The Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, Plaintiffs In Error v. Philip Quigley

• Decision Date: 01 December 1858
• Citation: 16 L.Ed. 73,62 U.S. 202,21 How. 202
• Parties: THE PHILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON, AND BALTIMORE RAILROAD COMPANY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. PHILIP QUIGLEY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

62 U.S. 202

21 How. 202

16 L.Ed. 73

THE PHILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON, AND BALTIMORE RAILROAD

COMPANY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,

v. PHILIP QUIGLEY.

December Term, 1858

THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland.

It was an action on the case for libel brought by Quigley against the railroad company, under the circumstances which are fully set forth in the opinion of the court, which also contains the instructions of the Circuit Court to the jury.

The case was argued by Mr. Schley and Mr. Donaldson for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Davis for the defendant.

The counsel for the plaintiffs in error made the following points:

1. An action of libel cannot be sustained against the plaintiff in error. The laws, under which it exists as a corporate body, are a part of the record. It is a railroad company, with defined and limited faculties and powers; and it can exercise no incidental powers, except such as are necessary to the full exercise of the faculties and powers expressly given by its charter. Being a mere legal entity, it is incapable of malice; and in the very definition of libel, malice is an essential element. The action should have been instituted against the natural persons, who published the alleged libel.

Rex v. The Great North of England Railway Co., 9 Q. B., 315.

Stevens v. Midland Counties Railway Co., 10 Exchequer, 352.

Commonwealth v. The Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 345.

State v. Great Works Mill and Man. Co., 20 Maine, 41.

McClelland v. Bank of Cumberland, 24 Maine, 566.

Childs v. Bank of Missouri, 17 Missouri, 213.

And, for illustration, the cases of Colman v. The Eastern Counties Railway Co., 4 Railway C., 513, and Salomons v. Lainy, 6 Railway C., 301, are referred to, showing that the corporation is not bound by acts of directors, when such acts are ultra vires.

2. Even if the action of libel could be maintained against the plaintiff in error, in a case of unlawful publication, yet, upon the proof in this case, there was no such publication.

The communication, by the president and directors to the stockholders, of the results of the investigation into the conduct of the company's officers, was a privileged communication; and even if it amounted to a publication, no action will lie, unless upon proof of express malice and the want of probable cause; and the burden of proving malice and want of probable cause was on the plaintiff below.

Van Dyck v. Guthrie, 4 Duer, 268.

Vanderzee v. McGregor, 12 Wend., 545.

Davison v. Duncan, 40 Law and E. Rep., 219.

Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 Carr and Payne, 680; 32 Eng. C. L. Rep., 685.

Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B., 583; 70 Eng. C. L. Rep., 583.

Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B., 308; 71 Eng. C. L. Rep., 307.

Harris v. Thompson, 13 C. B., 333; 76 Eng. C. L. Rep., 333.

Cockayne v. Hodgkinson, 5 Carr and Payne, 543; 24 Eng. C. L. Rep., 448.

Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. Mees. and Ros., 181.

Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. and El., 380, 39 Eng. C. L. Rep., 115.

Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend., 320.

Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick., 163.

Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 Mann., Grang., and Scott, 315; 65 Eng. C. L. Rep., 291.

White v. Nicholls, 3 How., 266.

Cooke v. Wilde, 30 Law and E. Rep.

3. But there was no evidence of publication, by the defendant, of the matter complained of as libellous. The report of the president and directors to the stockholders of the company, communicating the results of the investigation, was no such publication; and the adoption of their report, and the consequent printing of the testimony, and its authorized distribution amongst the stockholders, was no such publication.

Rex v. Baillie, 2 Esp. N. P., 10, and cited in Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend.

4. There was no evidence of express malice on the part of the corporation, or on the part of the board of directors, or on the part of the stockholders. It is not a case in which vindictive damages could properly be given.

2 Greenl. Ev., secs. 253, 420.

Day v. Woodworth, 13 How., 371.

5. The first instruction of the court below was erroneous in several particulars. It directed the jury that they might infer malice, from the mere falsehood of any statement in the letter of Mahoney, respecting the plaintiff in his trade and occupation; and that the distribution of the printed book, among any of the stockholders, rendered the defendant liable in the action. The defendant, under this instruction, was not at liberty to claim a verdict, except upon proof of the truth of every statement in said letter; for the distribution of the book, to some extent, amongst the stockholders, was not denied.

6. But the second instruction was even more exceptionable. It was calculated to mislead the jury; and, although, undoubtedly, not so designed, seemingly suggests to them the propriety of giving exemplary damages. The quantum of damages, under this instruction, was to be composed of two items: firstly, such amount as would render reparation to the plaintiff; AND, secondly, such amount as would act as an adequate punishment to the defendant; and in making up this blended amount, the jury were told to give such damages as, in their opinion, were called for and justified in view of all the circumstances of the case. The instruction left the jury at large, irrespective of the special character in which the plaintiff complained. In his declaration, the plaintiff sued, in his character as a mechanic, for an alleged libel upon him, as a mechanic; and he complains of injury to his reputation, not as a man, but as a mechanic; and he claims special, and not general, damages. Now, there was certainly evidence, and strong evidence, to show that the plaintiff had not sustained any actual damage in his reputation, or in his business, as a mechanic; and, if so, the case was one, not for vindictive, but nominal damages. The standard of making reparation to the plaintiff, and of punishing the defendant, is not warranted by the declaration, and not justified by the cause of action.

7. The Circuit Court, upon the proof adduced, had not jurisdiction in this case. The plaintiff and defendant were not citizens of different States.

[The plaintiff sued as a citizen of Delaware. The defendan was described as 'a body corporate in the State of Maryland incorporated by a law of the General Assembly of Maryland. But the proof showed that the defendant was also a body corporate in Delaware, incorporated by an act of the Legislature of Delaware. If the defendant was a citizen of Maryland, (as regards the question of jurisdiction,) because incorporated under the laws of Maryland, then, by parity of reason, the defendant was also a citizen of Delaware, because incorporated under the laws of Delaware. The proof also showed that four of the directors and some of the stockholders were citizens and residents of Delaware; and the articles of union, under which the defendant exists as a corporate body, contain an express provision, that the stated meetings of the board of directors shall be held, alternately, in Wilmington and in Philadelphia; and that an office shall be kept open in Wilmington, for the transfer of the stock of the company. And by the provisions of an act of the State of Delaware, forming a part of the charter of this company, an annual tax is imposed on so much of its capital stock as formed, before the union, the capital stock of the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company.]

The plaintiff and defendant below were therefore citizens of the same State.

In the case of this company against Howard, (13 How., 307,) this point did not arise, as the plaintiff in that case was a citizen of Illinois.

In the case of Marshall v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, (16 How., 314,) no question was made below in relation to jurisdiction, and the proof did not present the precise question which arises in this case.

In Rundle v. The Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, (14 How., 80, 95,) the facts were essentially different.

Nor was it necessary that this objection should have been made by plea in abatement. The cases of Sheppard v. Graves, (14 How., 510,) and of Jones v. League, (18 How., 76,) it is supposed, do not apply to a case like this. The objection does not present any question of disability of the plaintiff, or of privilege of the defendant. Pleading to the action admits, indeed, the averments of the declaration as to the citizenship of the parties, but nothing more. And if the defendant be a citizen also, of Delaware, as well as of Maryland, there is no repugnancy between the fact admitted in the pleading, and the fact established by the proof. The court, sua sponte, would decline jurisdiction in such case, even if waived by the parties.

The counsel for the defendant in error made the following points:

1. That a corporation may be liable for a libel.

P. and D. St. Co. v. Hungerford, 6 G. and J., 291; 7 G. and J., 44.

East Counties Railway v. Brookes, 2 Eng. L. and Eq., 406.

16 East, 8; Angel & Ames, ch. 10, sec. 9; 14 Eng. C. L. R., 159.

Merls v. Tariff. Manuf. Co., 10 Conn., 384.

Williams v. Beaumont, 10 Bingham, 260, 270.

Goodspeed v. E. Haddam Bk., 22 Conn., 530, 538.

Trenton M. L. I. Co. v. Perine, 3 Zebraskie, 402.

2. That there is sufficient proof of the publication and printing by the corporation.

Clark v. Corp. Washington, 12 Wheat., 40.

Bank U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat., 64.

Bank Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299.

Union Bank v. Ridgeley, 1 H. and G., 325.

3. That the publication was not in form or substance a privileged communication.

4. The measure of damages was rightly assigned by the court. 14 Howard, 468.

5. (a) The jurisdiction is sufficiently alleged.

(b) The question cannot now be raised on the record.

(c) If it could, the facts show jurisdiction as well as the averment.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, (Quigley,) a citizen of Delaware,...