Grant v. Warden
| Decision Date | 17 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-2362.,09-2362. |
| Citation | 616 F.3d 72 |
| Parties | David N. GRANT, Petitioner, Appellant, v. WARDEN, MAINE STATE PRISON, Respondent, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Christopher K. MacLean, with whom Elliot & MacLean, LLP, was on brief, for appellant.
Donald W. Macomber, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, LIPEZ and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner David N. Grant was convicted of the murder of his mother-in-law after a jury trial in the Maine Superior Court. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed his conviction, see State v. Grant, 939 A.2d 93 (Me.2008), and the federal district court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Grant appeals from the denial of his petition, contending that the SJC's rejection of his claim that law enforcement officers obtained incriminating statements from him in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. After careful consideration, we affirm.
We summarize the facts as recounted by the SJC, supplementing with additional facts from the record to the extent they are consistent with the SJC's account. See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir.2006). We “must ‘accept the state court findings of fact unless [Grant] convinces us, by clear and convincing evidence, that they are in error.’ ” Id. (quoting McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir.2002) (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1))). Grant does not contend on appeal that the state court's factual findings were in error.
On the afternoon of November 30, 2004, Grant ingested about a half-ounce of cocaine and then drove to the home of his mother-in-law, Janet Hagerthy, in Farmingdale, Maine. Following an argument, Grant attacked Hagerthy, tied her hands behind her back, loaded her into his pick-up truck, and dumped her in a field. Her body was found the following day and a later autopsy indicated the cause of death to be blunt force trauma and blood loss from stab wounds.
Around 11:30 p.m. on the night of November 30, law enforcement officers were dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle accident, where they found Grant's pick-up truck in a ditch off the side of the road. Grant was moving around in the cab of the truck, waving a knife and repeatedly plunging it into his throat. The officers shocked Grant several times with a taser to subdue him, then wrestled away Grant's knife, handcuffed him, and removed him from the truck. Grant was cuffed and secured to a long board and transported by ambulance to Eastern Maine Medical Center, where he had emergency surgery.
Grant's surgery was completed early on the morning of December 1. In the hours after his surgery, detectives repeatedly attempted to interview him. During the first three attempts, made on the morning of December 1, Grant was not conscious or lucid enough to make a statement. The first interview began at 4:26 a.m., just after Grant's surgery. Detectives explained that they wanted to talk with Grant about his mother-in-law and attempted to advise Grant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), but terminated the interview because he was not coherent. During the second interview attempt at 9:51 a.m., another detective, David Tripp, explained that he was investigating the Hagerthy case and advised Grant of his Miranda rights. Grant responded that he did not want to talk and his throat was sore. At 11:45 a.m., Tripp returned and re-read Grant his Miranda rights. Grant again said that he did not want to talk because his throat was sore and indicated that he could not write because his hands were sore.
Detective Tripp returned at 1:42 p.m. that afternoon and administered a new set of Miranda warnings. Grant acknowledged his rights and had the following exchange with Tripp:
At that point, Tripp immediately stopped questioning Grant. Tripp proceeded to explain that he was investigating the homicide of Janet Hagerthy and that he and another detective from the Evidence Response Team were going to collect evidence from Grant, including fingernail clippings, a blood sample, and penile swabs. Tripp showed Grant the warrant authorizing the search and stated, The detectives then executed a search of Grant's body, during which they took hand and nail swabs, nail clippings, pubic hair combings, a penile swab, and a blood sample.
Grant then continued to answer questions, and during the ensuing interrogation he made a number of incriminating statements about his involvement in the killing of his mother-in-law. 1 At 9:47 a.m., Grant stated, “I mean I know I've already told you enough to hang me ... but I think I'd really like to have a lawyer present.” Tripp promptly terminated the interrogation. Later that day, Grant was released from the hospital and arrested. Throughout Grant's hospital stay on December 1 and 2, law enforcement officers were stationed in the hallway outside his room.
On December 29, 2004, a grand jury indicted Grant for murder, see Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 201(1)(A). Prior to trial, Grant moved to suppress his statements from the December 2 interview, contending that he had repeatedly invoked his Miranda rights on December 1 and that his December 2 statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied his motion to suppress. The court concluded that Grant was not in custody until after the 1:42 p.m. interview on December 1 when detectives executed a search warrant on his body, and further found that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent during any of the December 1 interviews. A jury found Grant guilty of murder and the court sentenced him to a term of seventy years' imprisonment.
The SJC affirmed Grant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Grant's motion to suppress his December 2 statements. However, the SJC rejected the motion court's reasoning and instead held, following an extensive analysis of the facts, that Grant was in custody throughout his stay at the hospital and that he unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent during the 1:42 p.m. interview on December 1. 2 Grant, 939 A.2d at 103-04. The court further reasoned that law enforcement officers “scrupulously honored” Grant's invocation of his right to remain silent before renewing interrogation the following morning, and therefore his December 2 statements were properly admitted at trial. Id. at 107 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975)). The SJC denied Grant's motion for reconsideration.
Grant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on the sole ground that his December 2 statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This appeal followed.
We review the district court's denial of Grant's habeas petition de novo. Abrante v. St. Amand, 595 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2010). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court may not grant habeas relief as to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court decision either (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Only the first prong of the AEDPA standard, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), is at issue here.
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if the court “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”...
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