Brown v. Callahan

• Decision Date: 07 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-10843.,09-10843.
• Parties: Janis L. BROWN, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jason Ray Brown, Deceased; Billy Ray Brown, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Thomas J. CALLAHAN, Sheriff of Wichita County, Texas, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

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Janis L. BROWN, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jason Ray Brown, Deceased; Billy Ray Brown, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Thomas J. CALLAHAN, Sheriff of Wichita County, Texas, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-10843.

United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 7, 2010.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

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Guy Hubert Riddle (argued) and Geffrey William Anderson (argued), Anderson, Riddle & Kuchler, L.L.P., Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Robert Scott Davis (argued), David Ryan Herring Iglesias, Flowers Davis, P.L.L.C., Tyler, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, PRADO, Circuit Judge, and OZERDEN, District Judge. ^*

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:

Jason Brown died tragically while detained in the Wichita County Jail. His estate sued Sheriff Thomas Callahan for failure to train and supervise the jail's

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medical employees and for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of deliberate indifference to detainees' serious medical needs. The district court denied Sheriff Callahan's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and he appeals. Because there is insufficient evidence of deliberate indifference or objective unreasonableness by the Sheriff, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying facts are not in dispute. Jason Brown died of a gastrointestinal hemorrhage while in pretrial custody in the Wichita County Jail. During the 55 hours between Brown's book-in and his death, he informed the intake nurse of multiple serious medical problems, repeatedly vomited what appeared to be blood, complained of feeling unwell, requested to be sent to the emergency room, and ultimately was non-responsive for extended periods of time. During his confinement, Brown lacked access to his prescription medications. An attending jail nurse, Nurse Krajca, treated Brown's symptoms by giving him liquid antacid, placing him in a medical solitary cell, and administering an anti-nausea suppository. Brown was neither transferred to a hospital ER, nor was he seen by the jail's supervising physician, Dr. Bolin. In fact, no one from the jail ever contacted Dr. Bolin for his advice on Jason Brown. The jail's deputies, however, periodically checked Brown's condition from outside the medical solitary cell. When the deputies checked on him the next evening, Brown was dead.

Brown's parents, Janis and Billy Ray Brown, filed suit individually and as representatives of the estate of Jason Brown against Sheriff Callahan and others. Relevant to this appeal, the Appellees contend that Sheriff Callahan is liable for Brown's death in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under two possible theories. First, they argue that Callahan is personally responsible for training staff and supervising the medical treatment of individuals in the custody of the jail. More specifically, the Appellees allege that Sheriff Callahan failed to supervise properly the jail staff and Dr. Bolin, who intimidated the nurses, discouraging them from contacting the doctor or referring patients to the ER for further medical treatment. Second, the Browns allege that the Sheriff ratified as custom or policy Dr. Bolin's intimidation of the nursing staff that caused their son's death.

Sheriff Callahan moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied his motion. It found that the Appellees offered sufficient evidence to create material fact issues whether (a) Sheriff Callahan failed adequately to supervise the jail's medical personnel, and (b) approved or ratified “Defendant Bolin's pattern and practice of harassing and intimidating jail nurses when they would call him with questions regarding nursing care, discouraging sending inmates to the hospital causing Brown's death.” The same evidence persuaded the court that Sheriff Callahan's actions may have been objectively unreasonable and therefore not protected by qualified immunity. Sheriff Callahan appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a denial of a public official's motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity by determining “whether the district court erred in assessing the legal significance of the conduct that the district court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment.” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 347 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc).

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The court reviews de novo the district court's legal determination of the materiality of the identified fact issues. Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 634 (5th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is required if the movant establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof. See Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir.2005). Once an official pleads the defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified immunity, id., but all inferences are drawn in his favor.

The qualified immunity defense has two prongs: whether an official's conduct violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff; and whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir.2009). A court may rely on either prong of the defense in its analysis. Id.

If the defendant's actions violated a clearly established constitutional right, the court then asks whether qualified immunity is still appropriate because the defendant's actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of “law which was clearly established at the time of the disputed action.” Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (5th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). Whether an official's conduct was objectively reasonable is a question of law for the court, not a matter of fact for the jury. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1999). To be clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.2008). The unlawfulness of the defendant's actions must have been readily apparent from sufficiently similar situations, but it is not necessary that the defendant's exact act have been illegal. Id. at 236-37. An official's actions must be judged in light of the circumstances that confronted him, without the benefit of hindsight. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In essence, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that no reasonable officer could have believed his actions were proper. Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994).

III. DISCUSSION

As a pretrial detainee, Jason Brown had a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right not to be denied, by deliberate indifference, attention to his serious medical needs. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc). Whether Dr. Bolin, jail nurses, or other staff violated Brown's rights is not before us; the Browns' case against Dr. Bolin and Nurse Kracja, awaits trial pending the outcome of this appeal, and we express no opinion on its merits. Sheriff Callahan had no knowledge of and did not participate in the events surrounding Brown's fatal period of detention. Thus, the Sheriff can only be held liable in his capacity as a supervisor of the jail for his own unconstitutional conduct. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (no respondeat superior liability of supervisors).

The Browns have alleged two theories of supervisory liability, which, being founded on the same facts, may be discussed

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together. Mirroring the requirements in this circuit, they contend first that Callahan failed to train or supervise Dr. Bolin and the jail staff; that a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the unconstitutional denial of medical care to Jason; and his failure to train or...