Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. State, 1678-6424.
Decision Date | 24 June 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 1678-6424.,1678-6424. |
Citation | 62 S.W.2d 107 |
Parties | ANDERSON, CLAYTON & CO. et al. v. STATE ex rel. ALLRED, Atty. Gen., et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Fulbright, Crooker & Freeman, W. B. Bates, and Leon Jaworski, all of Houston, and Johns, McCamblell & Snyder, of Corpus Christi, for appellants.
James V. Allred, Atty. Gen., and T. S. Christopher and Neal Powers, Asst. Attys. Gen., E. H. Crenshaw, Jr., of Kingsville, John C. North, of Corpus Christi, and J. H. Tallichet, of Houston, for appellees.
This case is before the Supreme Court upon certified questions from the honorable Court of Civil Appeals of the Seventh District.
The pertinent facts are that on August 12, 1932, the state of Texas, on the relation of James V. Allred, Attorney General, and James V. Allred, as Attorney General, plaintiffs, made application to the district court of Nueces county to secure a temporary injunction against M. D. Anderson, W. L. Clayton, Benjamin Clayton, and Lamar Fleming, Jr., doing business under the name of Anderson, Clayton & Co., and others, to restrain them and their employees from violating the provisions of chapter 277, Acts of the 42d Legislature, known as House Bill 335 (see Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 911b), by operating and causing to be operated and from aiding and abetting the operation of trucks over the highways of Texas for transporting property for compensation or hire without obtaining permits from the State Railroad Commission.
Plaintiffs prayed for recovery of penalties described in said act aggregating $3,000 as to each defendant, and further prayed for a perpetuation of the injunction upon final hearing. On August 27, 1932, the application on the part of the state for temporary injunction was heard by the court, at which time it was announced to the court by plaintiffs' attorneys that they were willing for the application for temporary injunction to be denied, and on this announcement the court entered its order denying the relief sought by plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the denial of the temporary injunction, arrests, prosecutions, and threats of arrests of Anderson, Clayton & Co.'s drivers continued, and on September 10, 1932, pursuant to a cross-bill filed by them, the court entered a restraining order enjoining the three members of the Railroad Commission, Mark Marshall, the director of the transportation division, and L. G. Phares, chief of the highway control, from further arresting, prosecuting, and threatening to arrest the drivers of the motor vehicles. It further appears that on September 19, 1932, plaintiffs' suit came on for hearing on the matter of permanent injunction, and on this date the defendants in said suit filed their third amended original answer and cross-bill, and on the same date plaintiffs took a nonsuit, and in the cross-petition filed by the defendants it was alleged that they, as actors, were complaining of the original plaintiffs as set out in the original petition as being the state of Texas, by and on the relation of James V. Allred, Attorney General of the state of Texas, and James V. Allred, as Attorney General of the state of Texas, and particularly of C. V. Terrell, Lon Smith, E. O. Thompson, comprising the Railroad Commission, Mark Marshall, director of motor transportation, and L. G. Phares, chief of the highway control, as agents and representatives of the state. In the cross-bill it is alleged that said officers were acting in excess of their authority and unlawfully, and cross-petitioners sought an order enjoining such officers from interfering with the operation of trucks over the highways for the transportation of their property by such cross-petitioners. They denied the violation of any law, and alleged that they were operating the trucks by virtue of lease contracts with the others thereof, and set out in detail the manner and method employed by them in the use of such trucks for the transportation of their property.
After the filing of the third amended answer and cross-bill by the defendants, and after the state had taken a nonsuit, the attention of the court was called to the cross-bill and that they would insist upon prosecuting the same. The court on the same date entered an order continuing in effect the temporary restraining order theretofore issued pursuant to defendants' cross-bill pending hearing thereon on the 25th day of October 1932. The cross-bill came on for hearing on application for temporary injunction on October 25, 1932, at which time all of the cross-defendants named in the cross-bill filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court because the cross-petition disclosed that the cross-petitioners were seeking an injunction against the enforcement of a penal statute of the state and showed no vested or property rights in cross-petitioners which could be protected by a court of equity.
Subject to the plea of jurisdiction, Mark Marshall and all others named in the cross-action answered by general demurrer, special exceptions, general denial, admitted their official positions, alleged their duties, their good faith in the performance thereof, the violation of the statute by cross-petitioners and attacked as a subterfuge the lease contracts and their insufficiency as a justification for the operation of trucks or as a defense to the provisions of the penal statutes.
We quote from the certificate as follows:
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