USA v. Carlisle

Decision Date11 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. 10-1173.,10-1173.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Lamar CARLISLE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Anthony W. Geller, Attorney, argued, Office of the United States Attorney, Fort Wayne, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew S. Williams, Attorney, argued, Williams, Williams & Doxsee, Fort Wayne, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BAUER, FLAUM and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

On February 18, 2008, Eddie Lamar Carlisle was arrested at the home of Michael Chapman during a drug sweep. Two officers caught Carlisle fleeing from the back of the house while two other officers entered the front door of the house. Carlisle was carrying a closed backpack with him. The officers searched the backpack and found marijuana, crack, a scale, a spatula, and packaging materials. Carlisle was charged with one count of knowingly possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more but less than fifty grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine base and one count of possessing with intent to distribute marijuana. Carlisle moved to suppress the evidence found in the bag, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held a suppression hearing. At the hearing, Carlisle claimed that the backpack was not his and that someone in the house asked him to carry the bag to the garage. The district court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that Carlisle did not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of the bag because he did not have a privacy interest in the bag. Carlisle pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. Because we agree with the district court that Carlisle did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag, we affirm.

I. Background

The series of events that led up to the arrest of Eddie Lamar Carlisle began in the middle of the afternoon of February 18, 2008, when Sergeant Thomas Strausborger of the Fort Wayne Police Department executed a search warrant several doors down from Michael Chapman's residence. While there, Strausborger observed people coming and going from Chapman's residence in a manner that he considered indicative of a drug operation. Considering the suspicious traffic pattern and several tips his office had previously received, Strausborger contacted Detective Andrew Irick, who worked with the agency that monitors home detention detainees, and told Irick about his suspicions.

That evening, Officers Michael Smothermon, Matthew Snyder, Andrew Irick, and Jeff Halsey went to Chapman's house to perform an unannounced visit to search for drugs. Chapman was a home detention detainee who voluntarily submitted to wearing a tracking device on his ankle and consented to announced and unannounced searches of his home as part of the home detention program. Because of Chapman's status as a home detainee, the officers did not need a search warrant. At the house, Smothermon and Snyder went to the back while Irick and Halsey remained in the front. Although all of the officers were in radio contact, the record does not precisely reflect how the timeline of what occurred in front of the house lines up with the timeline of events behind the house. Upon arriving, Irick knocked on the front door and identified himself as a police officer. Irick saw a woman peek out and begin to play with the lock. Officer Halsey looked through a side window and saw a man, a woman, and a younger child moving around the living room. Irick and Halsey heard glass breaking inside the house and then the woman opened the front door.

At some point between when the officers in front first knocked and when the officers gained access to the house through the front door, Carlisle exited through the back door of the house. Prior to Carlisle exiting the house, Officer Smothermon saw someone look out of the vertical blinds on the side of the house. Then, according to Officer Smothermon, Carlisle exited the rear of the house in a nervous manner, paused for a second glancing around, and began to run toward the alleyway behind the garage. Carlisle was carrying a backpack with him. When Carlisle started to run, Officer Smothermon came out of his hiding position and ordered Carlisle to stop. Officers Smothermon and Snyder did not know who Carlisle was and thought he may be Chapman trying to escape. Smothermon drew his taser and ordered Carlisle to the ground. Snyder drew his gun. Carlisle put the bag down and laid down on the ground. Smothermon handcuffed Carlisle. The officers said that they handcuffed Carlisle because he was attempting to flee and because they feared for officer safety due to the nature of the search of the house. Around the same time that the officers in front gained access to the house, one of the two officers in the back of the house radioed the front door officers to tell them that they apprehended an individual attempting to flee.

Inside the house, the officers conducted a consent search. The officers secured the adults in the dining room area and performed a protective sweep of the home. Because it was cold outside, the officers took Carlisle inside. The officers also grabbed the backpack and brought it into the house. Inside the home, Officer Snyder asked Carlisle for identification while Officer Smothermon patted him down to determine whether he had any weapons, which he did not. Officer Snyder also searched the bag that Carlisle had been carrying. Officer Snyder testified that he could not determine the contents of the bag without opening it. There is no testimony that Officer Snyder attempted to do a pat-down of the bag to determine if it contained weapons without opening it. When Officer Snyder opened the backpack he saw a clear plastic bag containing a green leafy substance and an off-white substance in the shape of a cookie, which turned out to be crack. Based on his experience, Officer Snyder recognized the green leafy substance as marijuana. He did not recognize the off-white substance. Officer Snyder also saw a scale with a powder residue on it, a spatula, and packaging materials in the bag. At that time, Officer Snyder read Carlisle his Miranda rights. According to Officer Snyder, Carlisle denied knowledge of the contents of the bag. Carlisle did not claim or deny ownership of the bag at that time.

Carlisle moved to suppress the evidence found in the bag. At the suppression hearing, Carlisle gave the following testimony concerning his relationship to the bag:

Q: You were taking the bag to the garage?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Going to throw it away?
A: No. Just asked me to put it there.
Q: They asked you to put it in there?
A: He, he asked me.
Q: Who asked you?
A: Michael Chapman.
Q: Because it wasn't your bag, right?
A: No.
Q: It was Chapman's bag?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You didn't know what was it in?
A: No.

The district court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. First, the district court found that the initial stop was a proper Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion arising from Carlisle's exiting the rear of a house that was being searched in connection with suspected drug activity. Turning to the search of the backpack, the district court found that Carlisle did not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag. In the alternative, the district court found that even if Carlisle did have standing, the search was proper under the Fourth Amendment.

II. Discussion

Carlisle appeals the district court's findings that the initial stop was reasonable and that the warrantless search of the backpack did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual determinations for clear error and legal questions de novo. United States v. Ellis, 499 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.2007). Determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion are normally mixed questions of fact and law, but when “what happened?” is not at issue, the ultimate resolution of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed is a question of law which we review de novo. United States v. Burnside, 588 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir.2009).

A. The Initial Stop

Carlisle contends that the officers did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him and therefore, this stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. If the stop was improper, the fruits of the stop would also be improper and the contents of the bag should have been excluded.

Police officers may conduct a brief investigatory stop of a suspect if they have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a crime is about to be or has been committed. United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). The suspicious conduct may be ambiguous and susceptible to an innocent explanation, but the officers may detain the individual to resolve such ambiguity. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125-26, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Officers may rely on their experience in evaluating the significance of the suspect's conduct. United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir.2005). During the stop, the officer may conduct a pat-down search to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the subject is armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The protective search permitted without a warrant during a Terry stop is “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). The officers may also detain a bag or luggage from...

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