Nash v. Auburn University

Decision Date23 October 1985
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 85-H-1141-E.
Citation621 F. Supp. 948
PartiesDavid M. NASH and Donna C. Perry, Plaintiffs, v. AUBURN UNIVERSITY, Frank G. Vice, J.T. Vaughan, H.C. Morgan, and James E. Martin, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

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McPhillips, DeBardelaben & Hawthorne, Julian McPhillips, Griffin Sikes, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiffs.

Balch & Bingham, David Boyd, Montgomery, Ala., Samford & Samford, Thomas D. Samford, III, Opelika, Ala., Melton & Espy, Joe Espy, Montgomery, Ala., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HOBBS, Chief Judge.

This cause is now before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment filed October 15, 1985 and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed on October 16, 1985. Counsel for both parties orally waived the Rule 56(c) ten day waiting period before the time fixed for a hearing, and a hearing on both motions was held on October 18, 1985. Upon consideration of the motions, briefs, affidavits, transcripts, oral arguments of counsel, and other documents properly before this Court, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is due to be denied, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

FACTS

Plaintiffs Nash and Perry were first year students in Auburn University's College of Veterinary Medicine at the time of the events which form the basis of their claims. On June 6, 1985, they were advised in writing that they were charged with violations of the University's Student Code of Professional Ethics (the "Code"). The specified violation was "academic dishonesty, in that while taking examinations during 1984-1985 school year, information was allegedly obtained in an unethical manner." The notice advised that in accordance with the Code, plaintiffs were allowed 72 hours to prepare their defense and that a hearing would be conducted by the Student Board of Ethical Relations (the "Board") on June 10, 1985.

Plaintiffs attended the June 10 hearing accompanied by counsel. Before any evidentiary proceedings commenced, plaintiffs objected to the June 6, 1985 notice as inadequate and too vague to reasonably advise them of the charges against them. Plaintiffs requested a more specific notice, and one additional day to prepare their defense. After consultation with counsel, plaintiffs expressly agreed to a new hearing date on the evening of June 12, with the understanding that a more specific charge would be made by 1:00 p.m. on June 11.

Plaintiffs timely received the restated notice which charged them with "giving or receiving assistance or communications ... during the anatomy examination on or about May 16, 1985" in violation of the Code. The notice also listed several classmates of plaintiffs and several members of the anatomy faculty who were expected to support the charges at the hearing.

The student honor court hearing was conducted as scheduled on June 12. Again, plaintiffs were accompanied by an attorney, who was allowed to counsel and advise plaintiffs during the hearing, but who was not allowed to participate directly in the proceedings. The Board did not have legal counsel present, and the proceedings were conducted by the non-voting student chancellor of the Board. The plaintiffs, witnesses and Board members were all present throughout the hearing. A transcript of these proceedings is an exhibit in this case, (Def.Exhibit # 20).

At the hearing before the student honor court, the witnesses against plaintiffs first made their statements and answered questions from the Board members. Plaintiffs were then allowed to present their own statements, respond to the charges, and rebut the statements of the witnesses. Next, plaintiffs presented witnesses in their defense who also gave statements and responded to the Board members' questions. Further questions were directed by the Board members to the witnesses and to the plaintiffs. After the Board completed its questioning, plaintiffs were provided an opportunity to question the witnesses against them by directing their questions through the chancellor. Although plaintiffs asked some questions of Board members, their request for a recess was denied and the hearing was concluded.

Following the hearing, the Board deliberated outside the presence of witnesses and plaintiffs and unanimously concluded that plaintiffs were guilty of the charge of academic dishonesty. Plaintiffs were notified of the Board's finding, the recommended penalty of suspension with an option to reapply for admission after one year, and their right under the Code to appeal to the dean of the College of Veterinary Medicine.

On June 13, 1985, plaintiffs perfected an appeal to the dean. Pursuant to the Code, the dean referred the case to the college's Faculty Committee on Admissions and Standards (the "Committee") for a recommendation.

On June 19, 1985, the nine faculty members on the Committee conducted a day-long meeting to consider the appeal. They were provided copies of the materials presented at the Board hearing and then listened to the entire tape recording of the June 12, 1985 hearing before the Board, which hearing had taken in excess of three hours. Plaintiffs then presented well-prepared oral and written statements in their defense. After these statements, the Committee retired to deliberate, at which time they voted unanimously to recommend to the dean that the Board's findings and recommendation of punishment be upheld. The dean accepted the recommendation and upheld the Board's action.

Later in the summer, plaintiffs were allowed to perfect an appeal to the president of the University. After reviewing the file, the president affirmed the actions of the Board, the Committee, and the dean.

DISCUSSION

In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs claim that their procedural and substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution were violated by the actions of Auburn University and the other named defendants. In addition, plaintiffs allege a pendent state law claim that plaintiffs' enrollment in and payment of tuition to Auburn University constituted a contract which Auburn University breached by wrongfully suspending plaintiffs.

I. Procedural Due Process

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs have both a property interest and a liberty interest which are adversely affected by their suspension from Auburn University. Consequently, defendants properly conclude that their actions must have accorded plaintiffs the minimal requirements of due process. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).

Since due process applies, the more difficult question is what process was due plaintiffs. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Turning to that question the Court notes that "the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). In the context of student suspensions, the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at p. 578, 95 S.Ct. at 738, has given this clear admonition:

"Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint.... By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities."

The courts have established minimum guidelines as to how much process is due in the context of student suspensions. The Supreme Court has emphasized that "a school is an academic institution, not a courtroom or administrative hearing room." Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88, 98 S.Ct. 948, 954, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). Although "a university cannot ignore its duty to treat its students fairly, neither is it required to transform its classrooms into courtrooms." Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 597 F.Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D.Mich.1984), citing Jenkins v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 506 F.2d 992, 1000 (5th Cir.1975). Furthermore, procedural due process in the context of a school disciplinary proceeding does not require all the trappings or procedural safeguards of a criminal trial because "formalizing hearing requirements would divert both resources and attention from the educational process." Jaksa, 597 F.Supp. at 1250.

What procedural due process does require is, at a minimum, that the "students facing suspension ... be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." (emphasis in original) Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). However, the "timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accomodation of the competing interests involved." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Consequently, due process is a flexible concept "calling for such procedural protections as the situation demands." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). With these broad, flexible general principles as guides, the court will consider plaintiffs' procedural due process challenges.

A. Right to Adequate Notice

Plaintiffs claim that the amended, specific notice given on June 11 was inadequate because it was not received until thirty hours before the hearing on June 12.

Without suggesting that the notice in this case would otherwise have been so short as to violate the Constitution of the United States, the record is clear that plaintiffs fully agreed to the schedule which was followed. The conversation between the student chancellor of the Board and plaintiffs' counsel at the June 10 scheduled...

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8 cases
  • U.S. v. Miami University, No. C-2-98-0097.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • March 20, 2000
    ...to a criminal trial and the notice of charges need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal indictment"); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F.Supp. 948, 953 (M.D.Ala.1985) (stating that "procedural due process in the context of a school disciplinary proceeding does not require all the trapping......
  • Heenan v. Rhodes, Civil Action No. 2:09cv75–MHT.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • December 27, 2010
    ...‘formalizing hearing requirements would divert both resources and attention from the educational process.’ ” Nash v. Auburn, 621 F.Supp. 948, 953 (M.D.Ala.1985) (Hobbs, J.) (citations omitted), aff'd, 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.1987). In this vein, “the great majority of cases support the concl......
  • Nash v. Auburn University
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • March 16, 1987
    ...on the merits. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Nash v. Auburn University, 621 F.Supp. 948 (M.D.Ala.1985). The court later denied appellants' motion for an injunction pending appeal. Appellants ask us to reverse the district co......
  • Smith v. Denton, 93-1297
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • April 3, 1995
    ...Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930, 82 S.Ct. 368, 7 L.Ed.2d 193 (1961); Nash v. Auburn University, 621 F.Supp. 948 (D.C.Ala.1985). Moreover, Dr. Smith did not violate the spirit of due process. He did investigate the initial charge against Ms. Denton......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Enforcement of Law Schools' Non-academic Honor Codes: a Necessary Step Towards Professionalism?
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 89, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...students against whom disciplinary action had been taken). Cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment include Nash v. Auburn University, 621 F. Supp. 948 (D. Ala. 1985), affd, 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1987) (denying plaintiffs' claims that their procedural and substantive due process rights und......

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