Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., s. 78-1814
| Citation | 615 F.2d 423 |
| Decision Date | 15 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 78-1814,78-1813,s. 78-1814 |
| Parties | Robert N. SHARP, Mary Sharp, and James S. Brannon, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Robert N. Sharp, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO. and Louis Lakis Ford, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. Bruce CONGER and Lucille Conger, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FURNITURE FREIGHT SALES and General Finance Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Barry M. Barash, Galesburg, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Aaron J. Kramer, Wm. T. Kirby, Chicago, Ill., Barney Olson II, Galesburg, Ill., Wm. V. Altenberger, Peoria, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before SWYGERT, SPRECHER and BAUER, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiffs-appellants in these consolidated cases appeal from two Decisions and Orders of the district court granting summary judgments in favor of the defendants-appellees on the appellants' complaints for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. ("Act"), and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq. ("Regulation Z"). The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in holding that the denomination of the appellees Ford Motor Credit Company and General Finance Corporation as "assignees" rather than as "creditors" on the disclosure statements made in connection with the installment credit sales to the appellants did not constitute a violation of the Act or Regulation Z. 1 We conclude that the identities of Ford Credit and General Finance were adequately disclosed to the appellants in compliance with the statute and regulations, and accordingly affirm the judgments appealed from for the reasons set forth below.
The retail installment credit transactions underlying the complaints in these cases were essentially identical in all respects material to the disposition of this appeal. Appellee Ford Motor Credit Company provides financing to Ford dealers by extending operating and inventory loans, and by purchasing retail installment contracts for the sale of automobiles by its dealers. In connection with the latter program, Ford Credit provides to its dealers for their optional use forms of credit applications, installment sales contracts, and rate charts for computing finance charges. Although the dealers negotiate all terms of the installment contracts directly with their customers, the dealers, pursuant to the provisions of the Ford contract form and a standing arrangement with Ford Credit, typically assign the executed contracts to Ford Credit within a few days after the sales are consummated. Ford Credit is usually unaware of any specific sale until the contract is presented for assignment; however, dealers may obtain prior approval for customers with marginal credit ratings. Ford Credit is not obligated to purchase any contracts from its dealers, but it ordinarily rejects only a minor percentage of those proffered. Appellee General Finance Corporation undertakes similar financing arrangements with various retail dealers in consumer goods.
Appellants Robert and Mary Sharp sought credit from appellee Louis Lakis Ford, Inc. for the purpose of purchasing a new Ford automobile from Lakis. Appellants Bruce and Lucille Conger sought credit from appellee Furniture Freight Sales for the purpose of purchasing certain household goods and furniture. Accordingly, the Sharps completed a credit application on a form supplied to Lakis by Ford Credit and the Congers completed a credit application on a General Finance form provided to Furniture Freight Sales. The finance companies approved the submitted credit applications and informed the dealers that they would purchase the proposed installment contracts upon execution by the appellants and the dealers. The executed contracts were subsequently assigned by the dealers to the finance companies in accordance with the assignment provisions contained therein. The finance companies remitted cash less discounts to the dealers, notified the appellants of the assignments, and provided them with coupon payment books and other materials related to their financial obligations under the installment contracts.
The appellants' complaints alleged that Ford Credit and General Finance were creditors within the intendment of the Act and Regulation Z, and that the disclosure of their relationship as assignees of the installment contracts was improper. The complaints did not challenge the accuracy or adequacy of the disclosures relating to the credit transactions, but only that Ford and General were not adequately identified therein as creditors. The installment contracts were the only documents which purported to make the disclosures required under the Act and Regulation Z. No purpose is served by summarizing the disclosures contained in these documents, with the exception of the closing information. Immediately opposite the spaces where the appellants affixed their signatures in acknowledgment of having received a true and complete copy of the installment contract, the following language appeared on the Sharp and Conger contracts, respectively:
The foregoing contract is hereby accepted by the Seller and assigned to Ford Motor Credit Company in accordance with the terms of the Assignment set forth on the reverse side hereof.
The foregoing contract is hereby accepted by the Seller named below and is assigned to GENERAL FINANCE CORPORATION OF ILLINOIS in accordance with the terms of the Assignment set forth on the reverse side hereof and as initialed below.
In their motions for summary judgment, the appellants argued that these assignments were not true disclosures of Ford's and General's identities as creditors in...
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Ferrell v. Pierce
...to the district court. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 F.2d 423, 424 n. 1 (7th Cir.1980). Even if the constitutional issue were properly before us, we doubt that it would be so substantial as to requi......
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