623 F.Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1985), 84-41-CIV-7, E.E.O.C. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.

• Docket Number: 84-41-CIV-7.
• Citation: 623 F.Supp. 15
• Date: 17 May 1985
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. E.I. DuPONT de NEMOURS & COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

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623 F.Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1985)

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,

v.

E.I. DuPONT de NEMOURS & COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 84-41-CIV-7.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Wilmington Division. .

May 17, 1985

Humphrey S. Cummings, Michael H. McGee, E.E.O.C., Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff.

A. Bruce Clarke, Gardner G. Courson, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Raleigh, N.C., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

ORDER

BRITT, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], brings this action on behalf of Reverend Carl M. Reaves against Reaves' former employer, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company [DuPont], alleging that DuPont discriminated against Reaves on the basis of his religious beliefs and practices, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). More particularly, plaintiff contends that defendant failed to reasonably accommodate Reaves' religious practices to the extent that it would not place an undue hardship on the conduct of its business, as it was required to do. Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979). See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982).

This matter is now before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant claims that summary judgment is appropriate for two reasons: (1) the undisputed facts in this case establish as a matter of law that DuPont "reasonably accommodated" Reverend Reaves' religious practices and that further accommodation would have placed undue hardship on its business; and (2) the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) and its interpretative guidelines are unconstitutional.

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I. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship.

Defendant has set forth at great length for the court the circumstances surrounding Reaves' discharge. Although many material facts are undisputed, the court finds that genuine issues of material fact still remain in dispute. In particular, the parties disagree about whether there were further "reasonable accommodations" which could have been made without undue hardship to the employer. Resolution of this issue is a material factual question which the court must decide upon the basis of evidence presented.

II. Unconstitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Defendant also argues that summary judgment should be granted because the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) and its interpretative guidelines are unconstitutional. Defendant contends that (1) section 2000e(j) violates the first amendment's prohibition against governmental establishment of religion; (2) the EEOC interpretative guidelines for section 2000e(j), 29 C.F.R. §§ 1605.1-1605.3, also represent an unconstitutional attempt by the government to establish religion; and (3) the EEOC interpretative guideline embodied in 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) is unconstitutionally vague.

Every appellate court which has considered the constitutionality of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) has held that it does not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc., 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982); Nottleson v. Smith Steel Workers, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046, 102 S.Ct. 587, 70 L.Ed.2d 488 (1982)...