it is unconstitutional. It did not authorize courts to substitute their judgments for those of the state legislatures, but directed them only to examine the evidence to see whether reputed safety justifications are substantive, not "illusory." See id. at 449, 98 S.Ct. 787 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Second, the district court did...