Texaco Inc. v. Department of Energy

• Decision Date: 15 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. DC-52 to DC-54.,DC-52 to DC-54.
• Citation: 616 F.2d 1193
• Parties: TEXACO INC. et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY et al., Defendants-Appellants. CLARK OIL AND REFINING COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY et al., Defendants-Appellants. INDEPENDENT REFINERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs-Appellants. v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

616 F.2d 1193

TEXACO INC. et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY et al., Defendants-Appellants.

CLARK OIL AND REFINING COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY et al., Defendants-Appellants.

INDEPENDENT REFINERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs-Appellants. v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. DC-52 to DC-54.

Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.

Argued April 30, 1979.

Decided October 15, 1979.

Barbara J. Weller, Atty., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. (Robert R. Nordhaus, Gen. Counsel, and Howard E. Shapiro, Sol., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C., with her on the brief), for defendant-appellant Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

David Galbraith, Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress, Washington, D. C. (Fred W. Drogula, Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress, Washington, D. C., with him on the brief), for defendant-appellant Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc.

Donald B. Craven, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, D. C. (Jay L. Carlson and Craig D. Miller, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, D. C., with him on the brief); and Stephen H. Bard and Elizabeth P. Smith, White Plains, N. Y., Charles S. Lindberg, William Streets and Francis A. Rowen, Jr., New York City; W. J. McAnelly, Jr., Barbara Finney and Edward de la Garza, Houston, Tex., with him on the brief, for plaintiffs-appellees Texaco, Inc., Mobil Oil Corp. and Exxon Corp.

Timothy J. Bloomfield, Dunnells, Duvall, Bennett & Porter, Washington, D. C., and Edwin Jason Dryer, Washington, D. C., on the brief, for plaintiff-appellee Independent Refiners Assn. of America.

Timothy J. Bloomfield, Dunnells, Duvall, Bennett & Porter, Washington, D. C., and Terry A. Barnett and Richard W. Bowe, Cladouhos & Brashares, Washington, D. C., on the brief, for plaintiffs-appellees Clark Oil & Refining Corp. and Crown Central Petroleum Corp.

Before HOFFMAN, JOHNSON and GEWIN, Judges.

FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., Judge.

This is an appeal from orders entered August 29, 1978, and November 14, 1978, by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The consolidated cases concern challenges to an interim order of the Department of Energy (DOE) granting adjustment relief under the oil entitlements program to Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. (Corco).

The background to this dispute is an effort by the DOE to stimulate the production of California crude oil. On June 15, 1978, the DOE announced a special procedure using grants of exception relief to provide incentives for the transportation of California crude oil to refineries outside the state. On June 22, 1978, Corco applied for such exception relief, and on June 30, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) of the DOE issued a proposed decision and order granting Corco two types of relief: (1) entitlements worth $4.41 per barrel of California crude oil purchased by Corco for processing at its Puerto Rican refinery, and (2) partial exemption from entitlements penalties assessed against refiners selling residual fuel oil in the East Coast market. Several refiners, including Texaco, Mobil, and Exxon, filed notices of objection to the proposed decision. These objections triggered a process for comment and hearings on the proposed decision, only at the conclusion of which a final decision and order could be entered. On July 17, however, Corco filed an application for interim relief to permit it to begin transporting California crude oil to its Puerto Rican refinery during the period set aside for the consideration of objections to the proposed decision. Three days later, on July 20, the OHA granted Corco's application and issued an interim decision and order. This order stated that the relief granted would not later "be rescinded or significantly reduced." Under the interim order, Corco was to receive entitlements of $4.41 per barrel of California crude oil, up to a total of 25,000 barrels, for sixty days.

The following day, July 21, Exxon filed a notice of appeal from the interim decision with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Texaco, Mobil, Crown, and the Independent Refiners Association of America (IRAA) followed suit. On August 8, FERC issued interim procedural regulations governing its review of requests for exception relief, and on August 9, FERC dismissed Exxon's appeal on the ground that it lacked statutory authority to review "grants" of relief. Interpreting § 504(b) of the DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7194(b)(1), FERC ruled that it only has jurisdiction to review "denials" of requests for relief.

Texaco, Mobil, Exxon, Clark, and Crown filed complaints in the district court seeking a permanent injunction restraining the DOE from implementing the interim order. The IRAA filed a separate complaint alleging that FERC improperly refused to review the grant of interim relief. That point was the sole basis of the district court's decision. The district court held that FERC has authority to review the July 20 interim order. Accordingly the court remanded the proceeding to FERC.¹

The case is now before this Court on appeal by FERC. There are three issues:

(1) whether TECA has jurisdiction over this appeal;

(2) whether the DOE's decision and order of September 12, 1978, moots this case; and

(3) whether Section 504(b)(1) of the DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7194(b)(1) only confers jurisdiction on FERC to review denials of requests for exception relief.

Because this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, it need not reach the latter two issues.

Plaintiffs argue quite simply that the issue on appeal arises solely under the DOE Act, and that this Court's limited jurisdiction does not extend to such issues. Defendants concede that the issue appealed arises solely under the DOE Act, but argue that that issue is part of a larger "case or controversy" arising under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA). Issues arising under the EPAA are indisputably the dominion of this Court.

A literal reading of the statutes lends plausibility to defendants' position. Precedent indicates, however, that this Court has consistently decided whether it has jurisdiction on an issue-by-issue basis. Because the issue on appeal here arises solely under the DOE Act, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals is a court of special and limited jurisdiction. In creating TECA, Congress gave it "exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from the district courts of the United States in cases and controversies arising under this title or under regulations or orders issued thereunder." § 211(b)(2), Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 754, incorporated this grant of special jurisdiction:

Sections 209 through 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 . . . shall apply to the regulation promulgated under section 4(a), to any order under this Act, and to any action taken by the President (or his delegate) under this Act, as if such regulation had been promulgated, such order had been issued, or such action had been taken under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.

The DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7192, in turn, provides that:

(a) Judicial review of agency action taken under any law the functions of which are vested by law in, or transferred or delegated to the Secretary, the Commission or any officer, employee, or component of the Department shall, notwithstanding such vesting, transfer, or delegation, be made in the manner specified in or for such law.

(b) Notwithstanding the amount in controversy, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all other cases or controversies arising exclusively under this chapter, or under rules, regulations, or orders issued exclusively thereunder . . ..

Agency action taken under the EPAA is one such function that has been transferred to the DOE. Therefore, judicial review of such agency action may be had, as provided by the EPAA, in the district court and subsequently in this Court. There is no question, for example, that an order granting or denying adjustment relief from the oil entitlements program may be appealed to this Court. But in its present posture, this is not such a case.

The complaint in this case challenges the interim adjustment relief granted to Corco. The district court, however, did not reach the merits of that decision and order. It stopped short of the merits, holding only that FERC erred in refusing to hear plaintiffs' objections to the interim decision and order. For purposes of this appeal, then, the only "agency action" being challenged is the "inaction" of FERC in refusing to entertain plaintiffs' appeals. That inaction was based on FERC's reading of Section 504(b)(1) of the DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7194(b)(1), which provides:

If any person is aggrieved or adversely affected by a denial of a request for adjustment under subsection (a) of this section such person may request a review of such denial by the Commission and may obtain judicial review in accordance with this subchapter when such a denial becomes final.

Whether FERC must entertain an appeal from a grant as well as a denial of adjustment relief thus involves an interpretation of the DOE Act itself and not an application of any other law, the functions of which have been transferred to the DOE. Section 502(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7192(b), thus controls judicial review. It provides that the district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising exclusively under the Act without special provision for appeal to TECA. That "omission" is decisive on the question of this Court's jurisdiction. This Court may act only where it has express authority to do so.

Defendants argue, however, that it is not the nature of the issue on appeal but the nature of the case or controversy that is determinative of this Court's jurisdiction. Both Section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act and Section 502...