Richard v. Gray

• Decision Date: 16 January 1953
• Citation: 62 So.2d 597
• Parties: RICHARD v. GRAY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 597

62 So.2d 597

RICHARD v. GRAY.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

Jan. 16, 1953.

R. K. Bell, Miami, for appellant.

Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of dismissal entered upon motion of the appellee in a suit for libel instituted by the appellant against the appellee in the court below. The ground of appellee's motion to dismiss was that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and the sole question here presented is whether the alleged libellous statements are actionable per se.

The appellant is an attorney and is also a City Councilman of the City of Miami Beach, Florida. The appellee is a radio commentator. The statements complained of were made by the appellee in a radio broadcast over a radio station in Dade County, Florida. A transcript of the entire broadcast was attached to the appellant's complaint as a part of Count IV thereof. It appears therefrom that the appellant made a statement to the St. Louis Post Dispatch (which story was also carried by the Miami newspapers) to the effect that he had received a bribe offer of $200,000 to allow punchboards to operate. Most of this particular broadcast by the appellee was devoted to comment on the appellant's statement to the St. Louis Post Dispatch respecting the offer of a bribe, and it is this comment which forms the basis for the instant suit for libel.

The appellant complained particularly of the following comments by the appellee:

'I've no desire to injure a man in his career or his family; but I cannot do otherwise if he has started the ball rolling by his stories to the St. Louis Post Dispatch which opened up this whole yarn, and that, you must admit is true. No one started it but the man himself.'

'I want Plissner to appear before the grand jury because if Plissner appears before the grand jury I think there might be six members on the city council.' (It appears elsewhere in the broadcast that Plissner is the alleged intermediary who carried the offer of the bribe to the appellant, and that the city council is composed of seven members.)

'I know a lot of things that I cannot reveal. I am only waiting for the grand jury to open it officially and then I will tell you the whole story which I cannot tell you at this moment; I am sworn to secrecy, but believe me there is much dishonesty being prattled back and forth and when you hear the whole story you will be very, very strongly in favor of a recall action or some other form of public punishment, either bad publicity, or something that will tear the honest veil that some people are wearing in this community. That's all I've got to say.'

The appellee would up his broadcast by stating 'I am inviting a law suit publicly; I hope he does; I hope he does; please; thank you.'

The decisions in this jurisdiction, as well as others, clearly establish that a publication is libellous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession. See McCrary v. Post Pub. Co., 109 Fla. 93, 147 So. 259; Harriss v. Metropolis Co., 118 Fla. 825, 160 So. 205; Piplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla....