People v. Sabin

• Decision Date: 27 July 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 114953, Calendar No. 2.
• Citation: 614 N.W.2d 888,463 Mich. 43
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James A. SABIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

614 N.W.2d 888

463 Mich. 43

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James A. SABIN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 114953, Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 4, 2000.

Decided July 27, 2000.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, James J. Gregart, Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith B. Ketchum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Kalamazoo, for the people.

Martin J. Beres, St. Clair Shores, for defendant-appellee.

John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Detroit, for Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney.

Gentry Law Offices, P.C. (by Kevin S. Gentry), Brighton, and Willey & Chamberlain (by Raymond E. Beckering, III), Grand Rapids, for Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.

Brian L. Mackie, President, and William A. Forsyth, Prosecuting Attorney, Grand Rapids, for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

(AFTER REMAND)

Opinion

CORRIGAN, J.

We granted leave in this criminal sexual conduct case arising from defendant's alleged sexual assault of his thirteen-year-old daughter to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant sexually assaulted his former stepdaughter¹ and that an order existed prohibiting defendant from having contact with children under the age of seventeen. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining arguments.

I. Factual Background and Procedural Posture

The complainant alleged that defendant sexually assaulted her in late September 1994. She testified that she and defendant were alone in the family home in the afternoon. Defendant began "acting ... weird" and left the living room, where the complainant was watching television. He returned after removing his t-shirt. He sat next to the complainant and began rubbing her leg. He then stood up, locked the front door, turned off the television, and unplugged the telephone. The complainant attempted to leave through the back door, but defendant led her by the arm back into the living room.

The complainant testified that defendant pushed her to the ground and, while holding her down, removed her clothes. Defendant then had sexual intercourse with the complainant. After the assault, defendant told the complainant that if she reported the incident to her mother, her mother would "be really upset with [her] for breaking her family up again...." The complainant, however, told a friend about the assault approximately two weeks later. That disclosure led to a Department of Social Services investigation, and ultimately prompted a prosecutor to charge defendant with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. § 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2).

The prosecution moved before trial under MRE 404(b) to admit evidence that defendant had repeatedly sexually assaulted his stepdaughter. The prosecution argued at the hearing on the pretrial motion that the evidence would show defendant's motive and intent, and show the absence of mistake. The trial court tentatively admitted the evidence on the ground that it demonstrated defendant's intent, but requested that defendant's stepdaughter testify outside the presence of the jury before the court would make a final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence.

At trial, defendant's stepdaughter testified outside the presence of the jury that defendant sexually abused her during the period beginning when she was in kindergarten and ending in 1985, when she was in the seventh grade. The abuse stopped because defendant "went away." The stepdaughter testified that defendant performed oral sex on her three to seven times weekly during the period. She also recalled one incident during which defendant had her lay on her side and he placed his penis between her legs. She recalled another incident during which defendant's daughters from a prior marriage² were at the family home for the weekend. The stepdaughter testified that, as the three girls slept on the living room floor, defendant performed oral sex on her. She heard defendant performing oral sex on the other girls. The stepdaughter testified that defendant instructed her not to tell anyone about his conduct because "it would hurt the family, that mom would be mad at [defendant and her]."

In argument, the prosecution stressed the similarities between the charged incident and the abuse of the stepdaughter. The prosecution argued that the evidence was relevant to show the absence of mistake, to support the complainant's credibility, and to aid the jurors in their evaluation of the evidence by demonstrating that an adult can be sexually attracted to, and actually accomplish a sex act with, a child.

The trial court admitted the evidence, reasoning as follows:

Here, I think the evidence tends to show that the Defendant has committed other wrongful acts involving a child, or a juvenile, who was a member of the same household, which is the exact situation we have in the allegations in this trial.

Furthermore, we have the Defendant indicating that that conduct should not be reported for fear of breaking up the family or getting people in trouble. And, I think that is all consistent with the—the way in which he is alleged to have engaged in sex or sexual penetration in this case.

Therefore, I think it is, indeed, relevant, particularly where the Defense is a general denial.

Therefore, I believe it is offered for a proper purpose.

The second facet which I must consider is whether it is relevant. In light of the general denial I think it is relevant.

Third, whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403. I find that it-it is not, in light of the testimony presented here today, particularly because I will give a limiting instruction as provided for in [People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993) ] and I will give it not only in advance of [the stepdaughter's] testimony, but if so requested I will give a limiting instruction at the conclusion of the trial in my general instructions to the jury.

The trial court gave a preliminary instruction to the jury regarding the stepdaughter's testimony, cautioning the jury regarding its consideration of the evidence. The court explained that "the relevancy of this testimony is to show ... the Defendant's scheme, plan or system of how he does certain things. It is not—you must not conclude, and you cannot conclude or infer that because he may have done something wrong in the past that he, therefore, did something wrong in the incident for which he is on trial." The stepdaughter then testified before the jury regarding the alleged abuse.

The prosecution also moved before trial to admit evidence of the existence of an order prohibiting defendant from having contact with children under the age of seventeen. In the spring of 1994, the parole board had released defendant after having served nine years in prison for a 1985 first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction arising from his having had sexual intercourse with one of his daughters from his first marriage. A condition of defendant's parole was that he not have contact with anyone under the age of seventeen.

The prosecution argued that the existence of the order was relevant because it would explain the complainant's actions after the assault. The prosecution proposed that witnesses and counsel refer to the condition of parole as a "state agency" order to guard against the jury learning about the prior conviction. The trial court granted the motion.

The jury convicted defendant of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding defendant's abuse of his stepdaughter and the existence of the state agency order.³ The Court construed the trial court's remarks as admitting the evidence for the improper purpose of establishing defendant's propensity to sexually abuse his children. The Court further determined that the evidence was not admissible to prove defendant's common scheme, plan, or system because the only similarity between the acts was that defendant allegedly told each victim that disclosing the abuse would break up the family. The Court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence greatly outweighed its probative value.

Regarding the state agency order, the Court of Appeals held that the unfair prejudice resulting from the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. It further concluded that the evidence likely misled the jury and confused the issues. The Court reasoned that the jury likely drew a connection between evidence that defendant had been separated from his family for ten years, a state agency had determined that defendant posed a risk to children, and defendant had molested his stepdaughter. The evidence, the Court concluded, seriously prejudiced defendant by informing the jury that defendant could not be trusted near his own children. The Court determined that the probative value of the evidence did not justify the prejudicial testimony because the reason for the complainant's delay in reporting the assault was not an issue at trial and defense counsel did not argue that the delay affected the complainant's credibility. Further, the Court reasoned, the evidence was not necessary to explain defendant's alleged threat because, if the police believed the complainant's accusation, the family would have been separated regardless of the terms of defendant's parole.

The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court's errors were not harmless. It rejected, however, defendant's claim that the prosecution's failure to specify the exact date of the...