613 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1980), 77-3519, Raceway Properties, Inc. v. Emprise Corp.
|Citation:||613 F.2d 656|
|Party Name:||RACEWAY PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EMPRISE CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||January 31, 1980|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit|
Argued Dec. 5, 1979.
George F. Karch, Jr., Charles L. Freed, Thompson, Hine & Flory, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rodney D. Joslin, Robert Hanley, Jenner & Block, Barbara Steiner, Nicole Finitzo, Chicago, Ill., George I. Meisel, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
Before WEICK, CELEBREZZE and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges.
This case is before the court on appeal from a judgment entered by the district court dismissing plaintiffs-appellants civil antitrust suit. Appellants' second amended complaint specifically alleged that defendants had secured extensions of concession franchise agreements at Thistledown Race Track through the use of illegal monopoly
power, in violation of various federal and state antitrust provisions. The issues presented for appellate review are two: whether the district court's order is a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; and, whether the district court appropriately determined the scope of the relevant market within the context of appellants' antitrust claims. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
The defendants-appellees are concessionaires engaged in the franchise concession business which consists of selling food, beverages, and other like items in numerous establishments like ball parks, race tracks, and airports. The appellants are the present owners and operators of Thistledown Race Track and are parties to a contract giving defendants exclusive rights to sell concessions at Thistledown. The appellants contend defendants secured extensions of the exclusive agreement in violation of law and seek a declaration that these extensions are illegal and unenforceable. 1
In April of 1977 the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On June 22, 1977 the district court entered an order denying both motions finding genuine issues of material fact making summary judgment inappropriate. In its memorandum opinion, the district court determined that the relevant market for purposes of appellants' claims was the franchise market, the market in which these franchise agreements were negotiated, and not the concession market...
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