U.S.A v. Doe

Decision Date16 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-2615.,09-2615.
Citation617 F.3d 766
PartiesUNITED STATES of Americav.John DOE, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Candace Cain, (Argued), Office of Federal Public Defender, Pittsburgh, PA, Thomas W. Patton, Office of Federal Public Defender, Erie, PA, for Appellant.

Robert L. Eberhardt, Laura S. Irwin, (Argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, Marshall J. Piccinini, Office of United States Attorney, Erie, PA, for Appellee.

Before FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges, and DITTER,* District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal asks whether 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which forbids a district court from imposing a term of imprisonment at initial sentencing for the purpose of drug rehabilitation, restricts a district court from considering medical and rehabilitative needs when revoking a defendant's supervised release and requiring the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. The District Court sentenced the defendant, John Doe, to 24 months of imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised release with the objective of helping him recover from his cocaine addiction. On appeal, Doe challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of that sentence. Because we hold that the plain language of § 3583(e) governing discretionary revocation of supervised release expressly requires consideration of medical needs, we will affirm.

I.

Doe 1 was indicted on September 13, 2005 for possession with intent to deliver five grams or more of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Doe entered a guilty plea. On August 28, 2006, the District Court sentenced Doe to 30 months of imprisonment followed by 4 years of supervised release. Doe's initial sentence was a significant reduction from the Guidelines Range of 60 to 65 months of imprisonment and was based in large part upon Doe's cooperation with law enforcement in other investigations, as expressed by the Government in a 5K motion.2

At the sentencing hearing, both the District Court and the prosecutor acknowledged that Doe had a severe addiction to cocaine. In the Judgment and Commitment Order, the District Court recommended Doe be assigned to the 500-hour drug rehabilitation program conducted by the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, the District Court ordered that, while on supervised release, Doe must not unlawfully possess or use a controlled substance and that he must submit to drug testing within 15 days of release from incarceration and at least two other times thereafter. The Order further required that Doe “participate in a program of testing and, if necessary, treatment for substance abuse as directed by the probation officer until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer,” and “contribute to the cost of services for any such treatment.” (App. 4.) Doe was resentenced pursuant to a sealed Rule 35(b) motion on August 1, 2007, to 12 months of imprisonment, which amounted to time served, and his 4 years of supervised release began on August 7.

While on supervised release, Doe enrolled in the Tri-State Business Institute's Academy of Cosmetology to learn to be a barber. In a letter to Doe's probation officer, a school administrator described Doe as “a great student” who was “very dedicated” and had made the Dean's list. (Sealed App. 36.) Throughout his supervised release, Doe kept his appointments with his probation officer and participated in a mental health treatment program for his drug addiction.

Despite these positive efforts, Doe was not successful in refraining from the use of cocaine. On February 27, April 7, and April 10 of 2008, Doe submitted urine samples to his probation officer that tested positive for cocaine. In an effort to aid his rehabilitation, Doe was offered the option to waive a hearing on these violations in exchange for modification of the terms of his supervised release. He accepted this waiver, and his release was modified to include 180 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring and participation in a mental health treatment program approved by the probation officer.

The new conditions did not, however, have any substantial effect on Doe's cocaine use. On May 12, May 19, and June 3 of 2008, Doe again submitted urine samples that tested positive for cocaine. On July 2, 2008, Doe's probation officer filed a petition on supervised release in the District Court noting that Doe had submitted six cocaine-positive urine samples since the beginning of his supervised release. At the request of the probation officer, the District Court entered an order on July 7, 2008, modifying Doe's supervised release to again include 180 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring and participation in a mental health treatment program approved by the probation officer.

Again, the modifications did not deter Doe from his drug use. On November 4, 2008, Doe's probation officer filed a second petition on supervised release, noting Doe had submitted six more urine samples that tested positive for cocaine: July 8, September 30, October 3, October 7, October 14, and October 21 of 2008. The petition catalogs the utter failure of Doe's rehabilitative efforts:

During the course of the defendant's supervision, he has been positive for cocaine on 18 different occasions. He has been given the opportunity of inpatient and outpatient drug treatment, and local social services of outpatient mental health, and housing assistance. The defendant was placed on the electronic monitor on July 15, 2008, which did not curb his illegal drug usage ...

(App. 47.) The probation officer requested an order that Doe appear and show cause why his supervised release should not be revoked.

At the show cause hearing, Doe requested one more opportunity to comply with the terms of his supervised release. The government agreed, on the condition that “this is his last chance.” (Sealed App. 39.) On November 24, 2008, the District Court revoked Doe's supervised release and imposed a new term of supervised release of 36 months, and placed him on electronic monitoring for six months, to run consecutively with his ongoing term of monitoring from the prior modification. ( Id. at 40.)

Doe's “last chance” proved to be another failure. On May 6, 2009, Doe's probation officer filed a third petition on supervised release based on two more urine samples that tested positive for cocaine and Doe's admission on April 13, 2009, that he had used cocaine during the preceding weekend. The District Court again convened a show cause hearing at which Doe admitted the violations. At sentencing, the government initially argued that Doe was making “a laughing stock of our supervised release system” and that he should serve 36 months incarceration with no supervised release. (Id. at 46-47). Doe's counsel suggested a sentencing range of 4 to 10 months, or in any event no greater than 18 months, of incarceration followed by additional supervised release.

The District Court then revoked Doe's supervised release and imposed a sentence of 24 months of incarceration. In doing so, the judge explained:

Well, what I am going to do here is, I am going to impose a sentence of 24 months with no supervision. I am not doing it because you-so much because you violated the law, but I am doing it in an attempt to protect you from yourself. You know, a serious addiction like that can only have one final result, and we don't want it to happen with you.

( Id. at 53.) Doe objected to this reasoning, noting [t]here is Third Circuit case law that I believe stands for the proposition that you can't incarcerate someone for treatment purposes.” ( Id.)

The government then modified its request and asked that 12 months supervised release be imposed following the 24 months of incarceration and that the judge make “clear that you are not sentencing him for the purpose of keeping him clean, but in response to the violations which he committed[.] ( Id. at 55.) The District Court modified the sentence to include supervised release but did not substantially retreat from its rationale for the sentence, responding, “I can't say no because the sentence is certainly intended for, in part to keep him clean. But again, he wouldn't be here [ ] if he hadn't violated the law. So, for that dual reason, we are imposing sentence.” ( Id. at 55-56.) The District Court then imposed a 24 month sentence of imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release. This timely appeal followed.3

II.

This Court reviews the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district court's sentence upon revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir.2007). Procedurally, the sentencing court must give “rational and meaningful consideration” to the relevant § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir.2007) (en banc). Where procedural reasonableness turns on a question of statutory interpretation, we conduct plenary review of the meaning of the statute. See United States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir.2006). If a sentencing court followed the appropriate procedures in imposing the sentence, we then look to whether the sentence itself was substantively reasonable. See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir.2006). Substantive reasonableness inquires into “whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.” United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir.2006). Absent procedural error, we will affirm the sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.2009).

III.

Doe's claims of procedural and...

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