Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co.

Citation621 F.Supp.2d 230
Decision Date22 August 2007
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 1:05-CV-0944.
PartiesBrenda L. ERDMAN, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania

Patricia C. Zucker, Daley Zucker Meilton Miner & Gingrich, LLC, Wormleysburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

Donald R. Keller, Vladimir P. Belo, Bricker & Eckler, LLP, Columbus, OH, Joanne E. Kinzel, Jacobs & Associates, Camp Hill, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, District Judge.

Presently before the court is a motion by defendant Nationwide Insurance Company ("Nationwide") for partial reconsideration of a memorandum and order denying summary judgment in its favor on two of the claims asserted by plaintiff Brenda L. Erdman ("Erdman"). See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 510 F.Supp.2d 363 (M.D.Pa.2007). Nationwide contends that three aspects of the court's memorandum should be reconsidered: (1) the court's conclusion that Erdman proffered sufficient evidence to support a claim of association discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, (2) the court's ruling that Erdman's amended complaint sufficiently pled a claim of retaliation pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963, and (3) the court's finding that Erdman's request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") was a "protected activity" that could support a claim of retaliation pursuant to the PHRA.

The parties have fully briefed the issues, and the court heard oral argument on August 9, 2007. The motion is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant Nationwide's motion in part.

I. Summary of Facts1

The dispute in the instant case centers around Nationwide's decision to terminate Erdman's employment. While Erdman was employed at Nationwide, she gave birth to a disabled daughter. (Doc. 15 ¶ 7; Doc. 18 ¶ 8.) Erdman was twice granted modifications to her work schedule "due to the needs of her disabled child." (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 8-9; Doc. 18 ¶¶ 9-10.) Then, on March 12, 2003, Erdman's supervisors informed her that Nationwide was revoking her modified work schedule and that her job would be eliminated unless she agreed to accept a full-time position. (Doc. 15 ¶ 13; Doc. 18 ¶ 14.) Erdman accepted the full-time position, but "sought confirmation that she would be able to use her previously scheduled vacation in August 2003, to care [for] and supervise her 10-year-old daughter." (Doc. 44 ¶¶ 7, 10; Doc. 60 ¶¶ 7, 10.) One of Erdman's supervisors informed her that it was "unlikely" that Nationwide would permit her to take the requested vacation. (Doc. 44 ¶ 8; Doc. 60 ¶ 8.) Erdman responded that she would seek leave under the FMLA if her previous vacation request was not approved. (Doc. 44 ¶ 9; Doc. 60 ¶ 9.) To solidify her request for leave, Erdman submitted FMLA paperwork to Nationwide on April 22, 2003, seeking a period of leave that was to commence on July 7, 2003. (Doc. 15 ¶ 14; Doc. 18 ¶ 15; Doc. 44 ¶ 30; Doc. 60 ¶ 30.) On May 6, 2003, Erdman requested Nationwide's decision regarding her FMLA leave by May 9, 2003. (Doc. 15 ¶ 15; Doc. 18 ¶ 16.)

Nationwide terminated Erdman's employment on May 9, 2003. (Doc. 15 ¶ 16; Doc. 18 ¶ 17.) Nationwide contends that Erdman's employment was terminated because she engaged in "multiple incidents of inappropriate workplace behavior." (Doc. 43 at 6.) Erdman denies these allegations and counters that her termination was the culmination of "a focused and insidious campaign by her supervisor and other Nationwide managers ... to develop pre-textual bases upon which to fire her to prevent her from taking FMLA leave." (Doc. 61 at 6; Doc. 60 ¶¶ 11, 23, 26.) Erdman commenced the instant action, asserting claims pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, the ADA, and the PHRA, as well as a claim of breach of an employment contract. Only Erdman's ADA and PHRA claims remain.

II. Standard of Review

Motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) serve primarily to correct analytical errors in a prior decision of the court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 287-88 (3d Cir.2003). They may not be used as a device for introducing new evidence or claims not previously presented. See id. Such motions require the court to reconstruct the record as it existed at the time of the prior decision to determine whether the court committed an error of law material to the ruling. Id.; see also Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158-59 (3d Cir.1988).

It follows from this remedial purpose that the standard of review for a motion for reconsideration relates back to the standard applicable in the underlying decision. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 287-88; Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 824 F.2d 249, 253 (3d Cir.1987). When a reconsideration motion challenges the court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 controls the analysis. Relief may be granted if the materials presented in support of and in opposition to the summary judgment motion—including the pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits—"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir.2001). The court should not weigh conflicting evidence or make factual findings but, rather, should "consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" to determine whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Schnall v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 279 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. Discussion

Nationwide asks the court to reconsider its decision to deny summary judgment on Erdman's claims pursuant to the ADA and the PHRA. The court will address these claims seriatim.

A. ADA

Erdman's ADA claim is asserted pursuant to the "association provision," which prohibits an employer from "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to" an individual based upon the individual's relationship or association with a disabled person. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). To establish a prima facie case of association discrimination, a plaintiff must prove the following:

(1) the plaintiff was "qualified" for the job at the time of the adverse employment action;

(2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action;

(3) the plaintiff was known by his employer at the time to have a relative or associate with a disability;

(4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the employer's decision.

Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir.1997); see also Reddinger v. Hosp. Cent. Servs., Inc., 4 F.Supp.2d 405, 409 (E.D.Pa.1998).

In the instant case, Nationwide disputes only Erdman's ability to establish the fourth element of the prima facie case, to wit: the existence of a reasonable inference that Nationwide terminated Erdman's employment because of a belief that she would be required to miss work in order to care for her disabled daughter. (See Doc. 43 at 13.) In the memorandum and order dated June 12, 2007 (Doc. 85), the court held that Erdman had presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that this element has been established. In so finding, the court noted the following:

In the instant case, Erdman was terminated on May 9, 2003, the very day on which she had asked to be notified of Nationwide's decision regarding her FMLA leave. In addition, just two months earlier, Nationwide required Erdman to accept a full-time position, effectively revoking the part-time position that she had filled for five years. The court finds that this evidence could suggest to a reasonable jury that Nationwide harbored a certain degree of antagonism towards modified work schedules of the type required by Erdman to care for her disabled daughter.... [T]he court finds that the aforementioned evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to Erdman, would permit a reasonable jury to find that Nationwide terminated Erdman's employment because of a belief that she would be required to miss work in order to care for her disabled daughter.

(Doc. 85 at 15.)

Nationwide now argues that this decision effectively allows Erdman to pursue a reasonable accommodation claim, a theory of liability which is not permitted by the association provision. (See Doc. 88 at 10.) The court disagrees. Nothing about the court's prior opinion suggested that Nationwide was required to grant Erdman's request for leave to avoid running afoul of the association provision. In fact, the court's prior opinion recognized that the association provision "does not mandate that an employer provide an employee without a disability with a reasonable accommodation to enable the employee to care for a disabled individual with whom the employee is associated." (Doc. 85 at 16.) Instead, the court's prior opinion concluded only that the circumstances surrounding Nationwide's decision to terminate Erdman's employment raised a reasonable inference that her daughter's disability was a determining factor in Nationwide's decision. (Id. at 15-16.)

Nationwide now suggests that even if such an inference exists, Erdman's termination does not violate the association provision because her history of requests for modified work schedules and for leave made her termination permissible.2 There is a dearth of case law interpreting this aspect of the association provision, and Third Circuit case law on the subject is particularly limited. The court looks for guidance to the association provision's supporting regulations, which define the scope of the provision as follows:

[A]ssume...

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