623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980), 79-1551, Pinneke v. Preisser

Docket Nº:79-1551.
Citation:623 F.2d 546
Party Name:Verna PINNEKE, Appellee, v. Victor PREISSER, Commissioner of Iowa Department of Social Services, and Monica Murray, Director of the Cerro Gordo County Department of Social Services, Individually and in their Official Capacities, Appellants.
Case Date:June 27, 1980
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Page 546

623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980)

Verna PINNEKE, Appellee,

v.

Victor PREISSER, Commissioner of Iowa Department of Social

Services, and Monica Murray, Director of the Cerro Gordo

County Department of Social Services, Individually and in

their Official Capacities, Appellants.

No. 79-1551.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

June 27, 1980

Submitted Feb. 12, 1980.

Page 547

Stephen C. Robinson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Des Moines, Iowa (argued), Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, on brief, for appellant.

Dennis L. Groenenboom, Legal Services Corporation of Iowa, Mason City, Iowa, for appellee.

Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellants are state and local officials in charge of administering the State of Iowa's Medicaid program. They appeal from the District Court's 1 order requiring them to reimburse Appellee-Plaintiff Pinneke $3,024.52 for her expenses incurred for sex reassignment surgery and awarding her $500 as compensation for mental anguish and suffering resulting from the wrongful denial of benefits, together with attorney fees. Appellate jurisdiction rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). We affirm.

Pinneke began life as a male, but quickly became uncomfortable with the male gender identity. After extensive testing, doctors concluded that she had a transsexual personality, and required sex reassignment surgery. She underwent sex reassignment surgery on April 20, 1976. As a Supplemental Security Income recipient, Pinneke was eligible for benefits under the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). She applied for funding of her sex reassignment surgery under the Medicaid program, but the Cerro Gordo County office of the Iowa Department of Social Services refused funding. The Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Social Services affirmed this decision on the basis that the State of Iowa's Medicaid plan specifically excludes coverage for sex reassignment surgery. Pinneke then filed this suit seeking remedial injunctive and declaratory relief from the denial of her constitutional rights to equal protection and due process and her statutory right to Medicaid benefits.

On May 11, 1979, the District Court declared that the policy of denying Medicaid benefits for sex reassignment surgery where it is a medical necessity for treatment of transsexualism is contrary to the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976), and therefore violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. It declared the relevant parts of the Iowa State Plan void, and permanently enjoined the administration and enforcement of the Iowa Medicaid program in a manner to deny benefits for medically necessary care and treatment incident to sex reassignment surgery or subsequent corrective surgery.

Preliminarily, appellants argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), requires dismissal of the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction. Chapman held that supremacy clause claims challenging the validity of state welfare regulations

Page 548

because of conflict with the Social Security Act do not fall within the ambit of the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).

In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a federal court may hear a pendent claim based on the Social Security Act when a substantial constitutional claim is also presented. In his concurring opinion in Chapman, Mr. Justice White observed that the Chapman majority did not question the continuing validity of Hagans, 441 U.S. at 661 n.33, 99 S.Ct. at 1915 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). The dissenters in Chapman noted that "even a welfare recipient with a federal statutory claim may sue in a federal court if his lawyer can link this claim to a substantial constitutional contention. And under the standard of substantiality established by Hagans v. Lavine, supra, such a constitutional claim would not be hard to construct." Id. at 675, 99 S.Ct. at 1946. (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Herweg v. Ray, 619 F.2d 1265, at 1269 (8th Cir. 1980); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, at 166-168 (8th Cir. 1980).

The District Court found that by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3) and (4) it had jurisdiction over Pinneke's complaint raising issues arising under the equal protection, due process, and supremacy clauses of the Constitution. This determination, filed a few days before the Chapman decision, is incorrect in holding that the supremacy clause allegation could provide jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976), but the Chapman decision does not detract from the District Court's finding that section 1343 encompasses jurisdiction of the claims regarding equal protection and due process. It is irrelevant that the District Court did not reach the merit of these claims. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1382, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). Appellants' jurisdictional challenge is rejected.

On the merits of the claim, appellants assert that Congress conferred upon the states considerable latitude and discretion in shaping their medical assistance programs under Title XIX, and that the State of Iowa has properly exercised this discretion to formulate an irrebuttable presumption that treatment of transsexualism by alteration of healthy tissue cannot be considered "medically necessary." 2 Appellants apparently concede that Pinneke suffers from transsexualism, but contend that the state may make an irrebuttable presumption prohibiting a certain manner of treatment, even though...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP