Hampton v. Greenfield

• Decision Date: 24 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-C-2770,92-C-2770
• Citation: 618 So.2d 859
• Parties: Josie HAMPTON, Curatrix of Cathy Hampton, and Tutrix of Tananka Hampton v. Holly F. GREENFIELD, M.D., Karen Miller, M.D., M. Reyes, Charles Smith, M.D., State of Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources Consolidated With the United States Internal Revenue Service, et al.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 859

618 So.2d 859

Josie HAMPTON, Curatrix of Cathy Hampton, and Tutrix of Tananka Hampton v. Holly F. GREENFIELD, M.D., Karen Miller, M.D., M. Reyes, Charles Smith, M.D., State of Louisiana Department

of Health and Human Resources

Consolidated With the United States Internal Revenue Service, et al.

No. 92-C-2770.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 24, 1993.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Charles T. Williams, Metairie, John E. Baker, Mandeville, Blue, Williams & Buckley, Metairie, George F. Kelly, III, Kelly & Davenport, New Orleans, for applicant.

Joseph W. Thomas, Henry P. Julien, Jr., Julien & Julien, New Orleans, for respondent.

MARCUS, Justice. ^*

In 1986, while being treated at Charity Hospital of New Orleans ¹, Cathy Hampton suffered a cardiac arrest and lapsed into a coma from which she emerged mentally and physically impaired. Josie Hampton, as curatrix of Cathy Hampton and tutrix of Tananka Hampton, filed a medical malpractice action against the State of Louisiana; Charity Hospital of New Orleans; two medical residents employed by Charity Hospital, Drs. Smith and Greenfield; and a student registered nurse anesthetist, Marcus Reyes. A jury found the individual defendants guilty of negligence and set damages at $3,200,000. The trial judge found no liability on the part of the State and reduced the damages from $3,200,000 to $500,000 applying the limitation of liability contained in La.R.S. 40:1299.39, the Public Medical Malpractice Act. The court of appeal affirmed the liability of the individual defendants; however, it reversed the finding of no liability on the part of the State and Charity Hospital. The court also found that the 1988 amendment to La.R.S. 40:1299.39 which added the state and state hospitals could not be applied retroactively to limit Hampton's recovery against the State and Charity Hospital. Finally, finding the damages excessive, the court reduced the award to $1,500,000. Hampton v. Greenfield, 576 So.2d 630 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied, 581 So.2d 686 (La.1991).

Thereafter, the State, through the Division of Administration, invoked a concursus proceeding depositing $2,027,382.08 ² in the registry of the court and impleading the Internal Revenue Service; Josie Hampton; her attorneys, Joseph W. Thomas and Henry P. Julien; Claudette Thomas, former spouse of Joseph W. Thomas; John T. Pender, bankruptcy trustee of Joseph W. Thomas; the State of Louisiana; and the Office of Risk Management. The State alleged that the defendants had conflicting claims to the deposited funds. The Internal Revenue Service, John T. Pender, and Claudette Thomas were dismissed with prejudice. A stipulation between the remaining parties resulted in the release of $878,363.72 to Hampton and her attorneys. The State and the Office of Risk Management claimed the remaining funds arguing that they owed no enforceable duty to pay the Hampton judgment absent legislative appropriation. Hampton and her attorneys claimed the remaining funds pursuant to the Hampton judgment. Hampton, Julien, and Thomas filed exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action and a motion to dismiss.

The trial judge found that the State was using the concursus proceeding to relitigate retroactive application of the $500,000 cap on damages under La.R.S. 40:1299.39 to the claims against the State and Charity Hospital. The trial judge also found that it was confronted with a res nova issue; namely, whether the State and the Office of Risk Management could have the funds on deposit returned to them. The trial judge determined that they could not reasoning that under La.Code Civ.P. art. 4658 the State, as a plaintiff filing a concursus proceeding, had admitted that the deposited funds were owed to one or more of the defendants. Accordingly, the trial judge dismissed the concursus proceeding with prejudice and ordered disbursement of the remaining funds to Hampton, Julien, and Thomas. The State and the Office of Risk Management appealed. Hampton, Julien, and Thomas answered the appeal requesting an award of sanctions against the State. While the appeal was pending, the legislature passed La.Acts 1992, No. 409 appropriating funds from the Self-Insurance Fund for payment of the balance of the Hampton judgment plus interest. Consequently, motions to dismiss the appeal were filed by the parties; however, Hampton and her attorneys continued to urge their request for sanctions. The court of appeal found that the State was improperly using the concursus proceeding to relitigate the applicability of the $500,000 cap under the Public Medical Malpractice Act by conjuring a distinction between entitlement to a judgment and enforcement of a judgment and, according to the court, no such distinction exists. The court determined that the trial judge's reasons for judgment were adequate to support sanctions on appeal, since the State's arguments were identical to those already adjudicated by the court of appeal and the State was simply ignoring the court's prior holding. Accordingly, the court assessed sanctions ³ against the State under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 totalling two times the amount of judicial interest that would have accrued but for the filing of the concursus proceeding. ⁴ On the State's application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision. ⁵

The issues for our determination are whether a court of appeal may award sanctions under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 and, if not, under what authority may the court of appeal award damages for frivolous appeal and whether such damages are warranted in this case. ⁶

Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863A, every pleading must be signed by the attorney of record or by the party himself, if the party is unrepresented. A signature constitutes a certification that the attorney or party has read the pleading and, after reasonable inquiry, the attorney or party believes that the pleading is well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed for any improper purpose. Id. art. 863B. A court may find a violation of the certification requirements of this article on its own motion or motion of any party. If the court determines that a violation has occurred, the court "shall" impose appropriate sanctions. Id. art. 863D. However, sanctions under article 863D can only be imposed "after a hearing at which any party or his counsel may present any evidence or argument relevant to the issue of imposition of the sanction." Id. art. 863E. Only a trial court is capable of holding the required art. 863 hearing where evidence may be presented on the sanctions issue. Therefore, on its face, the ability to impose sanctions under art. 863 is limited to the trial court. Moreover, we believe that the authority to impose art. 863 sanctions is limited to the trial court. The court of appeal's authority to regulate conduct before it is governed by La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164, which provides in pertinent part that "[t]he [appellate] court may award damages for frivolous appeal." By limiting the court of appeal's authority to awarding damages solely for frivolous appeals, art. 2164 places a logical limit on the application of art. 863 to matters before the trial court. Therefore, it was improper for the court of appeal to look beyond the appeal filed in that court. Additionally, it was improper for the court of appeal to award sanctions under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863.

Next, we must determine whether an award of damages against the State is warranted under art. 2164 which, as stated above, permits an appellate court to award damages for frivolous appeal. Appeals are always favored and, unless the appeal is unquestionably frivolous, damages will not be allowed. City of Shreveport v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 131 La. 933, 60 So. 621, 622 (1913).

Damages for frivolous appeal are only allowed when "it is obvious that the appeal was taken solely for delay or that counsel is not sincere in the view of the law he advocates even though the court is of the opinion that such view is not meritorious." Parker v. Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co., 248 La. 449, 179 So.2d 634, 636-37 (1965).

First, we find that the State did not appeal the trial court's ruling merely to delay payment of the Hampton judgment. We find support for our conclusion in the State's dismissal of its appeal after Hampton's attorneys obtained legislative appropriation for the judgment. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the appeal was filed solely for delay. Accordingly, the State's appeal does not fall within the first category of frivolous appeals under Parker.

Next, applying Parker, we find that the State sincerely advocated its legal arguments on appeal. In its brief to the court of appeal, the State said that it was acting in "good faith" in asserting new legal arguments under the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana Revised Statutes. "[W]hen counsel proclaims his sincerity, a court finds itself without just cause to disbelieve unless, and only unless, the proposition advocated is so ridiculous or so opposed to rational thinking that it is evident beyond any doubt that it is being deliberately professed for ulterior purposes." Parker, 179 So.2d at 637.

On appeal, the State argued that the judgment was "unenforceable" because the legislature had not appropriated money to pay the judgment as required by the Louisiana Constitution. Moreover, the Office of Risk Management lacked statutory authority to pay the judgment. Although the State had previously paid judgments without prior legislative appropriation, the State argued that it had no legally enforceable duty to do so. The State noted that Hampton and her attorneys were free to seek special appropriation from the legislature for payment of the Hampton judgment.

Article XII, Sec. 10(C) of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides that:

The legislature shall provide a procedure for suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. It shall provide for the effect...