Maddox v. University of Tennessee

Decision Date21 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-5820,94-5820
Citation62 F.3d 843
Parties, 102 Ed. Law Rep. 477, 4 A.D. Cases 1253, 11 A.D.D. 694, 7 NDLR P 6 Robert E. MADDOX, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE; University of Tennessee Board of Trustees; Doug A. Dickey, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

John E. Selent, Michael A. Valenti (argued and briefed), Hirn, Doheny, Reed & Harper, Louisville, KY, for Robert E. Maddox, III.

Robert E. Maddox, III, Louisville, KY, pro se.

Ronald C. Leadbetter, Assoc. Gen. Counsel (argued and briefed), Beauchamp E. Brogan (briefed), University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, for University of Tennessee, University of Tennessee Bd. of Trustees and Doug A. Dickey.

Before: BROWN, MILBURN, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

BAILEY BROWN, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff-appellant, Robert Maddox, a former assistant football coach at the University of Tennessee, brought suit against the school, its Board of Trustees, and its athletic director, Doug Dickey (collectively "UT"), under Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 701, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101, et seq., alleging discriminatory discharge on the basis of his disability, alcoholism. The district court granted UT's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Maddox was not terminated solely by reason of, or because of, his handicap, but rather, because of a well-publicized incident in which Maddox was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Maddox appealed. We AFFIRM.

I. FACTS

On February 17, 1992, Doug Dickey, acting as UT's athletic director, extended to Maddox an offer of employment as an assistant football coach. The position did not carry tenure and was terminable at will in accordance with the policies of the Personnel Manual. As part of the hiring process, Maddox completed an application. On the line after "Describe any health problems or physical limitations, which ... would limit your ability to perform the duties of the position for which you are applying," Maddox wrote "None." In response to the question "have you ever been arrested for a criminal offense of any kind?" Maddox replied "No." These responses were not accurate. According to what Maddox alleges in this lawsuit, he suffers from the disability of alcoholism. Also, Maddox was arrested three times before 1992, once for possession of a controlled substance, and twice for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. As to the first answer, Maddox claims that it is in fact correct because "it has never affected my coaching ability ... I never drank on the job." As to the second question, Maddox claims that another university employee, Bill Higdon, advised him not to include the information concerning his prior arrests on the application.

On May 26, 1992, after Maddox began working at UT, a Knoxville police officer arrested Maddox and charged him with driving under the influence of alcohol and public intoxication. According to newspaper reports, the accuracy of which is not contested, Maddox backed his car across a major public road at a high rate of speed, almost striking another vehicle. When stopped by the officer, Maddox was combative, his pants were unzipped, and he refused to take a breathalyzer. He also lied to the arresting officer, stating that he was unemployed. This incident was highly publicized, and UT was obviously embarrassed by the public exposure surrounding the event.

Maddox entered an alcohol rehabilitation program at a UT hospital after his arrest. UT first placed Maddox on paid administrative leave. In June 1992, however, Dickey and then Head Coach Johnny Majors determined that the allegations were accurate and jointly issued a letter notifying Maddox that his employment was being terminated. They testified that termination was necessary because of: 1) the criminal acts and misconduct of Maddox; 2) the bad publicity surrounding the arrest; and 3) the fact that Maddox was no longer qualified, in their minds, for the responsibilities associated with being an assistant coach. 1 Both Dickey and Majors deny that they were aware that Maddox was an alcoholic or that Maddox's alcoholism played any part in the decision to discharge him. Nevertheless, Maddox brought this action alleging that the termination was discriminatory on the basis of his alcoholism in violation of his rights under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. UT responded by filing a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted. The court recognized that, under both statutes, a plaintiff must show that he was fired by reason of his disability. In the court's view, summary judgment was appropriate because Maddox could not establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether he had been fired by reason of his status as an alcoholic rather than by reason of his criminal misconduct. Maddox now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS
1. Standard of Review

Review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, utilizing the same test used by the district court to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Deaton v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 887 (6th Cir.1993). A court shall render summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion is made. See LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. TRW, Inc., 4 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir.1993).

2. Maddox was not terminated because of his disability

Maddox raises a number of issues on appeal which he contends show that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. Maddox first alleges that the district court erred in analyzing his claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 of the Act provides, "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a). 2 Thus, in order to establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show:

(1) The plaintiff is a "handicapped person" under the Act; (2) The plaintiff is "otherwise qualified" for participation in the program; (3) The plaintiff is being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program solely by reason of his handicap; and (4) The relevant program or activity is receiving Federal financial assistance.

Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). It is not disputed in this case that UT constitutes a program receiving Federal financial assistance under the Act. Likewise, we assume, without deciding, that alcoholics may be "individuals with a disability" for purposes of the Act. See Tinch v. Walters, 765 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir.1985); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1990). Thus, our analysis focuses on whether Maddox is "otherwise qualified" under the Act and whether he was discharged "solely by reason of" his disability. The burden of making these showings rests with Maddox. Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1386, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994).

In support of its motion for summary judgment, UT contended that both factors weighed in its favor. First, Dickey and Majors contended that they did not even know that Maddox was considered an alcoholic in making both the decision to hire and fire him. Moreover, they contended that Maddox was discharged, not because he was an alcoholic, but because of his criminal conduct and behavior and the significant amount of bad publicity surrounding him and the school. UT alternatively contended that Maddox is nevertheless not "otherwise qualified" to continue in the position of assistant football coach.

The district court granted UT's motion for summary judgment, specifically holding that UT did not discharge Maddox solely by reason of his disability. The court found it beyond dispute that Maddox's discharge resulted from his misconduct rather than his disability of alcoholism. The court noted,

"It cannot be denied in this case, Mr. Maddox was charged with ... [driving while under the influence and public intoxication] which would not be considered socially acceptable by any objective standard. The affidavit testimony of Mr. Dickey and Mr. Majors is clear on the point that it was this specific conduct, not any condition to which it might be related, which provoked the termination of Mr. Maddox's employment.

As a result, the court found it unnecessary to decide the alternative ground of whether Maddox was "otherwise qualified."

Maddox contends that the district court erred in distinguishing between discharge for misconduct and discharge solely by reason of his disability of alcoholism. Maddox claims that he has difficulty operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and therefore he characterizes drunk driving as a causally connected manifestation of the disability of alcoholism. Thus, Maddox contends that because alcoholism caused the incident upon which UT claims to have based its decision to discharge him, UT in essence discharged him because of his disability of alcoholism. In support, Maddox relies on Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 516-17 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 54, 121 L.Ed.2d 24 (1992), in which the Second Circuit held that a Rehabilitation Act plaintiff can show that he was fired "solely by reason of" his disability, or at...

To continue reading

Request your trial
186 cases
  • Gliatta v. Tectum, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • 8 Julio 2002
    ...to motivate discharge. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals, Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994). See also Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.1995). The first type, that the reasons had no basis in fact, is proven by evidence tending to establish that the proffe......
  • Badri v. Huron Hosp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • 10 Febrero 2010
    ..."caused" by the disability." Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 934 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Maddox, 62 F.3d at 847). See Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The ADA does not insulate employees from emotional......
  • Damron v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • 26 Junio 1998
    ... ... No. 4:97CV-051 ... United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee ... June 26, 1998 ... Page 813 ... COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED ... Page 814 ... Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; University of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1277, 1280 (6th Cir.1995); LaPointe v. UAW, ... 519, 523 (6th Cir.1997); Yenkin-Majestic Paint, 112 F.3d at 834; Burns, 91 F.3d at 844; Maddox v. University ... Page 833 ... of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 1995); Manzer, 29 ... ...
  • Schutts v. Bentley Nevada Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • 7 Mayo 1997
    ...protect Plaintiff from the consequences of his violent rage. Newland, ibid. (citing Collings, id. at 832-33; Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.1995)). The court need not entertain this matter Order filed Nov. 7, 1996 (Doc. # 31). Subsequently the Clerk entered jud......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • Sixth Circuit Eases Plaintiffs' ADA Burden; Proof Of 'Sole' Cause No Longer Required
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • 6 Junio 2012
    ...The "sole cause" standard for proving ADA claims first was established in the Sixth Circuit in 1995 in Maddox v. Univ. of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995). In Maddox, the Sixth Circuit applied the Rehabilitation Act's "sole cause" standard to the plaintiff's ADA claim, reasoning that ......
8 books & journal articles
  • Disability discrimination
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Employment Jury Instructions - Volume I
    • 30 Abril 2014
    ...Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards as are applied under the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. §794(d); Maddox v. Univ. of Tennessee , 62 F.3d 843, 846 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, circuit courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to Rehabilitation Act claim......
  • The Ada Interactive Process: the Employer and Employee's Duty to Work Together to Identify a Reasonable Accommodation Is More Than a Game of Five Card Stud
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 77, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...provisions of the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992). 2. 29 U.S.C. §§701 - 797b (1994). 3. See Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995). 4. See 42 U.S.C. §12116 (1994); see also 19 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1 -.16 (1997). 5. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1997)(Interpretiv......
  • Mixed-motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: a Brief Updated View of the Swamp - Robert Belton
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 51-2, January 2000
    • Invalid date
    ...60 F.3d at 1301. Other courts have expressly noted the issue but have declined to address it. See, e.g., Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 1995). 68. Congress specifically amended the ADA in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to make compensatory and punitive damages avail......
  • UNDERSTANDING TERMINATIONS FOR "DISABILITY-CAUSED MISCONDUCT" AS FAILURES TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 No. 4, April 2022
    • 1 Abril 2022
    ...an individual based upon the employee's misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability."); Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1995) (district court did not err in distinguishing between discharge for misconduct and discharge by reason of disability); Hami......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT