Rodney Gray v. B. Epps

Decision Date18 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-70021.,09-70021.
PartiesRodney GRAY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Christopher B. EPPS, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Michael Priest, Jr., Gill, Ladner & Priest, P.L.L.C., Thomas E. Royals, Royals & Mayfield, Jackson, MS, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Marvin Luther White, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, MS, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Rodney Gray (Gray), convicted of capital murder in Mississippi and sentenced to death, appeals the district court's denial of federal habeas relief. Gray contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of trial. Concluding that the state court's adjudication of Gray's claims was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History

On August 15, 1994, in Newton County, Mississippi, Grace Blackwell, the 79-year old murder victim, drove to her local bank and proceeded to the drive-through window. Arlene McCree was working as a bank teller, and Blackwell had been her customer since 1980. McCree thought Blackwell looked “terrible.” Usually, McCree and Blackwell would engage in small talk; however, on this occasion, Blackwell would not look at or converse with McCree. Instead, Blackwell simply stated “I need twelve hundred dollars.” McCree had to prompt Blackwell by asking her whether she wanted to cash a check or use a withdrawal slip. In response, Blackwell threw a blank check into the window tray. McCree could not see the backseat of the car because there were clothes “hanging in a very unusual manner.” Concerned by Blackwell's behavior, McCree asked Blackwell whether “something [was] wrong or ... someone [was] in the car with her.” Blackwell did not respond to the questions; instead, she attempted to mouth words to McCree, who could not read Blackwell's lips. After McCree made out the check for $1200, Blackwell signed it. Although McCree attempted to stall the transaction, she subsequently placed the money in the window tray, and Blackwell grabbed it. Blackwell then drove away saying “I'm hurrying, I'm hurrying.” McCree did not think that Blackwell was speaking to her. Believing Blackwell had been taken hostage, McCree called the Sheriff's Office.

A deputy sheriff was dispatched to Blackwell's home and found the front door open. Blackwell's car was not there and the “telephone wires [were] disconnected.” Meanwhile, Harry Jones was driving his car on Pine Bluff Road in Newton County and saw a brown Chrysler, which he later identified at trial as Blackwell's car, stopped in the road. He saw a man “wrestling with this lady.” Although he could not identify the woman, he identified Gray as the driver of Blackwell's car.

Later that same day, Lane McDill was driving to town on Newly Road 1 in Newton County and observed something lying “just off the bridge on the right-hand side of the road.” McDill stopped his vehicle and quickly discovered it was a deceased woman. He then drove to town and notified the police that there was a body at the bridge. As a result, law enforcement officers arrived at the scene, and the ensuing investigation revealed that Blackwell had been killed by a shotgun wound to the face. A forensic pathologist determined that Blackwell suffered a “series of injuries,” “including the presence of two shotgun wounds, as well as multiple scrapes of the skin, called abrasions, and lacerations, a cut, and contusions.” The lethal shotgun wound was a “contact shotgun wound with the muzzle of the shotgun placed against the area of the mouth.” The second shotgun wound “is consistent with having gone through an intermediate target scattering and striking the decedent over the left arm, left chest, and left cheek.” Blackwell's other injuries were consistent with either being struck by or pushed out of a vehicle. The forensic investigation also revealed that Blackwell had been raped and that the DNA analysis indicated that Gray was the perpetrator. 2

Additionally, the Newton County Sheriff's Office interviewed Mildred Curry, who was Gray's girlfriend at the time. Curry told them that Gray had called from jail and informed her that there was money in her bathroom vent. A deputy sheriff searched her residence and found $1,123 in the bathroom vent. The search also uncovered the clothes and boots that Gray was wearing on the day of the murder.

B. Procedural History

In 1995, a Newton County, Mississippi grand jury returned an indictment that charged Gray with committing intentional murder while engaged in the commission of the crime of kidnapping and/or rape in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e). A jury convicted Gray as charged. After a sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously found, among other things, that there were “insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances” and that the Defendant should suffer death.” The trial court sentenced Gray to death by lethal injection.

On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Gray's conviction and sentence. Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36 (Miss.1998). Gray applied for state post-conviction relief, which the Mississippi Supreme Court ultimately denied in a published opinion. Gray v. State, 887 So.2d 158 (Miss.2004). Gray subsequently filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied in a memorandum opinion and order. The district court granted Gray a Certificate of Appealability (COA) with respect to the issue he now raises on appeal. 3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Gray filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The petition, therefore, is subject to AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Pursuant to the federal habeas statute, as amended by AEDPA, we defer to a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims on the merits unless the state court's decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's decision constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Further, pursuant to section 2254(e)(1), state court findings of fact are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 947 (5th Cir.2001).

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM

Gray argues that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated during the sentencing phase of his trial. He contends that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence with respect to his family history and educational and mental health background at sentencing. More specifically, the district court granted a COA as to the claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to request their own court-appointed psychiatrist to offer mitigating evidence and counsel's failure to present the following:

(a) evidence of the poverty of Gray's family during his childhood; (b) evidence of the lack of support for Gray in his childhood, leading to low grades and other problems; (c) evidence of the psychological factors and condition suffered by Gray at the time of the alleged offense; (d) evidence of Gray's dull normal intelligence, and (e) adequate character testimony when family members, friends and neighbors were available to do so, when witnesses were available and willing to offer helpful testimony.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Gray must show (1) defense counsel's performance was deficient and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We must find that trial counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The Supreme Court instructs courts to look at the “norms of practice as reflected in the American Bar Association and the like” and to consider “all the circumstances” of a case. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. While [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,” Gray can demonstrate deficient performance if he shows “that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. However, [t]here is a ‘strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 793 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Strickland's “prejudice” prong requires a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance of his trial counsel, the outcome of his capital murder trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence...

To continue reading

Request your trial
79 cases
  • Walker v. Epps
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • 27 Marzo 2012
    ..."helped" or "cooperated" in Walker's defense, none of them said that they were available and willing to testify. See Gray v. Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 443 (5th Cir. 2010); Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2009). This issue is unexhausted and barred from review by this Court. Even if......
  • Bealefield v. Lumpkin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 30 Septiembre 2022
    ...Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts.” Gray v Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir 2010), citing Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2002). And the Fifth Circuit holds that an unreasonable application of fe......
  • Johnson v. Lumpkin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 30 Septiembre 2022
    ...Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts.” Gray v Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir 2010), citing Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2002). And the Fifth Circuit holds that an unreasonable application of fe......
  • Weathers v. Stephens
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • 31 Agosto 2015
    ...and suicide attempts but also Petitioner's history of drug and alcohol abuse), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 52 (2014); Gray v. Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2010) (federal habeas petitioner failed to satisfy prejudice prong of Strickland analysis where his trial counsel failed to present......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT