623 A.2d 1268 (Me. 1993), Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Brown

Citation:623 A.2d 1268
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM.
Party Name:BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR v. Robert P. BROWN.
Attorney:Karen A. Kingsley (orally), Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for plaintiff. Robert E. Mongue (orally), Kennebunk, for defendant.
Judge Panel:Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and RUDMAN, JJ.
Case Date:April 20, 1993
Court:Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
 
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Page 1268

623 A.2d 1268 (Me. 1993)

BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR

v.

Robert P. BROWN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 20, 1993

Argued March 1, 1993.

Karen A. Kingsley (orally), Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for plaintiff.

Robert E. Mongue (orally), Kennebunk, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and RUDMAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Robert P. Brown, an attorney licensed to practice law, appeals from an order of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court (Glassman, J.) finding him

Page 1269

in violation of Maine Bar Rules 3.1(a) 1 and 3.2(f)(3), 2 and suspending him from the practice of law for six months. Because the Court's conclusion that Brown violated the Bar Rules was based on a finding of misrepresentation that is not supported in the record, we vacate the judgment.

This case arises out of Brown's purchase of a forty-three acre parcel of undeveloped land in South Berwick, and his efforts to secure a deeded right of access to that land from John and Charlotte Chick, owners of the adjoining property. Brown's property had no deeded access, but Brown's predecessors in title had used an unpaved road that runs across the Chick property for access. There had been disagreement between Frank Malcolm Keyes, the person from whom Brown purchased the property, and the Chicks about Keyes' access over the old road. Attempts had been made to obtain from the Chicks a fifty-foot right of way over their land to the Keyes property. The Chicks refused to deed such a right of way, preferring that the width and permitted uses of the old road be limited.

Brown purchased the real estate from Keyes by warranty deed. Inserted in that deed to Brown was a clause quitclaiming any interest that Keyes had in a "fifty foot right of way over the old road extending across land now or formerly of John Chick[.]" After purchasing the property from Keyes, Brown, on October 2, 1989, wrote a letter to the Chicks asserting his claim to a right of way across the Chicks' property, and threatening a lawsuit against the Chicks to confirm the existence of the right of way if the matter was not otherwise resolved. That letter stated that Brown was "aware that the deed to the right of way ... is unrecorded." Brown brought suit against the Chicks later in October 1989. In his complaint, Brown asserted claims in the old road based on theories...

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