U.S. v. Hamilton, s. 79-1340

Decision Date30 April 1980
Docket Number79-1611,Nos. 79-1340,s. 79-1340
Citation620 F.2d 712
Parties80-2 USTC P 9497 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James C. HAMILTON, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Patrick R. Doyle, Las Vegas, Nev., for appellant.

C. Stanley Hunterton, Las Vegas, Nev., for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

Before KILKENNY, SKOPIL and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.

KILKENNY, Circuit Judge:

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant was indicted, tried by a jury, and convicted of filing a false and fraudulent income tax return, understating his income for the year 1975, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201.

From January, 1975, through May, 1976, appellant was the manager of slot machine operations for the Fremont Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. Briefly stated, the evidence showed that appellant acquired substantial holdings in real estate, stocks, and savings accounts while his liabilities increased by less than $13,000.00 in 1975. The government showed that appellant experienced an increase in net worth of $64,664.00 in twelve months on a reported taxable income of less than $26,000.00, and ultimately demonstrated that appellant had a true taxable income for the year 1975 of $68,000.00, and that he had evaded $12,878.00 in taxes. Substantial evidence was presented from which it could be inferred that the likely source of the increase in net worth was a slot machine "skim."

METHOD OF PROOF

Appellee employed what is commonly known as the "net worth and expenditures" In framing the law on the subject, the Supreme Court has said that the government, to sustain a conviction, must prove the three elements of the offense: (1) the existence of a tax deficiency, (2) willfulness in evading taxes, and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the income tax. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1010, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965). In proving the elements, the government is required to: (1) accurately establish the defendant's opening net worth, (2) identify a likely source of taxable income from which it may be inferred that the defendant's increase in net worth arose, and (3) conduct a reasonable investigation of any leads that suggest that defendant properly reported his income. Holland, supra; Gardner, supra. The latter three requirements are imposed because of the nature of the net worth and expenditures method of proof. As Holland and Gardner caution, the evidence in this kind of case should be carefully reviewed "bearing constantly in mind the difficulties that arise when circumstantial evidence as to guilt is the chief weapon of a method that is itself only an approximation." Holland, supra at 129, 75 S.Ct. at 132.

                method of proof.  1  This procedure was approved by the Supreme Court in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), and was recognized and approved by this court as recently as United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770 (CA9 1980)
                
PRINCIPAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Whether the government proved the existence of a tax deficiency.

II. Whether the government proved the element of willfulness of appellant in attempting to evade income taxes.

III. Whether the government proved an affirmative act constituting an evasion of income taxes.

I.

The establishment of an accurate opening net worth is crucial under the net worth and expenditures method of proof for "the correctness of the result depends entirely upon the inclusion in this sum of all assets on hand at the outset." Holland, supra 348 U.S. at 132, 75 S.Ct. at 134. Our review of the record convinces us that the government has supplied evidence to meet this requirement. Appellant's chief argument is that he must have had a cash hoard on hand at the end of 1974 and that this would mean that his opening net worth was substantially greater than the amount the government established. In this regard, he argues that the government failed to investigate and "purify" assets and sources of income allegedly revealed by a "150 M" notation on a 1974 new account form with a brokerage firm, by large bank deposits in 1972, 1973, and 1975, and by a 1967 loan application.

The government is not required "to embark on a Magellan-like expedition in order to prove that the unreported income was taxable." United States v. Heitt, 581 F.2d 1199, 1201 (CA5 1978). It is only required to pursue any reasonable leads as to possible sources of nontaxable income, United States v. Hom Ming Dong, 436 F.2d 1237, 1242 (CA9 1971). It need not "negate every possible source of nontaxable income, a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant." Holland, supra 348 U.S. at 138, 75 S.Ct. at 137. The principle remains that once the government has established its case, the defendant remains silent at his peril. Holland, supra at 138-139, 75 S.Ct. at 136-37; United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 671 (CA2 1955), aff'd. 350 U.S. 354, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956).

Appellant provided no reasonable leads, but now argues that the documents and deposits mentioned above put the government on notice of possible sources of income. We disagree. The loan application made only vague references to some assets allegedly held by appellant in 1967. Only a fraction of those assets were even valued on the application; and that at only $2,500.00. There was no indication that these assets were sold to produce a cash hoard 2 or that they were the source of nontaxable income. At trial, it became apparent that the "150 M" notation on the brokerage house new account form meant nothing. Testimony revealed that it was put on the form by a salesman and that there was no evidence in the record to substantiate the figure. Finally, there was no reasonable suggestion that the bank deposits came from nontaxable sources. It would be entirely unreasonable to require the government to pursue these phantom clues as to some mysterious sources and assets.

We, of course, recognize that the burden is always on the government to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The record reveals that the government thoroughly investigated appellant's financial status at the beginning of 1975. It established appellant's opening net worth figure by considering the information contained in appellant's income tax returns over the previous six years, nine bank accounts and their records, the acquisition and sale of ten securities, and six real estate transactions. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as this court must, Gardner, supra at 775; Hom Ming Dong, supra at 1242, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this question.

As part and parcel of this issue of the sufficiency of the evidence of a tax deficiency, it is appellant's contention that the government failed to meet its burden of proving the likely source for the unreported income, Holland, supra 348 U.S. at 138, 75 S.Ct. at 136; Gardner, supra at 775, and that the district court improperly admitted figures from standard budgets prepared by the Bureau of Labor to show appellant's living expenses.

We have no difficulty in holding that the jury could well have found that the likely source of taxable funds was the illegal diversion of money from slot machine revenues at the Fremont Hotel, where appellant was the slot machine manager. Fremont employees testified to the unusual system of dealing with slot machine revenues. The comptroller of the Fremont testified that during 1975 his representative was barred from the counting and wrapping of coins taken from the slot machines. Other witnesses testified regarding the operation of an unusual auxiliary bank which was very susceptible to being used to divert funds. The corporate head of the Fremont testified that he had filed an insurance claim to recover money lost by the Fremont through employee dishonesty. Most convincingly, a statistical expert examined the Fremont's slot machines, reviewed their reported performance, and compared them with similar machines at other casinos and with the manufacturer's built in performance specifications. He concluded that the odds against such machines performing as poorly as the Fremont's records indicated were greater than two billion to one. We disagree with appellant's contention that this statistical analysis should not have been admitted because it was speculative, confusing to the jury, and introduced without proper foundation. There is no question that it was highly relevant to whether moneys were being diverted from the slot machines and that it would likely assist the trier of fact in reaching its decision as to whether the government showed a likely source of income. The admission of the testimony was well within the trial court's discretion under FRE 702 and 703.

We observe that those involved in gambling and its related activities are engaged As noted above, the proof of the nondeductible expenditures is one factor in the net worth and expenditures method of proof. The taxpayer's nondeductible expenditures are added to the adjusted net values of the defendant's assets at the end of the subject year and, consequently, increase the figure to be compared with the opening net worth. In this case, the government found that during 1975 there was little activity in appellant's checking account and that the microfilming from two of appellant's banks was illegible. Consequently, it was impossible to reconstruct appellant's living expenses in the typical manner of producing checking account records. Instead, the government was forced to rely on independent estimates from the Bureau of Labor on what a person with appellant's reported income and family and financial obligations would be expected to spend on nondeductible items. Certainly, appellant must have expended some funds to maintain himself. At all times the government relied on the figures...

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